[members-discuss] Technical solution to resolve Spoofed IP traffic, Spoofed amplification DDoS attacks, BGP&RIR hijacking, IoT botnet infections and Botnet C&Cs

This was not attack against you Elad, but argument against your "idea". 
Just because someone does not like all your ideas does not mean they are 
against you personally.

You are not gaining any favors by spamming other RIPE members like this, 
you've been asked to stop numerous times now and it's been exposed this 
is probably an election campaign. So therefore, i would bet most on this 
list are against you personally at this point as well. It does not help 
that you have connections to some shady dealings like the south african 
IP hijacking. Neither does the irony of your signature ...

(everyone else, get the popcorn ready!)


On 4/30/20 11:41 PM, Elad Cohen wrote:
> Stuart,
>
> You are willing to sacrifice the good of the community for a personal 
> attack against me. Regarding what you wrote: do you know how many 
> compute time is wasted for all the current DDoS attacks that this 
> solution will not resolve ? do you know how many costs involved for 
> organizations and companies which are under DDoS attacks ? when you 
> compare the current to the state of this solution then this solution 
> is by far better than the current state.
>
> Respectfully,
> Elad
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *From:* Stuart Willet (primary) <stu at safehosts.co.uk>
> *Sent:* Thursday, April 30, 2020 11:39 PM
> *To:* Elad Cohen <elad at netstyle.io>; members-discuss at ripe.net 
> <members-discuss at ripe.net>
> *Subject:* RE: Technical solution to resolve Spoofed IP traffic, 
> Spoofed amplification DDoS attacks, BGP&RIR hijacking, IoT botnet 
> infections and Botnet C&Cs
>
> In fairness, I couldn’t even be bothered reading further than the 
> worlds BGP routers needing a firmware update to DOUBLE packet count 
> whilst adding compute time at an individual packet level.
>
> Another idea, slightly marred by the unfathomable costs involved, 
> along with its logistic impossibility.
>
> /me sits back and grabs the popcorn…..
>
> *From:*members-discuss [mailto:members-discuss-bounces at ripe.net] *On 
> Behalf Of *Elad Cohen
> *Sent:* 30 April 2020 21:31
> *To:* members-discuss at ripe.net
> *Subject:* [members-discuss] Technical solution to resolve Spoofed IP 
> traffic, Spoofed amplification DDoS attacks, BGP&RIR hijacking, IoT 
> botnet infections and Botnet C&Cs
>
> Hello Ripe Members!
>
> I will share the following solution in the near General Meeting and 
> I'm interested to share the following technical solution with you as 
> well, it will completely resolve: Spoofed IP traffic, Spoofed 
> amplification DDoS attacks, BGP&RIR hijacking. And will dramatically 
> lower: IoT botnet infections and Botnet C&Cs.
>
> By a single update to any BGP router, not any router needs to be 
> updated, only active BGP routers. If I will have the honor of being 
> elected to the Ripe Board I will harness all the power of Ripe and all 
> of the 5 RIR's and all of the LIR's in the 5 RIR's so routing 
> manufacturing companies will implement the below processes and methods 
> with a single firmware update to their BGP routers.
>
> I'm asking for your support in electing me so I will be able to enter 
> the Ripe Board and then I will be able to make everything which is 
> written in this post to come true.
>
> Regarding the bgp-anycasted infrastructure written below, ICANN is 
> written but the global bgp-anycasted infrastructure can be managed by 
> the 5 RIR's and/or by the ccTLDs registries (my main point is that who 
> will operate the bgp-anycasted infrastructure is not important for 
> now, as long as it will be an agreed authoritative non-governmental 
> non-commercial global entity/ies)
>
> With new tracking protocol over ip, routers will be able to confirm 
> that source ip came from the network of the announcing ASN, and hence 
> spoofed amplification DDoS attacks will be completely annihilated.
>
> The Process:
>
> At the source BGP router, for any ip packet with a source address that 
> is from the network of the source BGP router (lets call it original ip 
> packet) - the source BGP router will create a new ip packet (lets call 
> it tracking ip packet) with a new transport layer protocol and with 
> the same source address and with the same destination address and with 
> the same IP-ID such as the original ip packet.
>
> In the new tracking ip packet there will be a new transport layer 
> protocol (tracking protocol) with the following fields:
>
> AS number of source BGP router in clear text
>
> AS number of source BGP router encrypted with the private key of the 
> source BGP router
>
> The destination BGP router (a BGP router that the destination address 
> is in its network) whenever it receive a 'tracking ip packet' will 
> check if its have the internal boolean 'Check tracking flag' in it - 
> 'on' or 'off':
>
> If 'off' then the destination BGP router will drop that 'tracking ip 
> packet'
>
> If 'on' then the destination BGP router will decrypt the 'encrypted AS 
> number' with the public key of the specific AS number
>
> and after decryption the AS number need to be the result:
>
> if not then to drop the tracking ip packet and the original ip packet 
> related to it
>
> if yes then to drop the tracking ip packet and to forward the related 
> original ip packet to destination but only if the source address is 
> originated from the specific ASN (according to the local ASNs+ranges 
> table in the BGP router, such table will be received from ICANN)
>
> If the 'Check tracking flag' is set to 'on' then any original ip 
> packet that arrive to the destination BGP router will wait for the 
> related tracking ip packet (in case the related tracking ip packet 
> didn't already arrived to the destination BGP router). The destination 
> BGP router will manage such waiting for X number of seconds.
>
> The destination BGP router will match between a tracking ip packet and 
> an original ip packet - based on their source address and their 
> destination address and their IP-ID which will all be identical.
>
> More Aspects:
>
> - The end-devices will not need to be updated, any router will not 
> need to be updated, only all the BGP routers will need to be updated.
>
> - Any BGP router in the routing path, which the original ip packet and 
> the tracking ip packet are not destined to an ip address in its own 
> network - will not check the content of the tracking ip packet and 
> will forward both the tracking ip packet and the original ip packet as 
> they are.
>
> - Each BGP router will have all the public keys (of all the ASN's) 
> locally.
>
> - Each BGP router will have a full list of all the ASN's and all the 
> route objects ranges which are related to them locally.
>
> How BGP routers will receive all the ranges in all the route objects 
> of all the ASNs (in the 5 RIRs) and all the public keys of all the 
> ASNs (for decrypting the encrypted strings in 'tracking ip packets'):
>
> - Each BGP router will create a tcp session with ICANN backend 
> infrastructure (the backend infrastructure of ICANN will use BGP 
> anycast and will be available from many locations worldwide with 
> automatic syncing)
>
> - At this stage there will be a handshake process between the BGP 
> router and the ICANN backend infrastructure in order for ICANN to know 
> the correct ASN which is operating the BGP router - the BGP router 
> will send its ASN in cleartext and also its ASN encrypted with its 
> ICANN-communication-private-key , ICANN will know the related public 
> key for the specific ASN from the specific ASN object in the RIR (the 
> public key for communication with ICANN will be displayed there) - 
> after decryption ICANN will compare the decrypted string to the AS 
> Number for successful authentication.
>
> - After successful authentication, all the communication will be 
> encrypted, ICANN will notify the BGP router about its public key and 
> ICANN will use the public key of the ASN for the communication with 
> ICANN - from the ASN object in the RIR.
>
> - The BGP router will send over the session its public key to be used 
> by other BGP routers in order to decrypt the encrypted string in the 
> tracking ip packets that it will originate (that private key and 
> public key will be managed in the BGP router GUI or CLI).
>
> - ICANN will notify all the other BGP routers through the sessions 
> with them about a newly updated such public key of any other BGP router.
>
> - ICANN will also receive in real-time any route object 
> creation/modification/deletion notification from any of the 5 RIRs and 
> will then update all the BGP routers through all of their sessions.
>
> - In case a BGP router doesn't have an active session to ICANN backend 
> infrastructure (for any reason, might be due to networking issue) - 
> then temporarily the internal 'Check tracking flag' of it will be set 
> to 'off'. After the session with ICANN backend infrastructure will be 
> re-established and the BGP router will receive all the meantime 
> updates - the boolean value of 'Check internal flag' will return to 
> initial state.
>
> - Any update from ICANN backend infrastructure to a BGP router (such 
> as a public key of another BGP router, or a routing object update) - 
> will be confirmed that the update was received well by the BGP router 
> side.
>
> 'Check tracking flag' in BGP Routers:
>
> - BGP routers, in their GUI and CLI interfaces - will not allow the 
> end-user to set the boolean value of 'Check tracking flag', in order 
> to avoid misconfiguration.
>
> - The ICANN backend infrastructure through the session with the BGP 
> router - will be able to set the boolean value of the 'Check tracking 
> flag'.
>
> - The reason for it, is that if 'Check tracking flag' will be set on 
> some destination BGP routers while some other source BGP routers 
> weren't upgraded yet (and will not send the 'tracking ip packet' due 
> to it) - then 'tracking ip packet' will never reach the destination 
> BGP router and the internet will break.
>
> - Central setting of 'Check tracking flag' through ICANN backend 
> infrastructure - will allow ICANN to inform all the BGP routers at 
> once to switch 'on' the 'Check tracking flag'
>
> - ICANN, in the session to any BGP router, will also receive the 
> percentage of ip packets that were destained to that BGP router 
> network - that also had ip tracking packets, in this way ICANN will 
> know when all the BGP routers were properly globally updated and when 
> it is time to enable the 'Check tracking flag' in all the BGP routers.
>
> - ICANN will know if all the BGP routers in the world were upgraded 
> based on keeping the full BGP table and comparing it to all the BGP 
> routers that did and that did not open a session to ICANN backend 
> infrastructure.
>
> Automatic preventation of IoT botnet infections:
>
> - IoT botnets are based on default credentials, if we can block 
> default credentials of IoT devices then these kind of botnets (such as 
> Mirai-variants and similar) will stop to have an impact in the internet.
>
> - The data field in an ip packet - will always be the same for an 
> access attempt to a IoT device with default credentials - hence these 
> kind of "IP protocol data fingerprints" which are related to specific 
> "IP protocol numbers" will be provided by ICANN backend infrastructure 
> to each BGP router through the opened session with it.
>
> - There are two issues with matching incoming ip packets to the 
> "locally stored IP protocol data fingerprints" - the first one is that 
> ip packets can be sent by fragments (so not all the data field will be 
> sent at once in order to be able to be compared with the locally 
> stored data fingerprints) and the second is that usernames (or url's) 
> or any other textual data in the incoming ip packet data field can be 
> in uppercase or in lowercase. In order to overcome the possibility of 
> the existence of a single data fingerprint in multiple incoming ip 
> packet fragments - then in case the BGP router is recognizing the 
> incoming fragmented ip packet data value as part of an existing 
> fingerprint data in its local database then it will keep track of the 
> arrival ip packet fragments based on their specific IP-ID identifier 
> and the BGP router will not forward the last ip packet fragment if the 
> last ip packet fragment will cause all the related ip packet fragments 
> to match a specific ip fingerprint data (last ip packet doesn't have 
> to be the last fragmented part but it is the last ip packet that 
> arrived with that IP-ID identifier, so the BGP router will keep track 
> of the specific fragmented IP packets that arrived and their indexes 
> in order to know when the last one of them arrived). Regarding the 
> second issue - the stored data fingerprints in the local BGP router 
> will be stored in a way that some bytes of them (in specific indexes) 
> will not be compared and in case all the other bytes will match - then 
> the bytes in these indexes - will first be lowered case - and only 
> then comparison will be made to the specific indexed bytes in the 
> specific ip packet data fingerprint.
>
> - In case a IoT device behind a BGP router will be infected somehow 
> (for example when a specific fingerprint data with default credentials 
> for a specific device wasn't updated yet through ICANN backend 
> infrastructure), it will be able to infect all the other IoT devices 
> in the local network when the connectivity to them is not through the 
> BGP router, that kind of impact will be much much lower than infected 
> IoT device which can infect any other IoT device in the internet and 
> then massive botnets in the internet are created which are being used 
> for DDoS.
>
> Automatic prevention of botnet C&C ip addresses:
>
> - Botnets C&C are also a problem in the internet.
>
> - This problem can be overcome using the following technical addition: 
> the 5 RIR's will operate end-users honeypots machines all over the 
> world (it will be implemented by a single physical machine in each 
> location, for example in each datacenter and in each major ISP, each 
> single physical machine will emulate a virtual router and virtual 
> VM's, the virtual VM's will emulate many different kinds of 'real 
> world machines', any kind of automatic updating (in the operating 
> system configurations) will be disabled, these honeypots machines are 
> not intended to make any outgoing connection, the virtual routers will 
> monitor if any outgoing connection is made and if yes then it is to a 
> botnet C&C, the virtual router will update the ICANN backend 
> infrastructure regarding it and the ICANN backend infrastructure will 
> update all the BGP routers (in their open sessions) regarding it to 
> completely block any communication to that botnet C&C ip address. 
> There will be a web-based system and only the related Law Enforcement 
> Agency of that C&C ip address region - will be able to remove that C&C 
> ip address from being blocked after their manual check.
>
> - Honeypot machines will be deployed using 'templates' - these 
> templates must be signed and not anyone can create them, they should 
> be created and signed by an agreed Law Enforcement Agency such as 
> Interpol in order to make sure that these templates are by-design not 
> making any outgoing connection. The templates will be deployed in an 
> automatic way (major ISP's and datacenters will be able to easily add 
> a 'physical honeypot' server in their network, that will be shipped to 
> them), the re-initiation of a compromised 'virtual machine' that made  
> an outgoing connection - will also be automatic through the system in 
> the physical server.
>
> Respectfully,
>
> Elad
>
>
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