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Re: [mat-wg] Live Egyptian Internet Incident Analysis

  • To: Daniel Karrenberg <daniel.karrenberg@localhost
  • From: "Richard L. Barnes" rbarnes@localhost
  • Date: Mon, 31 Jan 2011 09:55:38 -0500
  • Cc: Randy Bush randy@localhost, Mark Dranse markd@localhost, mat-wg@localhost

It also seems like there are some things to learn here about how complex a 
network (or collection of networks) can be subject to this sort of shut-down.  
Iljitsch over at Ars Technica, for instance, is making the claiming that the 
more complex technical environment (not *legal*) in some other countries could 
make this harder.

I haven't thought about exactly what they would be, but it seems like there are 
some measurements that could be done to back up this claim, i.e., to evaluate 
the "shut-down-ability" of a national infrastructure, or conversely, its 
robustness.  Things like diversity of connectivity across providers and 
physical interconnection points come to mind.


On Jan 31, 2011, at 7:19 AM, Daniel Karrenberg wrote:

> About what we are doing:
> There is much mis-information and conjecture going on.  Therefore it is
> important to get measurable facts out there in real time.  We are being
> careful with analysis and conscious about not causing further breakage. 
> But there is value in documenting the facts. 
> About ISOC:
> It is ISOC's role to make policy statements supporting "The Internet is 
> for Everyone!" and as an ISOC trustee I fully support that. 
> About what the RIRs could do:
> I am not sure if it would be appropriate for the RIPE NCC to make policy
> statements on this issue.  What would be the legitimacy of such
> statements?  What would they do to the neutrality of the RIPE NCC? 
> RIPE making a statement is an entirely different matter.  That process
> is best started by enlisting support among the RIPE community, on the
> RIPE list and by talking to the chair. 
> Daniel