Re: [mat-wg] Live Egyptian Internet Incident Analysis
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To: Daniel Karrenberg <daniel.karrenberg@localhost
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From: "Richard L. Barnes" rbarnes@localhost
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Date: Mon, 31 Jan 2011 09:55:38 -0500
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Cc: Randy Bush randy@localhost, Mark Dranse markd@localhost, mat-wg@localhost
It also seems like there are some things to learn here about how complex a
network (or collection of networks) can be subject to this sort of shut-down.
Iljitsch over at Ars Technica, for instance, is making the claiming that the
more complex technical environment (not *legal*) in some other countries could
make this harder.
<http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011/01/how-egypt-or-how-your-government-could-shut-down-the-internet.ars>
I haven't thought about exactly what they would be, but it seems like there are
some measurements that could be done to back up this claim, i.e., to evaluate
the "shut-down-ability" of a national infrastructure, or conversely, its
robustness. Things like diversity of connectivity across providers and
physical interconnection points come to mind.
--Richard
On Jan 31, 2011, at 7:19 AM, Daniel Karrenberg wrote:
> About what we are doing:
>
> There is much mis-information and conjecture going on. Therefore it is
> important to get measurable facts out there in real time. We are being
> careful with analysis and conscious about not causing further breakage.
> But there is value in documenting the facts.
>
> About ISOC:
>
> It is ISOC's role to make policy statements supporting "The Internet is
> for Everyone!" and as an ISOC trustee I fully support that.
>
> About what the RIRs could do:
>
> I am not sure if it would be appropriate for the RIPE NCC to make policy
> statements on this issue. What would be the legitimacy of such
> statements? What would they do to the neutrality of the RIPE NCC?
>
> RIPE making a statement is an entirely different matter. That process
> is best started by enlisting support among the RIPE community, on the
> RIPE list and by talking to the chair.
>
> Daniel
>
