[dns-wg] final? draft of NTIA response

 this is a great piece of work ... and I CAN NOT support it.

--bill


On Fri, Nov 07, 2008 at 12:07:00PM +0000, Jim Reid wrote:
> Colleagues, here is what I hope is the final draft of our response to  
> the NTIA. I trust we can reach consensus on this. There is very little  
> time to continue with update/review cycles, so I would appreciate if  
> any comments were confined to showstoppers. We might have reservations  
> or quibbles about some of the detail or phrasing. However unless these  
> materially affect the response, could I ask you to please keep these  
> to yourself? My worry here is that further tweaks lead to yet more  
> comments and tweaks, and this goes on and on and on. The current  
> langauge may not be perfect. However I hope it is something that we  
> can all agree is good enough.
> 
> I would also ask WG members to say they support the text (assuming you  
> do of course). It would be better to have positive statements of  
> support instead of declaring that silence on this topic is consensus  
> for the WG.
> 
> 
> #
> #	$Id: ntia-draft,v 1.7 2008/11/07 11:55:18 jim Exp $
> #
> 
> The RIPE community (or DNS WG?) thanks the NTIA for its consultation
> on proposals to sign the root and is pleased to offer the following
> response to that consultation. We urge the adoption of a solution that
> leads to the prompt introduction of a signed root zone. Our community
> considers the introduction of a signed root zone to be an essential
> enabling step towards widespread deployment of Secure DNS, DNSSEC.
> 
> It is to be expected that a community as diverse as RIPE cannot have a
> unified set of detailed answers to the NTIA questionnaire. However  
> several
> members of the RIPE community will be individually responding to that
> questionnaire. We present the following statement as the consensus
> view of our community (or the DNS Working Group?) about the principles
> that should form the basis of the introduction of a signed DNS root.
> 
> 1. Secure DNS, DNSSEC, is about data authenticity and integrity and
> not about control.
> 
> 2. The introduction of DNSSEC to the root zone must be recognised as a
> global initiative.
> 
> 3. Addition of DNSSEC to the root zone must be done in a way that does
> not compromise the security and stability of the Domain Name System.
> 
> 4. When balancing the various concerns about signing the root zone,
> the chosen approach must provide an appropriate level of trust and
> confidence by offering a maximally secure technical solution.
> 
> 5. Deployment of a signed root should be done in a timely but not
> hasty manner.
> 
> 6. To assist with a timely deployment, any procedural changes
> introduced by DNSSEC should be aligned with the current process for
> coordinating changes to and the distribution of the root zone. However
> those procedural changes should provide sufficient flexibility to
> allow for the roles and processes as well as the entities holding
> those roles to be changed after suitable consultations have taken
> place.
> 
> 7. Policies and processes for signing the root zone should make it
> easy for TLDs to supply keys and credentials so the delegations for
> those TLDs can benefit from a common DNSSEC trust anchor, the signed
> root.
> 
> 8. There is no technical justification to create a new organisation to
> oversee the process of signing of the root.
> 
> 9. No data should be moved between organisations without appropriate
> authenticity and integrity checking.
> 
> 10. The public part of the key signing key must be distributed as
> widely as possible.
> 
> 11. The organisation that generates the root zone file must sign the
> file and therefore hold the private part of the zone signing key.
> 
> 12. Changes to the entities and roles in the signing process must not
> necessarily require a change of keys.
> 
>