[db-wg] source: field for non RIPE address space
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Nigel Titley
nigel at titley.com
Fri Nov 14 21:26:51 CET 2014
On 14/11/14 20:21, Job Snijders wrote: > On Fri, Nov 14, 2014 at 10:10:58AM -1000, Kaveh Ranjbar wrote: >>> If we implement such a RIPE-NONAUTH source, I'd expect a query >>> structered like this: >>> >>> $ whois -h whois.ripe.net -- "-K -s RIPE -Troute 210.57.192.0/20" >>> >>> to return "%ERROR:101: no entries found". >>> >>> Maybe another way of phrasing the feature request: anything created due >>> to authorisation against the RIPE-NCC-RPSL-MNT object will have "source: >>> RIPE-NONAUTH" set, instead "source: RIPE”.? >> Job, the query you have outlined is very similar to the queries that >> IRRToolset sends. Doing that will basically result in a much smaller >> filter list which some providers might not even notice (depending on >> filtering strategy). This eventually might result in a less “secure” >> (for a lack of better word) routing table. > I'm sorry, I don't understand what you mean with less "secure" routing > table in this context. Can you elaborate? Or maybe give an > (hypothetical) example? > I'm not sure but this sounds like Kaveh thinks that ISPs perform negative filtering whereas, at least in my experience they perform positive filtering, which will be made *more* secure. Of course I may be completely off beam Nigel
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