[db-wg] Proposal for restricting authentication concerning use of revoked and expired GPG ID's in key-cert objects
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netravnen at gmail.com
netravnen at gmail.com
Mon Nov 5 16:56:51 CET 2018
On 05/11/2018 16:12, Edward Shryane wrote: > This has been the behaviour at least since the re-implementation in 2012, we retained the existing behaviour for compatibility. I would not mind breaking this compatibility for a slight increase in security. Since the current behaviour has been in place for 6 or more years. > The RIPE database does validate key expiry but only adds a warning to the response. Should the RIPE database refuse to apply updates signed with an expired key? I will strongly PREFER if updates signed with an expired key is refused. > Should the RIPE database refuse to apply updates that were signed more than 'n' minutes ago (or in the future) ? I would say YES to this one. And prefer at most 1 hour of maximum accepted time since the message was signed. Before the update message will not be accepted and an error returned to the sender. > Revoked keys indeed cannot be used any more. To revoke a key, you will need to update the existing key-cert object with the revoked version. You can also delete the key-cert object. > > Is it enough to update or delete a revoked key? Should the RIPE database process key revocation certificates? o If emailed to auto-dbm at . I suggest it be processed and queued for automatic removal from the DB. o Having a regular scan of existing keys in the DB. And automatically remove the ones recently expired with a warning message to the maintainer of the automatic removal. Is what I will strongly prefer. (Similar process to how unreferenced person objects is removed today) Christoffer -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 833 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: <https://lists.ripe.net/ripe/mail/archives/db-wg/attachments/20181105/523c9824/attachment.sig>
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