Call for Support: RIPE response to the US NTIA's NoI
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Robert Martin-Legène
robert at martin-legene.dk
Mon Nov 17 11:28:26 CET 2008
I, as a DNS professional, support this statement. Robert Martin-Legène Peter Koch wrote: > ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > # > # $Id: ntia-draft,v 1.9 2008/11/13 20:20:41 jim Exp $ > # > > The RIPE community thanks the NTIA for its consultation on proposals > to sign the root and is pleased to offer the following response to > that consultation. We urge the adoption of a solution that leads to > the prompt introduction of a signed root zone. Our community considers > the introduction of a signed root zone to be an essential enabling > step towards widespread deployment of Secure DNS, DNSSEC. This view > is supported by the letter from the RIPE community to ICANN as an > outcome of discussions at the May 2007 RIPE meeting in Tallinn: > http://www.ripe.net/ripe/wg/dns/icann-root-signing.pdf. > > It is to be expected that a community as diverse as RIPE cannot have a > unified set of detailed answers to the NTIA questionnaire. However > several members of the RIPE community will be individually responding > to that questionnaire. We present the following statement as the > consensus view of our community about the principles that should form > the basis of the introduction of a signed DNS root. > > 1. Secure DNS, DNSSEC, is about data authenticity and integrity and > not about control. > > 2. The introduction of DNSSEC to the root zone must be made in such a > way that it is accepted as a global initiative. > > 3. Addition of DNSSEC to the root zone must be done in a way that does > not compromise the security and stability of the Domain Name System. > > 4. When balancing the various concerns about signing the root zone, > the approach must provide an appropriate level of trust and confidence > by offering an optimally secure solution. > > 5. Deployment of a signed root should be done in a timely but not > hasty manner. > > 6. Updates from TLD operators relating to DNSSEC should be aligned > with the operational mechanisms for co-ordinating changes to the root > zone. > > 7. If any procedural changes are introduced by the deployment of > DNSSEC they should provide sufficient flexibility to allow for the > roles and processes as well as the entities holding those roles to be > changed after suitable consultations have taken place. > > 8. Policies and processes for signing the root zone must be > transparent and trustworthy, making it straightforward for TLDs to > supply keys and credentials so the delegations for those TLDs can > benefit from a common DNSSEC trust anchor, the signed root. > > 9. There is no technical justification to create a new organisation to > oversee the process of signing of the root. > > 10. No data should be moved between organisations without appropriate > authenticity and integrity checking, particularly the flow of keying > material between a TLD operator and the entity that signs the root. > > 11. The public part of the key signing key must be distributed as > widely as possible. > > 12. The organisation that generates the root zone file must sign the > file and therefore hold the private part of the zone signing key. > > 13. Changes to the entities and roles in the signing process must not > necessarily require a change of keys. > > ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- >
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