From lorenzo at ripe.net Tue Mar 1 19:49:50 2005 From: lorenzo at ripe.net (Lorenzo Colitti) Date: Tue, 01 Mar 2005 19:49:50 +0100 Subject: Heads up: Long AS-sets announced in the next few days Message-ID: <4224B94E.7040404@ripe.net> Hi, as announced to the RIPE routing working group mailing list [1] and elsewhere, over the next few days the Computer Networks research group at Roma Tre University, in collaboration with the RIPE NCC RIS project, will be performing experiments involving announcements with large AS-sets in the AS-path. We are doing this to test innovative network discovery methodologies we developed to allow ISPs to determine how their prefixes are seen by the rest of the Internet. The announcements will be for prefixes 84.205.73.0/24 and 84.205.89.0/24 and will originate in AS12654. We have been performing similar experiments over IPv6, in collaboration with the NAMEX internet exchange, since December 2004 with no ill effects; furthermore, our announcements are standard BGP, so conformant implementations should be able to process them, and very long AS-sets have already been observed in the past (e.g. [2], [3]). However, we want to be careful to avoid router bugs on legacy devices, old firmware versions and the like, so we are first sending out test announcements with progressively longer AS-sets. Should you encounter a problem with these advertisements, please let us know and we will withdraw them. The proposed timetable of the test announcements is as follows. 2005-03-04: 14:00 UTC: 10-element AS-set 14:30 UTC: withdrawal 16:00 UTC: 25-element AS-set 16:30 UTC: withdrawal and, if there are no problems: 2005-03-07: 14:00 UTC: 50-element AS-set 14:30 UTC: withdrawal 16:00 UTC: 100-element AS-set 16:30 UTC: withdrawal Note: For reference, the AS-sets already observed in [2] and [3] contained 123 and 124 ASes respectively. For questions/comments, please contact compunet at dia.uniroma3.it or lorenzo at ripe.net. Regards, Lorenzo Colitti On behalf of the Roma Tre Computer Networks Research group [1] http://www.ripe.net/ripe/maillists/archives/routing-wg/2005/msg00021.html [2] http://www.ripe.net/projects/ris/Talks/0101_RIPE38_AA/sld003.html [3] http://www.ripe.net/maillists/ncc-archives/ris-users/2002/msg00044.html From gert at space.net Tue Mar 1 21:11:57 2005 From: gert at space.net (Gert Doering) Date: Tue, 1 Mar 2005 21:11:57 +0100 Subject: Heads up: Long AS-sets announced in the next few days In-Reply-To: <4224B94E.7040404@ripe.net> References: <4224B94E.7040404@ripe.net> Message-ID: <20050301201157.GE84850@Space.Net> Hi, On Tue, Mar 01, 2005 at 07:49:50PM +0100, Lorenzo Colitti wrote: > The proposed timetable of the test announcements is as follows. > > 2005-03-04: > 14:00 UTC: 10-element AS-set > 14:30 UTC: withdrawal > 16:00 UTC: 25-element AS-set > 16:30 UTC: withdrawal Please do not announce AS-sets that contain 5539. We are not part of your experiment, and we don't want to see our AS appear in other people's router error messages. Gert Doering -- NetMaster -- Total number of prefixes smaller than registry allocations: 71007 (66629) SpaceNet AG Mail: netmaster at Space.Net Joseph-Dollinger-Bogen 14 Tel : +49-89-32356-0 D- 80807 Muenchen Fax : +49-89-32356-234 From lorenzo at ripe.net Wed Mar 2 18:36:19 2005 From: lorenzo at ripe.net (Lorenzo Colitti) Date: Wed, 02 Mar 2005 18:36:19 +0100 Subject: Heads up: Long AS-sets announced in the next few days In-Reply-To: <20050301201157.GE84850@Space.Net> References: <4224B94E.7040404@ripe.net> <20050301201157.GE84850@Space.Net> Message-ID: <4225F993.7080703@ripe.net> Gert Doering wrote: >>2005-03-04: >> 14:00 UTC: 10-element AS-set >> 14:30 UTC: withdrawal >> 16:00 UTC: 25-element AS-set >> 16:30 UTC: withdrawal > > Please do not announce AS-sets that contain 5539. We are not part of > your experiment, and we don't want to see our AS appear in other people's > router error messages. Ok, no problem: we will not include AS 5539 in any of the AS-sets we announce. Regards, Lorenzo From lorenzo at ripe.net Wed Mar 2 20:35:20 2005 From: lorenzo at ripe.net (Lorenzo Colitti) Date: Wed, 02 Mar 2005 20:35:20 +0100 Subject: Heads up: Long AS-sets announced in the next few days In-Reply-To: References: <4224B94E.7040404@ripe.net> <20050301201157.GE84850@Space.Net> <4225F993.7080703@ripe.net> Message-ID: <42261578.2090005@ripe.net> James A. T. Rice wrote: > This seems to suggest that you are just picking ASns at random to inject > into the paths, and that you don't have a set of ASs which you have the > assignees permission to use. > > In which case please keep AS8330, AS8550, and AS8943 out of your > experiments too. > > Using not yet allocated ASns out of RIPEs asn-blocks would have been > more sensible, IMHO. James, we are not picking ASes at random. The AS-set announcements are part of new techniques we are developing for ISPs who wish to discover how their prefixes are seen by the rest of the Internet. We believe this will come to be a useful tool for operators. However, since this is still work in progress, and in scientific research there is no room for second place, I can't really reveal any more than that at the moment. I would like to point out, though, that our research group does have a proven track record in the field network discovery (examples available on request), and has created software useful to the operator community such as BGPlay [1][2]. That said, if you want us to exclude those ASes from our AS-sets, then we will do so. Regards, Lorenzo [1] http://www.ris.ripe.net/bgplay/ [2] http://bgplay.routeviews.org/bgplay/ From lorenzo at ripe.net Thu Mar 3 02:23:55 2005 From: lorenzo at ripe.net (Lorenzo Colitti) Date: Thu, 03 Mar 2005 02:23:55 +0100 Subject: Heads up: Long AS-sets announced in the next few days In-Reply-To: References: <4224B94E.7040404@ripe.net> <20050301201157.GE84850@Space.Net> <4225F993.7080703@ripe.net> <42261578.2090005@ripe.net> Message-ID: <4226672B.8020109@ripe.net> James A. T. Rice wrote: > So, the ASn's are not picked at random, yet mine might be included if I > don't specifically ask for them not to be included, yet you decline to > tell how my ASn might have been selected for this. Ok, I realize I might have given the wrong impression here. Sorry. So here's what we are doing: by artificially inserting ASes into the AS-set of an announcement, the ISP that makes the announcement can control where the announcement is propagated and thus discover paths followed by its announcements that are not usually visible, giving it a more complete knowledge of network topology in the vicinity. Since this is a new technique, it's not clear if it is actually effective, and to measure this we need to test it in the real world. If the experiments show that the technique performs as we hope, we intend to publish the results and provide the details for public use. We will post appropriate references to this list as soon as we have some hard data and have put it into a presentable form. But first we need to do the experiments... Regards, Lorenzo From henk at ripe.net Thu Mar 3 07:58:18 2005 From: henk at ripe.net (Henk Uijterwaal) Date: Thu, 03 Mar 2005 07:58:18 +0100 Subject: CANCELLED (Heads up: Long AS-sets announced in the next few days) In-Reply-To: <4226672B.8020109@ripe.net> References: <4224B94E.7040404@ripe.net> <20050301201157.GE84850@Space.Net> <4225F993.7080703@ripe.net> <42261578.2090005@ripe.net> <4226672B.8020109@ripe.net> Message-ID: <6.2.0.14.2.20050303074930.02be3100@localhost> Dear All, > But first we need to do the experiments... Given the large number of complaints on the various lists, I have decided to cancel this experiment for the time being. We may reschedule it at a later date, but only after we have posted a list of AS# to be used and given people a chance to opt-out beforehand. How exactly we are going to do this, has not been decided. As the RIPE NCC, we place great value in the support that you have given to our measurement experiments over the last years. I do not want to be responsible for destroying that trust with an experiment that may affect the reachability of 100+ AS's for a few hours during office hours. In Lorenzo's defence, I have to say that he is a very enthousiastic student who has been doing great stuff in the routing area. On this occasion, he became a bit overenthousiastic though. Henk ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Henk Uijterwaal Email: henk.uijterwaal(at)ripe.net RIPE Network Coordination Centre http://www.amsterdamned.org/~henk P.O.Box 10096 Singel 258 Phone: +31.20.5354414 1001 EB Amsterdam 1016 AB Amsterdam Fax: +31.20.5354445 The Netherlands The Netherlands Mobile: +31.6.55861746 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Look here junior, don't you be so happy. And for Heaven's sake, don't you be so sad. (Tom Verlaine) From james_r-ripelist at jump.org.uk Wed Mar 2 02:27:31 2005 From: james_r-ripelist at jump.org.uk (James A. T. Rice) Date: Wed, 2 Mar 2005 01:27:31 +0000 (GMT) Subject: Heads up: Long AS-sets announced in the next few days In-Reply-To: <4224B94E.7040404@ripe.net> References: <4224B94E.7040404@ripe.net> Message-ID: What exactly are you attempting to do here? Those announcements will get dropped on the floor at least in this AS right away: route-map peers-in deny 5 match as-path 109 ip as-path access-list 109 permit ^[0-9]+_[0-9]+_[0-9]+_[0-9]+_[0-9]+_[0-9]+_[0-9]+_[0-9]+_[0-9]+_[0-9]+ How does announcing ridiculously long as-paths help anyone, if anything we should be educating people that childishly long chains of prepends will not do what they want (presumably make more of a difference in traffic flows, which isn't going to work beyond a small number of prepends, as whats left is people localpreffing). James On Tue, 1 Mar 2005, Lorenzo Colitti wrote: > Hi, > > as announced to the RIPE routing working group mailing list [1] and > elsewhere, over the next few days the Computer Networks research group at > Roma Tre University, in collaboration with the RIPE NCC RIS project, will be > performing experiments involving announcements with large AS-sets in the > AS-path. We are doing this to test innovative network discovery methodologies > we developed to allow ISPs to determine how their prefixes are seen by the > rest of the Internet. The announcements will be for prefixes 84.205.73.0/24 > and 84.205.89.0/24 and will originate in AS12654. > > We have been performing similar experiments over IPv6, in collaboration with > the NAMEX internet exchange, since December 2004 with no ill effects; > furthermore, our announcements are standard BGP, so conformant > implementations should be able to process them, and very long AS-sets have > already been observed in the past (e.g. [2], [3]). However, we want to be > careful to avoid router bugs on legacy devices, old firmware versions and the > like, so we are first sending out test announcements with progressively > longer AS-sets. Should you encounter a problem with these advertisements, > please let us know and we will withdraw them. > > The proposed timetable of the test announcements is as follows. > > 2005-03-04: > 14:00 UTC: 10-element AS-set > 14:30 UTC: withdrawal > 16:00 UTC: 25-element AS-set > 16:30 UTC: withdrawal > > and, if there are no problems: > > 2005-03-07: > 14:00 UTC: 50-element AS-set > 14:30 UTC: withdrawal > 16:00 UTC: 100-element AS-set > 16:30 UTC: withdrawal > > Note: For reference, the AS-sets already observed in [2] and [3] contained > 123 and 124 ASes respectively. > > > For questions/comments, please contact compunet at dia.uniroma3.it or > lorenzo at ripe.net. > > > Regards, > Lorenzo Colitti > On behalf of the Roma Tre Computer Networks Research group > > [1] http://www.ripe.net/ripe/maillists/archives/routing-wg/2005/msg00021.html > [2] http://www.ripe.net/projects/ris/Talks/0101_RIPE38_AA/sld003.html > [3] http://www.ripe.net/maillists/ncc-archives/ris-users/2002/msg00044.html > > From james_r-ripelist at jump.org.uk Wed Mar 2 19:38:11 2005 From: james_r-ripelist at jump.org.uk (James A. T. Rice) Date: Wed, 2 Mar 2005 18:38:11 +0000 (GMT) Subject: Heads up: Long AS-sets announced in the next few days In-Reply-To: <4225F993.7080703@ripe.net> References: <4224B94E.7040404@ripe.net> <20050301201157.GE84850@Space.Net> <4225F993.7080703@ripe.net> Message-ID: This seems to suggest that you are just picking ASns at random to inject into the paths, and that you don't have a set of ASs which you have the assignees permission to use. In which case please keep AS8330, AS8550, and AS8943 out of your experiments too. Using not yet allocated ASns out of RIPEs asn-blocks would have been more sensible, IMHO. Regards James On Wed, 2 Mar 2005, Lorenzo Colitti wrote: > Gert Doering wrote: >>> 2005-03-04: >>> 14:00 UTC: 10-element AS-set >>> 14:30 UTC: withdrawal >>> 16:00 UTC: 25-element AS-set >>> 16:30 UTC: withdrawal >> >> Please do not announce AS-sets that contain 5539. We are not part of >> your experiment, and we don't want to see our AS appear in other people's >> router error messages. > > Ok, no problem: we will not include AS 5539 in any of the AS-sets we > announce. > > > Regards, > Lorenzo > > From kurtis at kurtis.pp.se Wed Mar 2 20:00:51 2005 From: kurtis at kurtis.pp.se (Kurt Erik Lindqvist) Date: Wed, 2 Mar 2005 20:00:51 +0100 Subject: Heads up: Long AS-sets announced in the next few days In-Reply-To: References: <4224B94E.7040404@ripe.net> <20050301201157.GE84850@Space.Net> <4225F993.7080703@ripe.net> Message-ID: <45a7dcf4ed6d4a7bfb02e9dab3ac66ed@kurtis.pp.se> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 2005-03-02, at 19.38, James A. T. Rice wrote: > This seems to suggest that you are just picking ASns at random to > inject into the paths, and that you don't have a set of ASs which you > have the assignees permission to use. Would't this then actually equate to resource hijacking along the lines of prefix hijacking? Who will be the first to hit the RIRs? - - kurtis - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP 8.1 iQA/AwUBQiYNZ6arNKXTPFCVEQL/sgCdHCBV87HM9jIgNATJhpW5aON/1TwAniAR i1p06marP5ra05ey9YcxX90f =W+rc -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From Michael.Hallgren at teleglobe.ca Wed Mar 2 20:54:34 2005 From: Michael.Hallgren at teleglobe.ca (Hallgren, Michael) Date: Wed, 2 Mar 2005 14:54:34 -0500 Subject: Heads up: Long AS-sets announced in the next few days Message-ID: <1797AB680DD0D211898700902717803217337C11@camtmms01.Teleglobe.CA> Idem 6453. Thanks ;) mh > -----Message d'origine----- > De : James A. T. Rice [mailto:james_r-ripelist at jump.org.uk] > Envoy? : mercredi 2 mars 2005 13:38 > ? : Lorenzo Colitti > Cc : Gert Doering; nanog at merit.edu; routing-wg at ripe.net; > ris-users at ripe.net; compunet at dia.uniroma3.it > Objet : Re: Heads up: Long AS-sets announced in the next few days > > > This seems to suggest that you are just picking ASns at > random to inject > into the paths, and that you don't have a set of ASs which > you have the > assignees permission to use. > > In which case please keep AS8330, AS8550, and AS8943 out of your > experiments too. > > Using not yet allocated ASns out of RIPEs asn-blocks would > have been more > sensible, IMHO. > > Regards > James > > On Wed, 2 Mar 2005, Lorenzo Colitti wrote: > > > Gert Doering wrote: > >>> 2005-03-04: > >>> 14:00 UTC: 10-element AS-set > >>> 14:30 UTC: withdrawal > >>> 16:00 UTC: 25-element AS-set > >>> 16:30 UTC: withdrawal > >> > >> Please do not announce AS-sets that contain 5539. We are > not part of > >> your experiment, and we don't want to see our AS appear in > other people's > >> router error messages. > > > > Ok, no problem: we will not include AS 5539 in any of the > AS-sets we > > announce. > > > > > > Regards, > > Lorenzo > > > > > > -- > Internal Virus Database is out-of-date. > Checked by AVG Anti-Virus. > Version: 7.0.300 / Virus Database: 266.4.0 - Release Date: 2005-02-22 > > -- Internal Virus Database is out-of-date. Checked by AVG Anti-Virus. Version: 7.0.300 / Virus Database: 266.4.0 - Release Date: 2005-02-22 From james_r-ripelist at jump.org.uk Wed Mar 2 22:00:35 2005 From: james_r-ripelist at jump.org.uk (James A. T. Rice) Date: Wed, 2 Mar 2005 21:00:35 +0000 (GMT) Subject: Heads up: Long AS-sets announced in the next few days In-Reply-To: <42261578.2090005@ripe.net> References: <4224B94E.7040404@ripe.net> <20050301201157.GE84850@Space.Net> <4225F993.7080703@ripe.net> <42261578.2090005@ripe.net> Message-ID: > we are not picking ASes at random. The AS-set announcements are part of new > techniques we are developing for ISPs who wish to discover how their prefixes > are seen by the rest of the Internet. We believe this will come to be a > useful tool for operators. > > However, since this is still work in progress, and in scientific research > there is no room for second place, I can't really reveal any more than that > at the moment. > > I would like to point out, though, that our research group does have a proven > track record in the field network discovery (examples available on request), > and has created software useful to the operator community such as BGPlay > [1][2]. > > That said, if you want us to exclude those ASes from our AS-sets, then we > will do so. So, the ASn's are not picked at random, yet mine might be included if I don't specifically ask for them not to be included, yet you decline to tell how my ASn might have been selected for this. So, yes, please do keep my ASns out of this cloak and dagger research. I would have thought it prudent to seek permission from the particular ASn operators before even considering using them for this experiment. Regards James PS, curious if AS7007 is part of your set of selected ASns, however they may have been selected. From james_r-ripelist at jump.org.uk Thu Mar 3 05:36:23 2005 From: james_r-ripelist at jump.org.uk (James A. T. Rice) Date: Thu, 3 Mar 2005 04:36:23 +0000 (GMT) Subject: Heads up: Long AS-sets announced in the next few days In-Reply-To: <4226672B.8020109@ripe.net> References: <4224B94E.7040404@ripe.net> <20050301201157.GE84850@Space.Net> <4225F993.7080703@ripe.net> <42261578.2090005@ripe.net> <4226672B.8020109@ripe.net> Message-ID: On Thu, 3 Mar 2005, Lorenzo Colitti wrote: > Ok, I realize I might have given the wrong impression here. Sorry. > > So here's what we are doing: by artificially inserting ASes into the > AS-set of an announcement, the ISP that makes the announcement can > control where the announcement is propagated and thus discover paths > followed by its announcements that are not usually visible, giving it a > more complete knowledge of network topology in the vicinity. > > Since this is a new technique, it's not clear if it is actually > effective, and to measure this we need to test it in the real world. If > the experiments show that the technique performs as we hope, we intend > to publish the results and provide the details for public use. > > We will post appropriate references to this list as soon as we have some > hard data and have put it into a presentable form. But first we need to > do the experiments... Hi Lorenzo, Its a basic design function to keep the net loop free, of BGP to not accept a route with the routers own ASn in the path from an external peer. You appear to be trying to take advantage of a side effect of this behaviour, in order to see what other ASn transitive adjacancies are available that would not normally be used, by inserting the ASns of transit AS's that would normally be used, into the as path you are announcing. I'm sure this was never an intended use for BGP as paths (or as sets, but that could be confused with the as-set object in the ripe database, which is something different, so i'll say as-paths). More to the point, you are breaking a very fundemenatal convention and expectation that if you see a given ASn in an as path, that route will have transited that given ASn. As such, inserting others ASns into an as path is about as helpful to debugging as policy routing all your ICMP traffic to a box running fakeroute! There are various 'better than regular bgp bestpath' platforms out there, such as those internap implements, routescience, sockeye, netvmg.. Are you certain that these products do not take into account the amount of churn of a given ASn? By inserting operators ASns into announcements for your research, you are artifically increasing the amount of churn seen for their ASn. I note from your initial email "The announcements will be for prefixes 84.205.73.0/24 and 84.205.89.0/24 and will originate in AS12654." I'd like to point you at https://www.ripe.net/ripe/docs/smallest-alloc-sizes.html and note that the smallest allocation from 84/8 is a /21, so by doing your announcements with /24s, you are probably going to hit some operators prefix length filters, thus tainting your results. You might be better off with some swamp space, which will be accepted globally as /24s. Sorry to be a wet blanket, but I think inserting other operators ASns without their permission is lunacy. I'm also concerned that this might lead to a convention where inserting other operators ASns into a path becomes more seen as 'acceptable', whereas it is currently regarded as a big 'no no'. And I suspect that prefix length filtering on your /24s from /21 space is going to taint the results anyway. Regards James From neil at DOMINO.ORG Thu Mar 3 09:26:15 2005 From: neil at DOMINO.ORG (Neil J. McRae) Date: Thu, 3 Mar 2005 08:26:15 -0000 Subject: Heads up: Long AS-sets announced in the next few days In-Reply-To: <42261578.2090005@ripe.net> Message-ID: <20050303082612.D12F8398C2@equinox.DOMINO.ORG> Please exclude AS8220. Regards, Neil. > -----Original Message----- > From: owner-nanog at merit.edu [mailto:owner-nanog at merit.edu] On > Behalf Of Lorenzo Colitti > Sent: 02 March 2005 19:35 > To: James A. T. Rice > Cc: Gert Doering; nanog at merit.edu; routing-wg at ripe.net; > ris-users at ripe.net; compunet at dia.uniroma3.it > Subject: Re: Heads up: Long AS-sets announced in the next few days > > > James A. T. Rice wrote: > > This seems to suggest that you are just picking ASns at random to > > inject into the paths, and that you don't have a set of ASs > which you > > have the assignees permission to use. > > > > In which case please keep AS8330, AS8550, and AS8943 out of your > > experiments too. > > > > Using not yet allocated ASns out of RIPEs asn-blocks would > have been > > more sensible, IMHO. > > James, > > we are not picking ASes at random. The AS-set announcements > are part of new techniques we are developing for ISPs who > wish to discover how their prefixes are seen by the rest of > the Internet. We believe this will come to be a useful tool > for operators. > > However, since this is still work in progress, and in > scientific research there is no room for second place, I > can't really reveal any more than that at the moment. > > I would like to point out, though, that our research group > does have a proven track record in the field network > discovery (examples available on request), and has created > software useful to the operator community such as BGPlay [1][2]. > > That said, if you want us to exclude those ASes from our > AS-sets, then we will do so. > > > > Regards, > Lorenzo > > [1] http://www.ris.ripe.net/bgplay/ > [2] http://bgplay.routeviews.org/bgplay/ > From gih at apnic.net Thu Mar 3 10:27:57 2005 From: gih at apnic.net (Geoff Huston) Date: Thu, 03 Mar 2005 20:27:57 +1100 Subject: Heads up: Long AS-sets announced in the next few days In-Reply-To: <45a7dcf4ed6d4a7bfb02e9dab3ac66ed@kurtis.pp.se> References: <4224B94E.7040404@ripe.net> <20050301201157.GE84850@Space.Net> <4225F993.7080703@ripe.net> <45a7dcf4ed6d4a7bfb02e9dab3ac66ed@kurtis.pp.se> Message-ID: <6.0.1.1.2.20050303202606.022c2650@kahuna.telstra.net> >On 2005-03-02, at 19.38, James A. T. Rice wrote: > > > This seems to suggest that you are just picking ASns at random to > > inject into the paths, and that you don't have a set of ASs which you > > have the assignees permission to use. > >Would't this then actually equate to resource hijacking along the lines >of prefix hijacking? Who will be the first to hit the RIRs? Isn't this a case of illustrating how easy it is to tell lies in BGP today? I don't see what hitting the RIRs has do to with this. The problem appears to be more basic than that - its just too easy to tell lies in BGP and get the lies propagated globally. Geoff From marcoh at marcoh.net Thu Mar 3 10:45:32 2005 From: marcoh at marcoh.net (MarcoH) Date: Thu, 3 Mar 2005 10:45:32 +0100 Subject: CANCELLED (Heads up: Long AS-sets announced in the next few days) In-Reply-To: <6.2.0.14.2.20050303074930.02be3100@localhost> References: <4224B94E.7040404@ripe.net> <20050301201157.GE84850@Space.Net> <4225F993.7080703@ripe.net> <42261578.2090005@ripe.net> <4226672B.8020109@ripe.net> <6.2.0.14.2.20050303074930.02be3100@localhost> Message-ID: <20050303094532.GA1097@marcoh.net> On Thu, Mar 03, 2005 at 07:58:18AM +0100, Henk Uijterwaal wrote: > Dear All, > > > But first we need to do the experiments... > > Given the large number of complaints on the various lists, I have decided > to cancel this experiment for the time being. We may reschedule it at > a later date, but only after we have posted a list of AS# to be used > and given people a chance to opt-out beforehand. How exactly we are going > to do this, has not been decided. Henk, Given that not everybody read these lists, although it would be usefull, I would suggest an opt-in model instead of opt-out. Grtx, MarcoH From kurtis at kurtis.pp.se Thu Mar 3 10:53:12 2005 From: kurtis at kurtis.pp.se (Kurt Erik Lindqvist) Date: Thu, 3 Mar 2005 10:53:12 +0100 Subject: Heads up: Long AS-sets announced in the next few days In-Reply-To: <6.0.1.1.2.20050303202606.022c2650@kahuna.telstra.net> References: <4224B94E.7040404@ripe.net> <20050301201157.GE84850@Space.Net> <4225F993.7080703@ripe.net> <45a7dcf4ed6d4a7bfb02e9dab3ac66ed@kurtis.pp.se> <6.0.1.1.2.20050303202606.022c2650@kahuna.telstra.net> Message-ID: <5d21e73566a6cacc7f591fbef61a7ba0@kurtis.pp.se> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 2005-03-03, at 10.27, Geoff Huston wrote: > >> On 2005-03-02, at 19.38, James A. T. Rice wrote: >> >> > This seems to suggest that you are just picking ASns at random to >> > inject into the paths, and that you don't have a set of ASs which >> you >> > have the assignees permission to use. >> >> Would't this then actually equate to resource hijacking along the >> lines >> of prefix hijacking? Who will be the first to hit the RIRs? > > Isn't this a case of illustrating how easy it is to tell lies in BGP > today? I don't > see what hitting the RIRs has do to with this. The problem appears to > be more > basic than that - its just too easy to tell lies in BGP and get the > lies propagated > globally. Well agreed. And that is an important point in itself. The reference to the RIRs was me trying to be ironic as when we have prefix hijacks that seems to be reported to the RIRs. - - kurtis - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP 8.1 iQA/AwUBQibejKarNKXTPFCVEQKO6ACeIzkX5j04JA3RK3Y48fSsXM0DMLEAoM+k 6+j6phNoiKSg5Qai2CNSloLa =TWvV -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From jeroen at unfix.org Thu Mar 3 18:02:09 2005 From: jeroen at unfix.org (Jeroen Massar) Date: Thu, 03 Mar 2005 18:02:09 +0100 Subject: Heads up: Long AS-sets announced in the next few days In-Reply-To: <6.0.1.1.2.20050303202606.022c2650@kahuna.telstra.net> References: <4224B94E.7040404@ripe.net> <20050301201157.GE84850@Space.Net> <4225F993.7080703@ripe.net> <45a7dcf4ed6d4a7bfb02e9dab3ac66ed@kurtis.pp.se> <6.0.1.1.2.20050303202606.022c2650@kahuna.telstra.net> Message-ID: <1109869329.23797.29.camel@firenze.zurich.ibm.com> On Thu, 2005-03-03 at 20:27 +1100, Geoff Huston wrote: >>On 2005-03-02, at 19.38, James A. T. Rice wrote: >> >> > This seems to suggest that you are just picking ASns at random to >> > inject into the paths, and that you don't have a set of ASs which you >> > have the assignees permission to use. >> >>Would't this then actually equate to resource hijacking along the lines >>of prefix hijacking? Who will be the first to hit the RIRs? > >Isn't this a case of illustrating how easy it is to tell lies in BGP today? >I don't >see what hitting the RIRs has do to with this. The problem appears to be more >basic than that - its just too easy to tell lies in BGP and get the lies >propagated globally. I am probably telling you what you already know, but for the ones who don't know it yet: Secure BGP (S-BGP): http://www.ir.bbn.com/projects/s-bgp/ http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0306/pdf/bellovinsbgp.pdf http://www.nwfusion.com/details/6484.html?def and of course the sister by amongst others Cisco: Secure Origin BGP (SO-BGP): http://bgp.potaroo.net/ietf/idref/ draft-ng-sobgp-bgp-extensions/ http://www.nwfusion.com/details/6485.html http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0306/pdf/alvaro.pdf etc... most people know how to google I guess ;) Aka BGP with certificates and other nice tricks. Greets, Jeroen -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 240 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part URL: From jeroen at unfix.org Thu Mar 3 20:19:24 2005 From: jeroen at unfix.org (Jeroen Massar) Date: Thu, 03 Mar 2005 20:19:24 +0100 Subject: Heads up: Long AS-sets announced in the next few days In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1109877564.23797.49.camel@firenze.zurich.ibm.com> On Thu, 2005-03-03 at 13:51 -0500, Blaine Christian wrote: >And, of course, the RPSEC working group draft that is supposed to target the >BGP requirements for those proposed systems is... > >http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-rpsec-bgpsecrec-01.txt > >The folks who worked on S-BGP and SO-BGP participated in it's creation (as >well as several operators). Please note that there are more than just two >proposed mechanisms for securing BGP. The two mentioned above are just the >most popular . Thanks for the new reading material, I had not seen that one yet... *print* will be a nice read (hmmm, actually I should swear at you for even more reading material, for which I have no time, oh well :) Greets, Jeroen -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 240 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part URL: From lorenzo at ripe.net Thu Mar 3 23:51:54 2005 From: lorenzo at ripe.net (Lorenzo Colitti) Date: Thu, 03 Mar 2005 23:51:54 +0100 Subject: Heads up: Long AS-sets announced in the next few days In-Reply-To: References: <4224B94E.7040404@ripe.net> <20050301201157.GE84850@Space.Net> <4225F993.7080703@ripe.net> <42261578.2090005@ripe.net> <4226672B.8020109@ripe.net> Message-ID: <4227950A.1010700@ripe.net> James A. T. Rice wrote: > You appear to be trying to take advantage of a side effect of this > behaviour, in order to see what other ASn transitive adjacancies are > available that would not normally be used, by inserting the ASns of > transit AS's that would normally be used, into the as path you are > announcing. Yes, that's more or less what we are proposing. > I'm sure this was never an intended use for BGP as paths No, obviously not. But many things in the protocols we use today are used in ways that the original authors didn't have in mind. Examples I can think of at the moment are IP-in-IP tunnels, TCP congestion control (bolted on to TCP long after it was first designed), NAT and private addresses, ..., but I'm sure there are many more. So I think a more relevant question than "was this intended", rather "is this useful? If so, does it break existing stuff?" > More to the point, you are breaking a very fundemenatal convention > and expectation that if you see a given ASn in an as path, that route > will have transited that given ASn. That is not true in all cases. RFC 1771, paragraph 5.1.6, says: > A BGP speaker that receives a route with the ATOMIC_AGGREGATE > attribute needs to be cognizant of the fact that the actual path to > destinations, as specified in the NLRI of the route, while having the > loop-free property, may traverse ASs that are not listed in the > AS_PATH attribute. I think that most of the the AS-sets you see announced in the Internet today have this property, and ours are no different: the sequence before the AS-set shows which ASes the announcement has passed through, and the AS-set which ASes the announcement "might have passed through". > As such, inserting others ASns into an as path is about as helpful to > debugging as policy routing all your ICMP traffic to a box running > fakeroute! I don't understand why this should be the case. If you exclude the AS-set, then you get exactly the path that was followed by the announcement. How does that hamper debugging? Regards, Lorenzo From gih at apnic.net Thu Mar 3 19:42:54 2005 From: gih at apnic.net (Geoff Huston) Date: Fri, 04 Mar 2005 05:42:54 +1100 Subject: Heads up: Long AS-sets announced in the next few days In-Reply-To: <1109869329.23797.29.camel@firenze.zurich.ibm.com> References: <4224B94E.7040404@ripe.net> <20050301201157.GE84850@Space.Net> <4225F993.7080703@ripe.net> <45a7dcf4ed6d4a7bfb02e9dab3ac66ed@kurtis.pp.se> <6.0.1.1.2.20050303202606.022c2650@kahuna.telstra.net> <1109869329.23797.29.camel@firenze.zurich.ibm.com> Message-ID: <6.0.1.1.2.20050304053824.02282aa8@kahuna.telstra.net> At 04:02 AM 4/03/2005, Jeroen Massar wrote: >On Thu, 2005-03-03 at 20:27 +1100, Geoff Huston wrote: > >>On 2005-03-02, at 19.38, James A. T. Rice wrote: > >> > >> > This seems to suggest that you are just picking ASns at random to > >> > inject into the paths, and that you don't have a set of ASs which you > >> > have the assignees permission to use. > >> > >>Would't this then actually equate to resource hijacking along the lines > >>of prefix hijacking? Who will be the first to hit the RIRs? > > > >Isn't this a case of illustrating how easy it is to tell lies in BGP today? > >I don't > >see what hitting the RIRs has do to with this. The problem appears to be > more > >basic than that - its just too easy to tell lies in BGP and get the lies > >propagated globally. > >I am probably telling you what you already know, but for the ones who >don't know it yet: > >Secure BGP (S-BGP): >http://www.ir.bbn.com/projects/s-bgp/ >http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0306/pdf/bellovinsbgp.pdf >http://www.nwfusion.com/details/6484.html?def > >and of course the sister by amongst others Cisco: > >Secure Origin BGP (SO-BGP): >http://bgp.potaroo.net/ietf/idref/ draft-ng-sobgp-bgp-extensions/ >http://www.nwfusion.com/details/6485.html >http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0306/pdf/alvaro.pdf precisely - I think we've now managed to reach a common understanding that looking for "lies" in BGP is a difficult and expensive task and more often than not the "lies" get through anyway. The approaches above clearly flag what is intended to be "truth", with the inference that what is not clearly traceable back to originating attestations is a potential lie. We really should be moving in this direction now! Geoff From blaine at blaines.net Thu Mar 3 19:51:38 2005 From: blaine at blaines.net (Blaine Christian) Date: Thu, 03 Mar 2005 13:51:38 -0500 Subject: Heads up: Long AS-sets announced in the next few days In-Reply-To: <1109869329.23797.29.camel@firenze.zurich.ibm.com> Message-ID: > I am probably telling you what you already know, but for the ones who > don't know it yet: > > Secure BGP (S-BGP): > http://www.ir.bbn.com/projects/s-bgp/ > http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0306/pdf/bellovinsbgp.pdf > http://www.nwfusion.com/details/6484.html?def > > and of course the sister by amongst others Cisco: > > Secure Origin BGP (SO-BGP): > http://bgp.potaroo.net/ietf/idref/ draft-ng-sobgp-bgp-extensions/ > http://www.nwfusion.com/details/6485.html > http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0306/pdf/alvaro.pdf > > etc... most people know how to google I guess ;) > > Aka BGP with certificates and other nice tricks. > And, of course, the RPSEC working group draft that is supposed to target the BGP requirements for those proposed systems is... http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-rpsec-bgpsecrec-01.txt The folks who worked on S-BGP and SO-BGP participated in it's creation (as well as several operators). Please note that there are more than just two proposed mechanisms for securing BGP. The two mentioned above are just the most popular . From risops at ripe.net Mon Mar 7 15:43:07 2005 From: risops at ripe.net (Generic RIS account) Date: Mon, 7 Mar 2005 14:43:07 GMT Subject: RIS Statistics Report Message-ID: <200503071443.j27Eh7TD015554@halfweg.ripe.net> RIS Statistics Report (20050228-20050307) This report was generated at Mon Mar 7 00:15:01 UTC 2005. It analyses the BGP Routing Tables which are collected by RIS Remote Collectors at different locations around the world. Check http://www.ris.ripe.net/weekly-report/ for more info. o Prefix Distribution RIS rrc00 rrc01 rrc02 rrc03 rrc04 rrc05 rrc06 rrc07 rrc10 rrc11 rrc12 rrc14 APNIC 30517 30336 29036 154 29505 28536 29312 29434 27639 28804 25359 29150 29341 ARIN 62704 62231 61114 414 62045 60926 61913 62091 59222 60948 55781 61181 61664 LACNIC 6919 6903 6884 667 6900 6474 6919 6900 6205 6856 6566 6884 6884 RIPE NCC 30559 25842 25534 6554 29890 24335 26017 25226 23881 25253 19753 26018 25148 OLD 35243 33157 31858 1103 34833 32099 32727 32637 30345 31821 28444 32093 32486 IANA 3803 3724 3630 637 3794 3620 3629 3681 3470 3610 3155 3711 3623 RFC1918 19 8 3 0 7 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 OTHER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 TOTAL 169764 162201 158059 9529 166974 155996 160517 159969 150762 157292 139058 159037 159147 AS number distributions wrt RIR and single-homed/multi-homed. o ASes per RIR region RIS rrc00 rrc01 rrc02 rrc03 rrc04 rrc05 rrc06 rrc07 rrc10 rrc11 rrc12 rrc14 ARIN 10727 10704 10602 266 10673 10612 10677 10590 10385 10579 9838 10611 10650 APNIC 2195 2184 2168 16 2188 2123 2178 2163 2138 2161 1809 2172 2171 RIPE NCC 6392 6373 6369 2465 6381 6236 6371 6339 6048 6355 5144 6374 6348 LACNIC 105 105 100 8 104 104 105 103 95 100 92 100 102 IANA 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Private 58 39 15 6 24 18 22 11 24 12 5 20 20 Others 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 Total 19479 19407 19256 2761 19372 19095 19355 19208 18692 19209 16889 19279 19293 o Number of single-homed ASes. RIS rrc00 rrc01 rrc02 rrc03 rrc04 rrc05 rrc06 rrc07 rrc10 rrc11 rrc12 rrc14 ARIN 3186 3382 4357 170 3533 4559 4276 6426 4433 4968 5036 4142 6117 APNIC 606 679 857 13 691 830 801 1256 892 1052 865 891 993 RIPE NCC 1689 2045 2487 1470 1935 2508 2138 3715 2334 2428 2430 2180 3346 LACNIC 48 50 55 6 49 60 55 69 50 53 56 53 67 IANA 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Private 50 31 9 3 18 12 16 9 19 6 4 14 18 Others 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 Total 5580 6188 7766 1662 6227 7971 7288 11477 7730 8509 8392 7282 10543 o Number of multi-homed ASes. RIS rrc00 rrc01 rrc02 rrc03 rrc04 rrc05 rrc06 rrc07 rrc10 rrc11 rrc12 rrc14 ARIN 7541 7322 6245 96 7140 6053 6401 4164 5952 5611 4802 6469 4533 APNIC 1589 1505 1311 3 1497 1293 1377 907 1246 1109 944 1281 1178 RIPE NCC 4703 4328 3882 995 4446 3728 4233 2624 3714 3927 2714 4194 3002 LACNIC 57 55 45 2 55 44 50 34 45 47 36 47 35 IANA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Private 8 8 6 3 6 6 6 2 5 6 1 6 2 Others 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Total 13899 13219 11490 1099 13145 11124 12067 7731 10962 10700 8497 11997 8750 IANA : AS65535 Others: AS65535 Distribution of AS number wrt Leaf, Transit. RIS rrc00 rrc01 rrc02 rrc03 rrc04 rrc05 rrc06 rrc07 rrc10 rrc11 rrc12 rrc14 Leaf 16122 16181 16180 2028 16131 16053 16192 16469 15730 16204 14201 16157 16386 Transit 3235 3104 2958 497 3125 2917 3055 2646 2786 2901 2386 3010 2804 Transit-only 122 122 118 236 116 125 108 93 176 104 302 112 103 Total 19479 19407 19256 2761 19372 19095 19355 19208 18692 19209 16889 19279 19293 o Average ASPATH length. RIS rrc00 rrc01 rrc02 rrc03 rrc04 rrc05 rrc06 rrc07 rrc10 rrc11 rrc12 rrc14 Avg 6.10 6.01 5.86 5.08 6.20 6.22 5.81 6.04 6.52 5.69 6.17 6.03 5.84 Std 2.52 2.41 2.43 2.67 2.55 2.57 2.56 2.29 2.49 2.28 2.23 2.60 2.76 o List of hot-spots during the week. Prefix Origin AS Number of updates 202.64.40.0/24 2706 496316 202.64.49.0/24 2706 492897 202.64.159.0/24 2706 346918 193.73.62.0/24 6730 277522 216.243.234.0/23 10970 274299 194.107.24.0/24 31152 162813 209.114.254.0/24 14359 156129 219.64.224.0/23 4755 142985 207.168.184.0/24 32832 142370 167.94.0.0/16 22413 115486 Total number of RIS BGP peering sessions: 488 From risops at ripe.net Mon Mar 14 14:59:01 2005 From: risops at ripe.net (Generic RIS account) Date: Mon, 14 Mar 2005 13:59:01 GMT Subject: RIS Statistics Report Message-ID: <200503141359.j2EDx1WX013262@halfweg.ripe.net> RIS Statistics Report (20050307-20050314) This report was generated at Mon Mar 14 00:15:01 UTC 2005. It analyses the BGP Routing Tables which are collected by RIS Remote Collectors at different locations around the world. Check http://www.ris.ripe.net/weekly-report/ for more info. o Prefix Distribution RIS rrc00 rrc01 rrc02 rrc03 rrc04 rrc05 rrc06 rrc07 rrc10 rrc11 rrc12 rrc14 APNIC 30454 30170 29258 170 29551 29346 29211 29777 29280 28952 24701 29337 14059 ARIN 62642 61987 61613 468 61999 61642 58798 61960 61329 60798 55248 61679 25008 LACNIC 8013 6967 6948 713 7988 6968 6941 6969 6948 6931 6766 6964 3330 RIPE NCC 27574 25643 25644 5309 26607 25290 24193 25198 25462 23316 17980 25492 13871 OLD 34107 32946 32163 905 33663 32899 31886 32799 32245 31515 27986 32517 12537 IANA 4762 3884 3799 558 4747 3867 3716 3814 3808 3141 3159 3826 1958 RFC1918 8 6 1 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 OTHER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 TOTAL 167560 161603 159426 8123 164555 160018 154745 160517 159072 154653 135840 159815 70764 AS number distributions wrt RIR and single-homed/multi-homed. o ASes per RIR region RIS rrc00 rrc01 rrc02 rrc03 rrc04 rrc05 rrc06 rrc07 rrc10 rrc11 rrc12 rrc14 ARIN 10718 10688 10615 278 10678 10680 10337 10604 10602 10428 9817 10653 6341 APNIC 2195 2179 2171 20 2180 2172 2172 2164 2155 2111 1809 2176 1446 RIPE NCC 6411 6389 6389 2150 6397 6382 6207 6358 6379 6002 4807 6324 4453 LACNIC 106 106 102 6 105 106 105 105 102 102 101 104 78 IANA 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Private 59 26 15 4 30 17 20 13 38 14 8 23 20 Others 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 Total 19492 19391 19295 2458 19393 19360 18844 19247 19279 18660 16544 19283 12341 o Number of single-homed ASes. RIS rrc00 rrc01 rrc02 rrc03 rrc04 rrc05 rrc06 rrc07 rrc10 rrc11 rrc12 rrc14 ARIN 3128 3703 4066 181 3367 4495 4341 6197 4056 6000 5311 4493 3187 APNIC 619 760 756 15 673 1006 801 1234 800 1106 905 885 655 RIPE NCC 1798 2437 2458 1254 2072 2894 2355 3720 2366 2711 2265 2305 1954 LACNIC 46 50 47 5 45 56 52 67 47 57 60 48 48 IANA 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Private 47 20 10 1 20 9 10 9 30 9 4 15 16 Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 Total 5640 6972 7339 1456 6179 8462 7562 11230 7301 9885 8547 7748 5863 o Number of multi-homed ASes. RIS rrc00 rrc01 rrc02 rrc03 rrc04 rrc05 rrc06 rrc07 rrc10 rrc11 rrc12 rrc14 ARIN 7590 6985 6549 97 7311 6185 5996 4407 6546 4428 4506 6160 3154 APNIC 1576 1419 1415 5 1507 1166 1371 930 1355 1005 904 1291 791 RIPE NCC 4613 3952 3931 896 4325 3488 3852 2638 4013 3291 2542 4019 2499 LACNIC 60 56 55 1 60 50 53 38 55 45 41 56 30 IANA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Private 12 6 5 3 10 8 10 4 8 5 4 8 4 Others 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 Total 13852 12419 11956 1002 13214 10898 11282 8017 11978 8775 7997 11535 6478 IANA : AS64500 AS40439 Others: AS65535 Distribution of AS number wrt Leaf, Transit. RIS rrc00 rrc01 rrc02 rrc03 rrc04 rrc05 rrc06 rrc07 rrc10 rrc11 rrc12 rrc14 Leaf 16137 16256 16174 1768 16149 16315 15728 16484 16226 15762 13901 16120 9823 Transit 3234 3020 3010 431 3127 2935 2974 2663 2937 2765 2315 3036 2009 Transit-only 121 115 111 259 117 110 142 100 116 133 328 127 509 Total 19492 19391 19295 2458 19393 19360 18844 19247 19279 18660 16544 19283 12341 o Average ASPATH length. RIS rrc00 rrc01 rrc02 rrc03 rrc04 rrc05 rrc06 rrc07 rrc10 rrc11 rrc12 rrc14 Avg 6.11 5.99 5.73 5.07 6.22 6.23 5.99 6.03 6.10 5.86 5.98 6.11 6.15 Std 2.57 2.51 2.51 2.54 2.56 2.59 2.61 2.30 2.47 2.42 2.23 2.73 3.07 o List of hot-spots during the week. Prefix Origin AS Number of updates 202.64.159.0/24 2706 422988 202.64.49.0/24 2706 422723 202.64.40.0/24 2706 349279 193.73.62.0/24 6730 266906 216.243.234.0/23 10970 255516 212.124.229.0/24 20995 188385 212.124.230.0/24 20995 186450 212.124.231.0/24 20995 173658 167.94.0.0/16 22413 125576 207.168.184.0/24 32832 118121 Total number of RIS BGP peering sessions: 489 From risops at ripe.net Mon Mar 21 19:38:30 2005 From: risops at ripe.net (Generic RIS account) Date: Mon, 21 Mar 2005 18:38:30 GMT Subject: RIS Statistics Report Message-ID: <200503211838.j2LIcUwt013256@halfweg.ripe.net> RIS Statistics Report (20050314-20050321) This report was generated at Mon Mar 21 00:15:02 UTC 2005. It analyses the BGP Routing Tables which are collected by RIS Remote Collectors at different locations around the world. Check http://www.ris.ripe.net/weekly-report/ for more info. o Prefix Distribution RIS rrc00 rrc01 rrc02 rrc03 rrc04 rrc05 rrc06 rrc07 rrc10 rrc11 rrc12 rrc14 APNIC 32184 31791 30353 153 30870 29015 20552 31629 29633 24652 11259 30339 12793 ARIN 63949 62329 61606 639 62359 61404 22372 62029 61588 48492 16277 62861 17528 LACNIC 8027 6986 6963 572 8006 6928 3978 6974 6963 6417 2710 6963 3660 RIPE NCC 27647 26265 26257 5475 27248 23759 16860 25469 25191 17452 13062 26574 13147 OLD 34064 33190 31822 886 33203 31211 14675 32671 31683 25350 8800 32355 10657 IANA 4200 4088 3993 460 4150 3954 2266 3999 3932 2432 1675 4002 1737 RFC1918 15 8 0 0 7 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 OTHER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 TOTAL 170086 164657 160994 8185 165843 156276 80703 162771 158990 124795 53783 163094 59523 AS number distributions wrt RIR and single-homed/multi-homed. o ASes per RIR region RIS rrc00 rrc01 rrc02 rrc03 rrc04 rrc05 rrc06 rrc07 rrc10 rrc11 rrc12 rrc14 ARIN 10747 10721 10634 280 10685 10617 5870 10616 10592 9553 4470 8400 5000 APNIC 2203 2191 2176 18 2197 2161 1713 2174 2158 1805 1181 2109 1253 RIPE NCC 6447 6427 6431 2255 6438 6012 5124 6391 6161 5022 4139 5830 4357 LACNIC 107 107 103 8 106 107 80 106 103 94 60 91 79 IANA 3 3 3 0 3 3 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 Private 58 32 16 2 27 21 16 12 31 6 11 16 18 Others 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 Total 19566 19482 19364 2563 19457 18922 12806 19303 19049 16484 9863 16449 10710 o Number of single-homed ASes. RIS rrc00 rrc01 rrc02 rrc03 rrc04 rrc05 rrc06 rrc07 rrc10 rrc11 rrc12 rrc14 ARIN 3213 3661 3856 189 3536 4696 2073 6259 4928 5457 2006 3650 2188 APNIC 617 773 749 15 676 1006 693 1226 867 858 487 914 479 RIPE NCC 1851 2408 2192 1362 2015 2844 1929 3819 2298 2225 1806 2205 1885 LACNIC 45 48 46 7 47 58 40 64 52 50 28 45 38 IANA 3 3 3 0 3 3 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 Private 43 21 12 1 19 13 12 11 23 4 6 14 17 Others 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 Total 5772 6915 6858 1574 6296 8621 4749 11383 8171 8598 4335 6830 4610 o Number of multi-homed ASes. RIS rrc00 rrc01 rrc02 rrc03 rrc04 rrc05 rrc06 rrc07 rrc10 rrc11 rrc12 rrc14 ARIN 7534 7060 6778 91 7149 5921 3797 4357 5664 4096 2464 4750 2812 APNIC 1586 1418 1427 3 1521 1155 1020 948 1291 947 694 1195 774 RIPE NCC 4596 4019 4239 893 4423 3168 3195 2572 3863 2797 2333 3625 2472 LACNIC 62 59 57 1 59 49 40 42 51 44 32 46 41 IANA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Private 15 11 4 1 8 8 4 1 8 2 5 2 1 Others 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 Total 13794 12567 12506 989 13161 10301 8057 7920 10878 7886 5528 9619 6100 IANA : AS64500 AS61972 AS40439 Others: AS65535 Distribution of AS number wrt Leaf, Transit. RIS rrc00 rrc01 rrc02 rrc03 rrc04 rrc05 rrc06 rrc07 rrc10 rrc11 rrc12 rrc14 Leaf 16221 16303 16219 1878 16213 15933 10081 16541 16054 13759 7597 13534 8269 Transit 3223 3065 3037 451 3131 2850 2238 2672 2878 2407 1648 2672 1866 Transit-only 122 114 108 234 113 139 487 90 117 318 618 243 575 Total 19566 19482 19364 2563 19457 18922 12806 19303 19049 16484 9863 16449 10710 o Average ASPATH length. RIS rrc00 rrc01 rrc02 rrc03 rrc04 rrc05 rrc06 rrc07 rrc10 rrc11 rrc12 rrc14 Avg 6.08 6.09 5.65 5.02 6.04 6.24 6.21 5.98 6.23 5.94 6.28 6.26 6.26 Std 2.53 2.47 2.46 2.60 2.50 2.51 2.65 2.27 2.47 2.44 2.45 2.74 3.00 o List of hot-spots during the week. Prefix Origin AS Number of updates 202.64.40.0/24 2706 409675 202.64.159.0/24 2706 408669 202.64.49.0/24 2706 276958 198.80.137.0/24 22488 260904 198.80.157.0/24 22488 260821 216.243.234.0/23 10970 254691 198.76.141.0/24 21617 122058 198.76.142.0/24 21617 120062 207.168.184.0/24 32832 116579 198.76.42.0/24 21617 80539 Total number of RIS BGP peering sessions: 488 From risops at ripe.net Mon Mar 28 16:09:33 2005 From: risops at ripe.net (Generic RIS account) Date: Mon, 28 Mar 2005 14:09:33 GMT Subject: RIS Statistics Report Message-ID: <200503281409.j2SE9XCb011434@halfweg.ripe.net> RIS Statistics Report (20050321-20050328) This report was generated at Mon Mar 28 00:15:01 UTC 2005. It analyses the BGP Routing Tables which are collected by RIS Remote Collectors at different locations around the world. Check http://www.ris.ripe.net/weekly-report/ for more info. o Prefix Distribution RIS rrc00 rrc01 rrc02 rrc03 rrc04 rrc05 rrc06 rrc07 rrc10 rrc11 rrc12 rrc14 APNIC 30553 30054 27286 0 30046 29518 29551 30055 29457 15419 16927 27554 23426 ARIN 62766 62273 41942 0 62414 61566 61605 61998 61301 30070 21809 58951 23422 LACNIC 8048 7005 5584 0 8025 6960 6976 7001 6938 4144 3843 6622 3086 RIPE NCC 28563 26070 21449 0 27623 25666 25560 25461 24760 18340 12690 24967 14776 OLD 33761 32903 22032 0 33394 32383 32214 32350 31167 17496 10894 30772 13825 IANA 4999 4139 3299 0 4894 4106 4002 4081 3967 3026 2003 3767 2158 RFC1918 15 7 2 0 5 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 OTHER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 TOTAL 168705 162451 121594 0 166401 160206 159908 160946 157590 88495 68166 152633 80694 AS number distributions wrt RIR and single-homed/multi-homed. o ASes per RIR region RIS rrc00 rrc01 rrc02 rrc03 rrc04 rrc05 rrc06 rrc07 rrc10 rrc11 rrc12 rrc14 ARIN 10764 10742 8568 245 10712 10726 10719 10637 10605 6907 5384 10337 5981 APNIC 2208 2190 2100 16 2198 2190 2184 2177 2164 1541 1391 2139 1967 RIPE NCC 6480 6452 5715 2200 6467 6452 6452 6418 6194 5095 4105 6301 4762 LACNIC 111 111 93 7 109 111 111 109 107 83 60 96 69 IANA 2 2 1 0 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 Private 57 34 14 1 30 24 17 13 27 8 9 15 22 Others 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 Total 19623 19532 16492 2469 19519 19506 19486 19357 19099 13636 10950 18891 12803 o Number of single-homed ASes. RIS rrc00 rrc01 rrc02 rrc03 rrc04 rrc05 rrc06 rrc07 rrc10 rrc11 rrc12 rrc14 ARIN 3244 3788 4337 146 3473 4347 4486 6594 4790 3603 2598 4995 2611 APNIC 641 787 866 14 693 831 814 1273 857 706 649 875 821 RIPE NCC 1836 2329 2362 1299 1976 2554 2531 3791 2270 2284 1706 2823 2091 LACNIC 53 57 59 7 55 63 66 75 64 53 38 61 43 IANA 2 2 1 0 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 Private 42 23 8 1 22 16 11 9 22 5 5 11 19 Others 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 Total 5818 6987 7634 1467 6221 7814 7911 11745 8005 6653 4997 8768 5587 o Number of multi-homed ASes. RIS rrc00 rrc01 rrc02 rrc03 rrc04 rrc05 rrc06 rrc07 rrc10 rrc11 rrc12 rrc14 ARIN 7520 6954 4231 99 7239 6379 6233 4043 5815 3304 2786 5342 3370 APNIC 1567 1403 1234 2 1505 1359 1370 904 1307 835 742 1264 1146 RIPE NCC 4644 4123 3353 901 4491 3898 3921 2627 3924 2811 2399 3478 2671 LACNIC 58 54 34 0 54 48 45 34 43 30 22 35 26 IANA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Private 15 11 6 0 8 8 6 4 5 3 4 4 3 Others 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Total 13805 12545 8858 1002 13298 11692 11575 7612 11094 6983 5953 10123 7216 IANA : AS64500 AS40439 Others: AS65535 Distribution of AS number wrt Leaf, Transit. RIS rrc00 rrc01 rrc02 rrc03 rrc04 rrc05 rrc06 rrc07 rrc10 rrc11 rrc12 rrc14 Leaf 16270 16367 13592 1797 16270 16418 16327 16616 16125 11043 8626 15944 10202 Transit 3235 3056 2627 430 3139 2990 3061 2654 2854 2173 1723 2819 2136 Transit-only 118 109 273 242 110 98 98 87 120 420 601 128 465 Total 19623 19532 16492 2469 19519 19506 19486 19357 19099 13636 10950 18891 12803 o Average ASPATH length. RIS rrc00 rrc01 rrc02 rrc03 rrc04 rrc05 rrc06 rrc07 rrc10 rrc11 rrc12 rrc14 Avg 6.00 6.15 5.99 5.11 5.91 6.02 5.87 5.98 6.19 6.18 6.28 5.80 6.15 Std 2.52 2.52 2.59 2.67 2.49 2.41 2.53 2.28 2.49 2.53 2.48 2.48 3.09 o List of hot-spots during the week. Prefix Origin AS Number of updates 202.64.49.0/24 2706 414676 202.64.40.0/24 2706 409425 83.219.160.0/19 34694 385414 198.80.137.0/24 22488 317021 198.80.157.0/24 22488 316891 216.243.234.0/23 10970 212171 199.181.158.0/23 4595 156621 204.201.21.0/24 20096 100615 207.168.184.0/24 32832 95735 198.76.142.0/24 21617 73512 Total number of RIS BGP peering sessions: 487