RE: [address-policy-wg] Re: [anti-spam-wg] Fwd: Re: Re: NCC#2007083003 Fwd: DELIVERY FAILURE:

  • To: address-policy-wg@localhost, anti-spam-wg@localhost
  • From: Jørgen Hovland jorgen@localhost
  • Date: Thu, 13 Sep 2007 10:15:18 +0200

I'm not sure if you have thought through your idea very thoughtfully, Mr Brown. The internet changes every second. It is more or less impossible to maintain proper information in ripe objects for end-users. An IP address can belong to customer A for 1 minute and then be taken over by customer B 5 seconds later in our net. If you want to contact the end-user directly, the RIPE whois server is not sufficient in the current state of today. 
Just keep contacting the ISP instead..

j


-----Original Message-----
From: address-policy-wg-admin@localhost [
] On Behalf Of der Mouse Sent: 24. august 2007 20:55 To: apwg-chairs@localhost address-policy-wg@localhost anti-spam-wg@localhost Subject: [address-policy-wg] Re: [anti-spam-wg] Fwd: Re: Re: NCC#2007083003 Fwd: DELIVERY FAILURE: > I Matthew Brown, would like to request that there be some sort of > action, to allow the ripe database managers to contact ISP(s) when > someone reports incorrect or outdated information. Good luck - and I mean that; I hope you succeed, though at this point I don't really expect it. I've gone a few rounds with RIPE myself on that issue; they appear to want the authority of "owning" (and being paid for the subdelegation of) address space without the concomitant responsibility. Not surprising, of course; lots of people would rather pocket the money and duck the responsibility. The real problem is that ICANN/IANA lets them get away with it, and I see that (that the top of the governance pyramid does not impose responsibility on those to whom it delegates authority - and I don't mean just RIRs; the same problem recurs with domains) as the fundamental problem that is killing today's net with abusers and abuses. Any system with mismatches between authority and responsibility grows abuses, until one of three things happens: (1) the mismatch is corrected, (2) the system collapses, or (3) in mild cases, an equilibrium is reached, with the level of abuse concomitant with the level of mismatches. In the case of Internet governance, the mismatch appears to be total, so (3) is out, and there appears to be no will whatever to do (1), so I expect the abuses to simply grow until the net collapses from them. The only reason I'm not just standing back and watching it happen is that I'd like to have a usable Internet myself in the near term - during the time it would take for the current system to collapse and shake out something less broken. /~\ The ASCII der Mouse \ / Ribbon Campaign X Against HTML mouse@localhost / \ Email! 7D C8 61 52 5D E7 2D 39 4E F1 31 3E E8 B3 27 4B