[db-wg] MD5s of the RIPE database, Deprecation of MD5 and safe authentication methods
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Pierre Kim
pierre.kim.sec at gmail.com
Tue May 5 23:13:02 CEST 2015
Dear Denis, Thank you for your explanation in detail about what happened in 2011. It is indeed interesting to know. -- Pierre Kim pierre.kim.sec at gmail.com @PierreKimSec https://pierrekim.github.io/ On 5/5/15, denis walker <ripedenis at yahoo.co.uk> wrote: > Hi Pierre > I would like to just clarify a few points in your email. > Firstly the article you referred to was published in November 2011. At that > time your could query for a MNTNER object and the MD5 hash was returned. > Although there was no file available on the FTP site with a list of all > MNTNER objects, as you know it was possible to download all the other bulk > object files and create a list of all referenced MNTNER objects. There was > no limit on how many of these that could be queried so it was not difficult > to get a list of all MD5 hashes. > > Two days later, in November 2011, another article was published outlining > the process of hiding the MD5 > hasheshttps://labs.ripe.net/Members/denis/securing-md5-hashes-in-the-ripe-database > This was accepted by the community and it was implemented in January > 2012https://www.ripe.net/ripe/mail/archives/db-wg/2012-January/003856.html > Since then it has not been possible to query for a MNTNER and receive the > MD5 hash. > In this second article, and again in the announcement to the DB WG, it > stated "The RIPE NCC will then contact all the maintainers of MNTNER objects > containing passwords and ask them to change these for new, strong > passwords." As far as I remember all MNTNER holders with MD5 passwords were > contacted and advised to change them. > cheersDenis WalkerIndependent Netizen > > > From: Pierre Kim <pierre.kim.sec at gmail.com> > To: db-wg at ripe.net > Sent: Monday, 4 May 2015, 22:12 > Subject: [db-wg] MD5s of the RIPE database, Deprecation of MD5 and safe > authentication methods > > Dear Database Working Group Members, > > I am contacting you to share the thoughts on the usage of MD5 in the > RIPE database. I already discussed the problems concerning MD5 > authentication with RIPE NCC Security<security at ripe.net> on 2 Apr 2015 > and RIPE NCC Security officer encouraged me to contact your group to > work together on this issue. > > In 2011, I had grabbed all the MD5s of the RIPE database before > they were taken out from the public view and I don't think I was the > only security researcher who downloaded all the hashes. > > This john-compatible file (containing MNT logins and MD5 hashs) was > never exposed to public but the hashs can be (VERY) easily > cracked. From the discussion with RIPE Security (who received a copy > of this file), 27.000 usable hashes (on a total of 36.000) appeared to > be valid til now. > > By reading > https://labs.ripe.net/Members/kranjbar/password-management-in-ripe-database > , I see : "The MD5 hash is public, when running a single query (not > for bulk queries)." > I assume this was a known problem but the RIPE didn't alert that all > the hashs have been retrieved, although there were some urgency to > change the passwords or to use a safer authentication method. > > When I discussed it with RIPE NCC Security, I gave a 90 day disclosure > policy about this "public" information, starting from the 16 Apr 2015. > The 90 day period can be adjusted by adding more days at the end if > RIPE shows a good progress of the migration. I wanted to do > responsible disclosure when I saw the RIPE Responsible Disclosure > Policy which is a Really Good Thing, I think. > > According to the RIPE transparency, as recommended by RIPE NCC > Security, therefore I am now contacting this working group to work > together because deprecation of MD5 is an important change in the RIPE > database and it must be debated in a democratic manner. > > My analysis is simple: The MD5 authentication is broken for years and > it's time to change to a more secure method. I think people needs to > be encouraged to move to SSO authentication. Using MD5 now is unsafe > and dangerous, especially with unchanged 4 year-old passwords. > > Please share your thoughts about this situation. I will be happy to > debate with you. > > > I want to thank Ivo Dijkhuis, RIPE NCC Information Security Officer, > for the quality of the exchanges we had. > > Regards, > > -- > Pierre Kim > pierre.kim.sec at gmail.com > @PierreKimSec > https://pierrekim.github.io/ > > > >
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