[anti-abuse-wg] survey on BGP prefix hijacking

Dear anti-abuse working group, 

BGP prefix hijacking remains a problem for Internet routing, despite
the (partial) use of RPKI or detection services.  We would like to
hear your opinions on BGP prefix hijacking (concerns, existing
defenses, needs, etc.) that would help us research new defense
mechanisms both for its detection and mitigation.

Please help us by answering this short (< 10min, 21 questions) and
anonymous survey.

Survey URL: http://tinyurl.com/hijack-survey <http://tinyurl.com/hijack-survey>

*** The survey ***

This survey is part of a joint research effort by CAIDA (www.caida.org <http://www.caida.org/>)
and the ICS-FORTH (www.ics.forth.gr <http://www.ics.forth.gr/>) research institute, to study
(a) operator awareness of BGP prefix hijacking attacks/incidents,
(b) presently used defenses against BGP prefix hijacking, (c) the
willingness to adopt new defense mechanisms, and (d) reasons that
may hinder the deployment of BGP prefix hijacking defenses.

We expect the findings of this survey to increase the understanding
of existing BGP hijacking defenses and the needs of network operators,
as well as help us design and implement new defense mechanisms that
we will present to the operator and scientific communities.

A summary of the aggregate results will be published as a part of
an article/conference paper.

Thank you in advance, and we look forward to your responses!

Alberto (CAIDA) and Pavlos (ICS-FORTH)

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