[routing-wg] RPKI Route Origin Validation and AS3333

On 19/03/2021 10:06, Ben Maddison via routing-wg wrote:
> Hi Nathalie,
> 
> On 03/18, Nathalie Trenaman wrote:
>> Dear Colleagues, Working Group,
>>
>> As discussed previously in this mailing list, some community members
>> expressed that they would like to see the RIPE NCC perform Route
>> Origin Validation on AS3333. We decided to ask the community for
>> advice and guidance on how we should proceed.
>>
>> What is Route Origin Validation?  Route Origin Validation is a
>> mechanism by which route advertisements can be authenticated as
>> originating from an expected autonomous system (AS).  The best current
>> practice is to drop RPKI invalid BGP announcements. These are
>> announcements that conflict with the statement as described in a Route
>> Origin Authorization (ROA).
>>
> I believe that you have hit the nail on the head here: dropping ROV
> Invalids has (IMO) now become the best practice for operators of all
> sizes. It is no longer some experimental technique for academics and
> people that live at the bleeding edge.
> 
> We wouldn't have the same debate about dropping martians, right?

I am not sure it is possible, but I would love to see some centralized 
site where all dropped ROV invalids would appear.  This way I can see if 
I have a problem as well as if someone tried to hijack my space but was 
thwarted by the drop.

Regards,
Hank

Caveat: The views expressed above are solely my own and do not express 
the views or opinions of my employer