[ncc-services-wg] 2013-04 New Policy Proposal (Resource Certification for non-RIPE NCC Members)
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Sander Steffann
sander at steffann.nl
Mon May 20 21:52:06 CEST 2013
Hi Martin, > On Mon, 2013-05-20 at 20:55 +0200, Sander Steffann wrote: >> About the "Obviously, and not only due to RPKI, a classic deterring >> safe-guard is required": I don't find this obvious at all. > > Again, what you said (no sed): > On Mon, 2013-05-20 at 15:57 +0200, Sander Steffann wrote: >> If the Dutch legal system gets so bad that they require >> disproportional measures to be taken by the RIPE NCC then I think we >> have bigger issues and should move the RIPE NCC to a different >> country. > > I am really interested in hearing how you think the decision model > should work here: > - What are "disproportional" measures? I was thinking of i.e. taking a whole LIR/ISP offline because one of their customers misbehaves. I think the RIPE NCC have a decent relationship to the LEA's so I doubt if such disproportional measures would happen. > - What should be the triggering mechanism for actually moving the RIPE > NCC to another country (possibly outside of the EU) ? Silly things like I described above. I never seriously thought of moving the RIPE NCC to a different country though. The line you quote was meant as hypothetical case. > If you don't see the above "obvious" it appears you haven't follow the > thought behind your quote (and mis-quote) through... Please do so. I still don't see any of this as obvious though. It would only be obvious if you are certain these bad things will actually happen, which I very much doubt. > [...] > > RPKI in this respect is entirely a non-issue! It's equivalent to TLS to > whois.ripe.net, ie. merely the transport - not the data source. I agree. > Having backups of the central information systems and clear rules of > their abuseability, to guard against the [by me, _completely_] expected > coming slippery slope, however, is entirely the core issue and a quite > obvious thing to implement. Ok. This discussion now seems to have gone beyond rPKI policy and so this thread isn't the right place to discuss it. I suggest you take this to the RIPE NCC Board then. I think it is the board's responsibility to take care of these issues, and you seem to have genuine concerns about this. I don't (as I mentioned: I see this only as a hypothetical case, not a realistic one) so I'm stepping aside here and I'll leave the rest of the discussion to the board. Cheers, Sander
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