Changes to RIPE NCC Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)

ripe-751: ripe-549: RIPE NCC RPKI (Resource Public Key Infrastructure) Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)

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Last updated February 2021 delete: </p> delete: <h2> Table of Contents delete: </h2> delete: <p> delete: <a href="#_Toc62822937"> March 2012 insert: </p>

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1. Introduction

As per Certification Policy (CP) [ delete: <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6484"> RFC 6484 insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#RFC6484"> insert: <span> [RFC6484] insert: </span> ]: : insert: </p>

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This document is the Certification Practice Statement of the RIPE NCC. It describes the practices employed by the RIPE NCC Certification Authority (CA) in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). These practices are defined in accordance with the requirements of the Certificate Policy (CP) [ delete: <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6484"> RFC 6484 delete: </a> ] for RPKI. delete: </p> delete: <p> RPKI (PKI) is designed to support the validation of claims by the current holders of Internet number resources (INRs), in accordance with the records of the organisations that act as CAs Certification Authorities (CAs) in this PKI. The ability to verify these such claims is essential to ensuring the unique and unambiguous distribution of these resources.

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The structure of the Resource PKI (RPKI) is congruent with the number resource allocation framework of the Internet. The IANA allocates Internet and parallels the existing INR distribution hierarchy. These INRs are distributed by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) to the number resources to Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), among others, as well as for special purposes [ delete: <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8190"> RFC 8190 insert: <a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5736"> RFC5736 ]. The RIRs RIRs, in turn, manage the allocation of number resources to End Users, Internet Service Providers (ISPs), (ISPs) and others.

In some regions, National Internet Registries (NIRs) are an additional tier in the INR distribution hierarchy, beneath the RIRs. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and network subscribers then form further tiers below these registries.

This PKI encompasses several types of certificates (see  delete: <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6480"> RFC 6480 (see IETF document insert: <a href="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/sidr/draft-ietf-sidr-arch/"> draft-ietf-sidr-arch-xx  for for more details):

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  CA certificates for each organisation distributing INRs and for each subscriber the INR holder insert: </p>

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  End-entity (EE) certificates for organisations to use to validate digital signatures on RPKI-signed objects delete: </li> delete: <li> In the future, the PKI may also include end-entity certificates in support of access control for the repository system, as described in Section 2.4 insert: </p>

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In addition to the CP  delete: <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6484"> [RFC 6484] CP [ insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#RFC6484"> RFC6484 , ], relevant information about general PKI concepts may be found in [ delete: <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280"> RFC 5280 delete: </a> ], RFC5280, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile".

delete: <p> Conventions used in this document: delete: </p> delete: <p> The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [ delete: <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2119"> RFC 2119 delete: </a> ]. delete: </p> delete: <h3> delete: <a name="_Toc62815719"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62822938"> delete: </a> 1.1. insert: <h3 class="western">

1. 1. Overview

This CPS describes:

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  Participants insert: </p>

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  Distribution of the certificates and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) insert: </p>

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  How certificates are issued, managed, re-keyed, renewed, managed and revoked insert: </p>

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  Facility management (physical security, personnel, audit, etc.) insert: </p>

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  Key management insert: </p>

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  Audit procedures insert: </p>

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The PKI encompasses several types of certificates: insert: </p>

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  CA certificates for each organisation distributing INRs and INR holders insert: </p>

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  End entity (EE) certificates for organisations to validate digital signatures on RPKI-signed objects insert: </p>

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The Certification Practice Statement (CPS) is for convenience and informational purposes only. The  delete: <a data-val="57095a23-e0ed-448f-84b2-f53e2a3c28dd" href="../../../resolveuid/57095a23-e0ed-448f-84b2-f53e2a3c28dd" data-linktype="internal"> The Terms and Conditions for the RIPE NCC Certification Service can be found at: insert: </p>

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insert: <a class="external-link" href="http://www.ripe.net/certification/legal/index.html"> http://www.ripe.net/certification/legal/index.html insert: </a> insert: </p>

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The RIPE NCC Certification Service Terms and Conditions delete: </a>  and the  delete: <a data-val="22d4440d-d129-428f-9b98-808f1c0e6ccf" href="../../../resolveuid/22d4440d-d129-428f-9b98-808f1c0e6ccf" data-linktype="internal"> RIPE NCC Certification Repository Terms and Conditions delete: </a>  prevail prevail over the CPS. The CPS and the CPS does not affect the interpretation of these Terms and Conditions.

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1. 2. Document Name and Identification

The name of this document is "RIPE NCC Certification Practice Statement for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure". delete: </p> delete: <h3> delete: <a name="_Toc62815721"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62822940"> delete: </a> 1.3. PKI". insert: </p>

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1. 3. PKI Participants

As per the CP [ delete: <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6484"> RFC 6484 insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#RFC6484"> insert: <span> [RFC6484] insert: </span> ]: delete: </p> delete: <p> Note that in : insert: </p>

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Note: In a PKI, the term "subscriber" refers to an individual or organisation that is a subject Subject of a certificate issued by a CA. The term is used in this fashion throughout this document, without qualification, and should not be confused with the networking use of the term to refer to an individual or organisation that receives service from an ISP. In such cases the term "network subscriber" will be used. Also note that, for brevity, this document always refers to PKI participants as organisations or entities, even though some of them are individuals.

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1. 3. 1. Certification Authorities (CAs)

This CPS covers five three types of CAs for the RPKI: one Offline CA for the RIPE NCC, one All Resources CA (ACA) Online CA for the RIPE NCC, one Production CA, and a number of Hosted CAs, and a number of Delegated hosted member CAs, which are all equivalent and may be described as a single CA for the purpose of this document.

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The Offline CA is the top-level CA for the RIPE NCC portion of RPKI, top level CA allowing the RIPE NCC to act as a Trust Anchor in the RPKI. delete: </p> delete: <p> The ACA The Online CA allows the RIPE NCC to act as parent of the Production CA, which in turn acts as a parent CA to RIPE NCC Members and the Delegated CA. Members. This three-layer two layer approach provides a secure revocation and recovery capability in case the ACA Online CA is compromised or becomes unavailable. Thus, the The Offline CA issues certificates only to instances of the ACA, and the Online CA. The CRLs it issues issued by the Offline CA are used to revoke only certificates a certificate issued to the ACA. delete: </p> delete: <p> The ACA issues certificates only to instances of the Production CA and the CRLs it issues are used to revoke only certificates issued to the Production Online CA. The Production Online CA is used to issue RPKI certificates to RIPE NCC members, End Users, and , Members, to whom Internet number resources have been distributed.

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In addition, addition the RIPE NCC offers a hosted CA service to RIPE NCC members and End Users. Members. These CAs are designated "hosted member CAs". Hosted The hosted member CAs are highly automated, taking care of the major part of the operational burden for RIPE NCC Members who want to act as CAs in the RPKI.  RPKI. insert: </p>

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See also insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#DefinitionsaandAcronyms"> insert: <span> section 1.6 1. 6 insert: </span> insert: </a> for definitions and acronyms used in this document.

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1. 3. 2. Registration Authorities

There is no distinct Registration Authority (RA) for either the Offline CA, ACA, and the Production CA or the Online CA operating under this CPS. The former needs no distinct RA capability because it issues certificates only to the Online CA. The Online CA depends on the single sign-on (SSO) mechanism used by the LIR Portal to identify individuals authorised to make requests. One of the possible sign-on mechanisms is by using an X.509 client certificate issued by the RIPE NCC Business PKI (see insert: <a> insert: <span> section 3.2.6. 3. 2. 6 insert: </span> insert: </a> for more details). The RIPE NCC already establishes a contractual relationship with each subscriber (RIPE NCC member) Member) and assumes responsibility for distributing and tracking the current allocation of address space and AS Numbers. Since the RIPE NCC operates the LIR Portal sign-on service and BPKI CA, no distinct RA is used.

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1. 3. 3. Subscribers

All RIPE NCC members and End Users Members can receive distributions of IP addresses and AS Numbers from the RIPE NCC Online CA and thus are subscribers in the PKI. delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815725"> PKI sense. insert: </p>

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insert: <a name="Relyingparties"> delete: <a name="_Toc62822944"> delete: </a> 1.3.4. 1. 3. 4. Relying parties

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As per CP insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#RFC6484"> insert: <span> [RFC6484] insert: </span> insert: </a> : insert: </p>

Entities or individuals that act in reliance on certificates or RPKI-signed objects issued under this PKI are relying parties. Relying parties may or may not be subscribers within this PKI. (See See insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#DefinitionsaandAcronyms"> insert: <span> section 1.6 1. 6 insert: </span> insert: </a> for the definition of an RPKI-signed object). delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815726"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62822945"> delete: </a> 1.3.5. object. insert: </p>

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1. 3. 5. Other participants

The RIPE NCC operates a repository that holds certificates, CRLs and other RPKI-signed objects, such as Route Origin Authorisation (ROA) objects. RIPE NCC Repository is regulated by the  delete: <a data-val="22d4440d-d129-428f-9b98-808f1c0e6ccf" href="../../../resolveuid/22d4440d-d129-428f-9b98-808f1c0e6ccf" data-linktype="internal"> RIPE NCC Certification Repository Terms and Conditions delete: </a> .  delete: </p> delete: <h3> delete: <a name="_Toc62815727"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62822946"> delete: </a> 1.4. insert: </p>

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1. 4. Certificate Usage

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insert: <a name="Appropriatecertificate"> delete: <a name="_Toc62822947"> delete: </a> 1.4.1. 1. 4. 1. Appropriate certificate uses

The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorisation in support of validation of claims of current holdings of INRs. Additional uses, consistent with the basic goal cited above, are also permitted under [ delete: <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6484"> RFC 6484 delete: </a> ]. delete: </p> delete: <p> Some of the certificates that may be issued under this PKI could be used to support operation of this infrastructure (e.g. access control for the repository system as described in Section 2.4.) Such uses are also permitted under the RPKI certificate policy. delete: </p> delete: <p> address space and/or AS Numbers. With regard to routing security, an initial goal of this PKI is to enable allow the holder of a set of address blocks to be able to declare, in a secure fashion, the AS Number of each entity that is authorised to originate a route to these addresses, including the context of ISP proxy aggregation. Additional uses of the PKI, consistent with the basic goal cited above, are also permitted under this policy.

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1. 4. 2. Prohibited certificate uses

Any uses other than those described in Section 1.4.1 insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#Appropriatecertificate"> insert: <span> section 1. 4. 1 insert: </span> insert: </a> are prohibited.

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insert: <a name="CPSAdministration"> delete: <a name="_Toc62822949"> delete: </a> 1.5. Policy 1. 5. CPS Administration

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1. 5. 1. Organisation administering the document

This Since this CPS is describes the implementation of the Offline CA, Online CA and hosted member CAs maintained by the RIPE NCC, this CPS is also administered by delete: </p> delete: <p> RIPE NCC delete: <br /> Stationsplein 11 delete: <br /> 1012 AB Amsterdam delete: <br /> The Netherlands  the RIPE NCC. However, it should be noted that approval procedures described in insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#CPSAdministration"> insert: <span> section 1. 5. 3-4 insert: </span> insert: </a> apply. insert: </p>

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Whenever the implementation is changed, this CPS will be modified and republished as a RIPE Document. This When this happens this will be announced through the appropriate channels, such communication channels (such as the RIPE NCC's Membership Announce ncc-announce mailing list ( delete: <a href="mailto:[email protected]"> [email protected] list). insert: </p>

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1. 5. 2. Contact person insert: </h4>

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The RPKI CPS point of contact is the RIPE NCC, Singel 258, 1016AB, Amsterdam, Netherlands. insert: </p>

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insert: <a name="PersondeterminingCPS"> ). delete: </p> delete: <h4> 1.5.2. Contact person  delete: </h4> delete: <p> The contact information is: delete: </p> delete: <p> Email:  delete: <a href="mailto:[email protected]"> [email protected] delete: <br /> delete: </a> Phone: +31 20 535 4444 delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815732"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62822951"> delete: </a> 1.5.3. 1. 5. 3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy

This document is reviewed on behalf of the RIPE community by qualified the Certification Authority Task Force (CA-TF). It is expected that the role of the CA-TF will be transferred to an appropriate RIPE Working Group when the RPKI becomes established as a RIPE NCC staff, as well as by an external party during the review delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815733"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62822952"> delete: </a> 1.5.4. service. insert: </p>

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1. 5. 4. CPS approval procedures

delete: <strong> A RIPE certification policy dealing with issues such as validity times, revocation, re-issuance and access to the services involved is currently being developed by the RIPE community. The implementation of the various CAs (Offline, Online and hosted member CAs) will reflect this policy. insert: </p>

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This CPS is not subject to the RIPE Policy Development Process delete: </strong> delete: </p> delete: <h3> delete: <a name="_Toc62815734"> Process. It provides a detailed outline of the implementation of the RPKI by the RIPE NCC. The CPS is publicly available and when necessary, additional reporting mechanisms, such as mailing lists or presentations at RIPE Meetings, are used to communicate the contents. When the RIPE NCC RPKI implementation is found to be inconsistent with applicable policies the RIPE NCC is committed to update the implementation and this CPS. insert: </p>

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insert: <a name="DefinitionsaandAcronyms"> delete: <a name="_Toc62822953"> delete: </a> 1.6. 1. 6. Definitions and Acronyms

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BPKI delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> Business PKI. PKI: A BPKI is used by the RIPE NCC to identify RIPE NCC members Members to whom RPKI certificates can be issued.

delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: <tr> delete: <td> delete: <p> CP delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> insert: <p>

CA Certificate Policy. A CP is a named set of rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular community and/or class of applications with common security requirements. The CP for the RPKI is [ delete: <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6484"> RFC 6484 delete: </a> ]. delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: <tr> delete: <td> delete: <p> CPS delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> Certification Practice Statement. A CPS is a document that specifies the practices that a Certification Authority employs in issuing certificates. delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: <tr> delete: <td> delete: <p> Distribution of INRs delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> Internet number resources (INRs) are distributed hierarchically. IANA distributes blocks of IP addresses and Autonomous System Numbers (ASNs) to the five Regional Internet Registries (RIRs). The RIRs distribute smaller address blocks and Autonomous System Numbers to organisations within their service regions, who in turn distribute IP addresses to their customers. delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: <tr> delete: <td> delete: <p> IANA delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> Internet Assigned Numbers Authority. IANA is responsible for global coordination of the Internet Protocol addressing systems and ASNs used for routing Internet traffic. IANA distributes INRs to RIRs. delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: <tr> delete: <td> delete: <p> INRs delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> Internet Number Resources. INRs are number values for three protocol parameter sets, namely: delete: </p> delete: <p> - IP version 4 addresses (IPv4) delete: </p> delete: <p> - IP version 6 addresses (IPv6) delete: </p> delete: <p> - Identifiers used in Internet inter-domain routing, currently Border Gateway Protocol-4 ASNs delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: <tr> delete: <td> delete: <p> ISP delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> Internet Service Provider. An ISP is an organisation managing and selling Internet services to other organisations. delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: <tr> delete: <td> delete: <p> NIR delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> National Internet Registry. NIRs manage the distribution of INRs for a portion of the geopolitical area covered by a Regional Internet Registry. NIRs form an optional second tier in the to INR distribution hierarchy. delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: <tr> delete: <td> delete: <p> RIR delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> Regional Internet Registry. An RIR is an organisation that manages the distribution of INRs for a geopolitical area. delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: <tr> delete: <td> delete: <p> RPKI-signed object delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td width="535"> delete: <p> A digitally signed data object (other than a certificate or CRL) declared to be such an object by the Standards Track RFCs. An RPKI-signed object can be validated using certificates issued under this PKI. The content and format of these data constructs depend on the context in which validation of claims of current holdings of INRs take place. Examples of these objects are repository manifests [ delete: <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6486"> RFC 6486 delete: </a> ] and Route Origin Authorisations (ROAs) [ delete: <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6482"> RFC 6482 delete: </a> ]. delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: <tr> delete: <td> delete: <p> CA delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> Certification Authority. A CA is an entity that issues digital certificates for use by other parties. delete: </p> delete: <p> A CA may issue CA certificates to subordinate CAs. Thus, Thus a tree structure of CAs can be created, often called dubbed Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). The RIPE NCC operates three levels of CAs in the PKI hierarchy hierarchy, covered in this CPS. delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: <tr> delete: <td> CPS: insert: </p>

Offline CA delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> The RIPE NCC Offline CA. This CA is kept offline when not in use for security reasons, and acts delete: </p> delete: <p> as the top level in the hierarchy. For the moment, moment this CA is making itself available as a Trust delete: </p> delete: <p> Anchor as described in [ delete: <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8630"> RFC 8630 delete: </a> ]. delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: <tr> delete: <td> [draft-TA-version4]. In the future this CA may become subordinate to a top level single Trust Anchor CA that will issue certificates to all RIRs. insert: </p>

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Online CA The RIPE NCC Online CA. This CA is used on a daily basis to issue certificates to subordinate hosted member CAs. insert: </p>

Hosted CA delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> member CA A hosted member CA that is technically hosted by the RIPE NCC as a RIPE NCC service in the LIR portal. delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: <tr> delete: <td> delete: <p> Delegated CA delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> Delegated CA is technically hosted by the company behind the CA. The issuing, revocation of its certificate follows the RPKI certificate provisioning protocol, see [ delete: <a href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6492"> RFC 6492]. delete: </a> delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: <tr> delete: <td> delete: <p> All Resources CA (ACA) delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> An Online CA that contains all resources (e.g. 0/0) and is signed by the Trust Anchor. For more information, please see the  delete: <a href="https://www.nro.net/regional-internet-registries-are-preparing-to-deploy-all-resources-rpki-service/"> NRO website Portal. insert: </p>

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CP Certificate Policy for the Resource PKI (RPKI). See insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#RFC6484"> insert: <span> [RFC6484] insert: </span> .

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CPS Certification Practice Statement. A CPS is a document that specifies the practices that a Certification Authority employs in issuing certificates. insert: </p>

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ISP Internet Service Provider. An ISP is an organisation managing and selling Internet services to other organisations. insert: </p>

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LIR Local Internet Registry (LIR) delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> An Registry. This is an organisation, typically a network service provider, that distributes IP addresses and AS Numbers to End Users and/or uses them in their its own infrastructure. delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: <tr> delete: <td> RIPE NCC Members are usually referred to as "LIRs". insert: </p>

LIR Portal delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> The public portal provided by the RIPE NCC provides for to its members to (LIRs) that allows them access to various RIPE NCC services, including the hosted member CA service. The LIR Portal portal is also used to access the RIPE NCC Online CA by specific users, as described later in this CPS.

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RIPE NCC Member delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> A natural person or a legal person entity that has entered into the RIPE NCC Standard Service Agreement (SSA) with the RIPE NCC.

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RIR Regional Internet Registry. An RIR is an organisation that manages the distribution and registration of IP address and AS Numbers within a particular region of the world. At present, there are five RIRs: ARIN (North America), RIPE NCC through a sponsoring agreement with a RIPE NCC member. delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: <tr> delete: <td> (Europe, the Middle East and parts of Central Asia), APNIC (Asia-Pacific), LACNIC (Latin America and Caribbean) and AfriNIC (Africa). insert: </p>

RP delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> Relying Party as defined in insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#Relyingparties"> insert: <span> section 1.3.4. above. delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: <tr> delete: <td> 1. 3. 4 insert: </span> insert: </a> . insert: </p>

TA delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> Trust Anchor. The top CA certificate in the chain used for validation. Relying Parties choose which CA certificate they trust as being the top of the validation tree. Relying Parties may choose to trust more than one TA.

delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: </tbody> delete: </table> delete: <p> delete: <strong> insert: <p>

RPKI Objects and Certificates delete: </strong> delete: </p> delete: <table class="table"> delete: <colgroup> delete: <col width="&quot;20%"> delete: <col width="80%"> delete: </colgroup> delete: <tbody> delete: <tr> delete: <td> Certificates: insert: </p>

Certificate delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> An X.509 PKIX Resource Certificate as described in [ delete: <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7318"> RFC 7318 insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#rescertificateprofile"> insert: <span> [res-certificate-profile] insert: </span> ].  delete: </p> delete: <p> - Certification . insert: </p>

insert: <p>

Certificates come in two flavors: insert: </p>

insert: <p>

Certificate Authority (CA): (CA) Certificates are used by Certification Certificate Authorities to issue subordinate certificates and EE certificates.

- End Entity (EE): (EE) Certificates are embedded in RPKI-signed objects such as Manifests and ROAs and are used to sign these objects (see [ delete: <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6488"> RFC 6488 insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#RFC6488"> insert: <span> [RFC6488] insert: </span> ]). ). Note the CAs described in this CPS do not currently issue any multi-use End Entity Certificates as described in [ delete: <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7318"> RFC 7318 insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#rescertificateprofile"> insert: <span> [res-certificate-profile] insert: </span> ]. delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: <tr> delete: <td> . insert: </p>

ROA delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> ROA Route Origin Authorisation. This is a digitally signed object that provides a means of verifying identifies a network operator, identified by an AS Number, that an IP address block holder has is authorised an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes to one or more prefixes within the a specified set of address block. blocks. See [ delete: <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6482"> RFC 6482 insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#RFC6482"> insert: <span> [RFC6482] insert: </span> ]. delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: <tr> delete: <td> . insert: </p>

CRL delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> Certificate Revocation List is a time-stamped list identifying revoked certificates that are signed by a CA or CRL issuer and made freely available in a public repository. See [ delete: <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7318"> RFC 7318 as described in insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#rescertificateprofile"> insert: <span> [res-certificate-profile] insert: </span> ]. delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: <tr> delete: <td> . insert: </p>

Manifest delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> A signed object under the RPKI listing all subordinate signed objects and certificates for a CA certificate. See [ delete: <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6484"> RFC 6486 insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#RFC6486"> insert: <span> [RFC6486] insert: </span> ]. . insert: </p>

insert: <p>

insert: </p>

insert: <p>

insert: <img alt="chart" class="image-inline" height="445" name="graphics2" src="resolveuid/2dbeabacefe07f1872db88bebe60cc1a" width="629" /> insert: </p>

insert: <p>

insert: </p>

insert: <table> insert: <colgroup>insert: <col width="194">insert: <col width="335">insert: </colgroup>insert: <thead>insert: <tr>insert: <td>insert: <td>insert: </tr>insert: </thead>insert: <tbody>insert: <tr>insert: <td>insert: <td>insert: </tr>insert: <tr>insert: <td>insert: <td>insert: </tr>insert: <tr>insert: <td>insert: <td>insert: </tr>insert: <tr>insert: <td>insert: <td>insert: </tr>insert: <tr>insert: <td>insert: <td>insert: </tr>insert: <tr>insert: <td>insert: <td>insert: </tr>insert: <tr>insert: <td>insert: <td>insert: </tr>insert: <tr>insert: <td>insert: <td>insert: </tr>insert: <tr>insert: <td>insert: <td>insert: </tr>insert: <tr>insert: <td>insert: <td>

insert: <h2 align="CENTER" class="western"> file insert: </h2> insert: </td>	insert: <h2 align="CENTER" class="western"> description insert: </h2> insert: </td>
insert: <p> ripe-ncc-ta.cer insert: </p> insert: </td>	insert: <p> RIPE NCC Offline CA (Trust Anchor) Certificate. insert: </p> insert: </td>
insert: <p> ripe-ncc-ta.crl insert: </p> insert: </td>	insert: <p> The Certificate Revocation List (CRL) for the RIPE NCC Offline CA (Trust Anchor). insert: </p> insert: </td>
insert: <p> ripe-ncc-ta.mft insert: </p> insert: </td>	insert: <p> The Manifest object listing all subordinate objects and certificates signed by the RIPE NCC Offline CA (Trust Anchor). insert: </p> insert: </td>
insert: <p> online.cer insert: </p> insert: </td>	insert: <p> The Online CA certificate that is signed and published by the RIPE NCC Offline CA (Trust Anchor). insert: </p> insert: </td>
insert: <p> online.crl insert: </p> insert: </td>	insert: <p> The Certificate Revocation List (CRL) for the Online CA. insert: </p> insert: </td>
insert: <p> online.mft insert: </p> insert: </td>	insert: <p> The Manifest object listing all subordinate objects and certificates signed by the Online CA. insert: </p> insert: </td>
insert: <p> member.cer insert: </p> insert: </td>	insert: <p> The member CA certificate that is signed and published by the Online CA. insert: </p> insert: </td>
insert: <p> member.crl insert: </p> insert: </td>	insert: <p> The Certificate Revocation List (CRL) for the member CA. insert: </p> insert: </td>
insert: <p> member.mft insert: </p> insert: </td>	insert: <p> The Manifest object listing all subordinate objects and certificates signed by the member CA. insert: </p> insert: </td>
insert: <p> roa1.roa insert: </p> insert: </td>	insert: <p> A ROA RPKI-signed object for the member CA.

delete: <p>   delete: </p> delete: <div> delete: <img class="img-100" src="../../../resolveuid/276066bac5eb468e92628882d9281eda" alt="" data-linktype="image" data-scale="" data-val="276066bac5eb468e92628882d9281eda" /> delete: </div> delete: <h2> delete: <a name="_Toc62815735"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62822954"> delete: </a> insert: <h2 class="western">

2. Publication and And Repository Responsibilities

delete: <h3> delete: <a name="_Toc62815736"> insert: <h3 class="western">

insert: <a name="Repositories"> delete: <a name="_Toc62822955"> delete: </a> 2.1. 2. 1. Repositories

As per the CP [ delete: <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6484"> RFC 6484 insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#RFC6484"> insert: <span> [RFC6484] insert: </span> ], , certificates, CRLs and RPKI-signed objects MUST be are made available for downloading by to all relying parties, network operators to download, to enable them to validate this data. The RIPE NCC will publish  this via a repository that is accessible via rsync and RRDP. This repository conforms to the structure described in [ delete: <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6481"> RFC 6481 insert: </p>

insert: <h3 class="western">

insert: <a name="PublicationofCertificati"> ]. delete: </p> delete: <h3> delete: <a name="_Toc62815737"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62822956"> delete: </a> 2.2. 2. 2. Publication of Certification Information

The RIPE NCC publishes uploads the certificates, CRLs and RPKI-signed objects that are issued to a it issues to a local repository system that operates as part of a world-wide distributed system of RPKI repositories.

delete: <strong> Offline CA delete: </strong>

The CA certificate for the RIPE NCC Offline CA is intended to be used as a Trust Anchor by relying parties. The Trust Anchor Locator, as per [ delete: <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6490"> RFC 6490 insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#RFC6490"> insert: <span> [RFC6490] insert: </span> ], , follows:

delete: <pre> https://rpki.ripe.net/ta/ripe-ncc-ta.cer delete: <br /> sync://rpki.ripe.net/ta/ripe-ncc-ta.cer delete: <br /> MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA0URYSGqUz2myBsOzeW1jQ6NsxNvlLMyhWknvnl8NiBCs/T/S2XuNKQNZ+wBZxIgPPV2pFBFeQAvoH/WK83HwA26V2siwm/MY2nKZ+Olw+wlpzlZ1p3Ipj2eNcKrmit8BwBC8xImzuCGaV0jkRB0GZ0hoH6Ml03umLprRsn6v0xOP0+l6Qc1ZHMFVFb385IQ7FQQTcVIxrdeMsoyJq9eMkE6DoclHhF/NlSllXubASQ9KUWqJ0+Ot3QCXr4LXECMfkpkVR2TZT+v5v658bHVs6ZxRD1b6Uk1uQKAyHUbn/tXvP8lrjAibGzVsXDT2L0x4Edx+QdixPgOji3gBMyL2VwIDAQAB delete: </pre> delete: <p> delete: <strong> insert: <p>

insert: </p>

insert: <p>

rsync://rpki.ripe.net/ta/ripe-ncc-ta.cer insert: </p>

insert: <p>

MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA0URYSGqU insert: </p>

insert: <p>

z2myBsOzeW1jQ6NsxNvlLMyhWknvnl8NiBCs/T/S2XuNKQNZ+wBZ insert: </p>

insert: <p>

xIgPPV2pFBFeQAvoH/WK83HwA26V2siwm/MY2nKZ+Olw+wlpzlZ1 insert: </p>

insert: <p>

p3Ipj2eNcKrmit8BwBC8xImzuCGaV0jkRB0GZ0hoH6Ml03umLprR insert: </p>

insert: <p>

sn6v0xOP0+l6Qc1ZHMFVFb385IQ7FQQTcVIxrdeMsoyJq9eMkE6D insert: </p>

insert: <p>

oclHhF/NlSllXubASQ9KUWqJ0+Ot3QCXr4LXECMfkpkVR2TZT+v5 insert: </p>

insert: <p>

v658bHVs6ZxRD1b6Uk1uQKAyHUbn/tXvP8lrjAibGzVsXDT2L0x4 insert: </p>

insert: <p>

Edx+QdixPgOji3gBMyL2VwIDAQAB insert: </p>

insert: <p>

insert: </p>

insert: <p>

Online CA delete: </strong>

The Online CA publishes subordinate certificates, CRLs and RPKI-signed objects under:

rsync://rpki.ripe.net/repository/33/36711f-25e1-4b5c-9748-e6c58bef82a5/1/

delete: <strong> Hosted delete: </strong>   delete: <strong> member CAs delete: </strong>

The hosted member CAs publish subordinate signed objects in the repository that is hosted by the RIPE NCC:

rsync://rpki.ripe.net/repository  rsync://rpki.ripe.net/repository

The exact URI of the publication point is unique per hosted CA. This member CA and can be found in the hosted member CA certificate as described in [ delete: <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7318"> RFC 7318 insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#rescertificateprofile"> insert: <span> [res-certificate-profile] insert: </span> ]. .

Note the repository structure is defined in [ delete: <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6481"> RFC 6481 insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#RFC6481"> insert: <span> [RFC6481] insert: </span> ]. delete: </p> delete: <h3> delete: <a name="_Toc62815738"> . insert: </p>

insert: <h3 class="western">

insert: <a name="TimeoorFFrequencyofPub"> delete: <a name="_Toc62822957"> delete: </a> 2.3. 2. 3. Time or Frequency of Publication

A certificate will be published within eight 24 hours of being issued (or deleted). delete: </p> delete: <p> The RIPE NCC will publish its CRL prior to the next in the scheduled CRL previously issued by the CA. delete: </p> delete: <h3> delete: <a name="_Toc62815739"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62822958"> delete: </a> 2.4. after issuance. insert: </p>

insert: <h3 class="western">

2. 4. Access Controls on Repositories

Write access to the repositories is limited to the systems running the ACA, Production Offline CA, Online CA and hosted member CAs.

delete: <h2> delete: <a name="_Toc62815740"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62822959"> delete: </a> insert: <h2 class="western">

3. Identification and And Authentication

delete: <h3> delete: <a id="3-1-naming"> delete: </a> 3.1. insert: <h3 class="western">

3. 1. Naming

delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815741"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62822960"> delete: </a> 3.1.1. insert: <h4 class="western">

3. 1. 1. Types of names

The Subject of each certificate issued by the RIPE NCC is identified by an X.500 Distinguished Name (DN). The distinguished name will consist of a single Common Name (CN) attribute with a value generated by the RIPE NCC. Optionally, the Serial Number attribute may be indicated along with the common name (to form a terminal relative distinguished name set), to distinguish between successive instances of certificates associated with the same entity.

For the Offline CA, CA the self-signed CA certificate is published as a Trust Anchor, as described in Section 2.2. insert: <a> insert: <span> section 2. 2 insert: </span> insert: </a> . The subject is “CN=ripe-ncc-ta”. ‘CN=ripe-ncc-ta'.

For all other certificates controlled by the ACA, Production Offline CA, Online CA and hosted CAs, member CAs the subject has the format CN=<pub key hash>, where the public key hash is a Base64 encoded form of the public key SHA-1 hash, as described in section 2.1 of [ delete: <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc6487.pdf"> RFC 4387 insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#RFC4387"> insert: <span> [RFC4387] insert: </span> ]. delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815742"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62822961"> delete: </a> 3.1.2. . insert: </p>

insert: <h4 class="western">

3. 1. 2. Need for names to be meaningful

The Subject name in each subscriber certificate will be unique to the public key found in on the certificates.

The Subject Note: The name should of the holder of an address block or AS Number is intended to not  be be "meaningful" in a the conventional, human-readable sense. The rationale is that these sense, since certificates issued under this PKI are used for authorisation in support of applications that make use of attestations of regarding INR holdings. They are holdings, not used to identify subjects. delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815743"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62822962"> delete: </a> 3.1.3. for identification. insert: </p>

insert: <h4 class="western">

3. 1. 3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers

Although Subject subject names in certificates issued by this registry should are not be meaningful, and may appear "random,", anonymity is not a function of this PKI. No PKI, and thus no explicit support for this feature is provided.

delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815744"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62822963"> delete: </a> 3.1.4. insert: <h4 class="western">

3. 1. 4. Rules for interpreting various name forms

None.

delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815745"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62822964"> delete: </a> 3.1.5. insert: <h4 class="western">

3. 1. 5. Uniqueness of names

The RIPE NCC certifies Subject names that are unique among the certificates that it issues. Although it is desirable that Subject names be unique throughout the PKI (to facilitate certificate path discovery), uniqueness is not required and is not enforced through technical means. The RIPE NCC generates Subject names to minimise the chance that two entities in the RPKI will be assigned the same name. Specifically, the generated subject based on the public key hash (described in Section 3.1.1.) keeps hash, as described in 3.1.1, reduces the likelihood of accidental collisions to a negligible minimum.

delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815746"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62822965"> delete: </a> 3.1.6. insert: <h4 class="western">

3. 1. 6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks

Since Because the subject names are not intended to be meaningful, the RIPE NCC makes there is no provision either to recognise or to authenticate trademarks, service marks, etc.

delete: <h3> delete: <a name="_Toc62815747"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62822966"> delete: </a> 3.2. insert: <h3 class="western">

3. 2. Initial Identity Validation

delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815748"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62822967"> delete: </a> 3.2.1. insert: <h4 class="western">

3. 2. 1. Method to prove possession of private key

For the Offline CA, proof of possession of the private keys used for the self-signed certificate can be determined internally.

For the ACA, which Online CA that acts as a subscriber to the Offline CA, and for the Production CA, which acts as a subscriber to the ACA, possession of the private keys is affected effected via the procedures used to generate and manage these keys. Specifically, the RIPE NCC uses a hardware security module (HSM) to generate the key pairs for each of these CAs. This CAs and thus assures that the private key is appropriately associated with the public key in the certificates issued by each of these CAs. CAs

For the hosted member CAs that act as subscribers to the Production Online CA, possession of the private keys is affected effected by the system. Note that the hosted member CAs are managed systems and operators do not access the keys directly. These CAs will contact the Production Online CA as needed, needed via protocols internal to the RIPE NCC. These protocols also cover proof of possession of the private keys.

delete: <p> The Delegated CA, which acts as a subscriber to the Production CA, holds its own key pair. The issuing or renewal of Certificates is performed via the provisioning  protocol. See [ delete: <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6492"> RFC 6492 delete: </a> ]. delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815749"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62822968"> delete: </a> 3.2.2. insert: <h4 class="western">

3. 2. 2. Authentication of organisation identity

Certificates The hosted Member CA is available only to RIPE NCC Members. The RIPE NCC has already established procedures to verify the identity of the RIPE NCC Members. These procedures are explained here: insert: </p>

insert: <p>

insert: <a class="external-link" href="http://www.ripe.net/info/faq/membership/newlir-setup.html#1"> http://www.ripe.net/info/faq/membership/newlir-setup.html#1 insert: </a> insert: </p>

insert: <p>

However it should be noted that certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the organisational identity of subscribers. However, certificates are issued to subscribers in a fashion that preserves the accuracy of INR registrations certificate holders. This is also reflected by the seemingly random subject names as represented in the RIPE NCC’s records. delete: </p> delete: <p> The RIPE NCC has already established procedures to verify the identity of Certificate Holders. See section 3.2.3. below. described in 3.1.3.

For hosted CAs, member CAs the RIPE NCC is able to map a logged-in logged in user to a specific organisation, and the organisation can be mapped to a specific public key. Thus, Thus the RIPE NCC is able to map these public keys to a specific set of resources as represented in the RIPE NCC records.

delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815750"> insert: <h4 class="western">

insert: <a name="Authenticationofindiv"> delete: <a name="_Toc62822969"> delete: </a> 3.2.3. 3. 2. 3. Authentication of individual identity

Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the individual identity of a subscriber. However, the RIPE NCC maintains contact information for each subscriber to support certificate renewal, re-key, and revocation. delete: </p> delete: <p> delete: <strong> Offline CA delete: </strong> delete: </p> delete: <p> Individuals The individuals who are authorised to operate the Offline CA are authenticated by possession of the necessary HSM keycards key cards and via physical and procedural security access controls.

delete: <strong> Hosted CAs delete: </strong> delete: </p> delete: <p> For hosted member CAs, individual identity is delegated to “Admin” and “Regular” the RIPE NCC Member's LIR Portal "admin" user. Admin users in the RIPE NCC’s must set up users for their LIR Portal. New users and associate them with the ‘certification‘ role in order to grant individuals access to the certification section. insert: </p>

insert: <p>

The admin user's identity can be added by the current (re-)established using the admin user and granted either “Admin” or “Regular” status. This user can then also maintain their CA. password reset procedure: insert: </p>

insert: <p>

insert: <a class="external-link" href="https://lirportal.ripe.net/lirportal/activation/activation_request.html"> https://lirportal.ripe.net/lirportal/activation/activation_request.html insert: </a> insert: </p>

insert: <p>

The reset procedure involves two halves of a code that are sent via two separate paths, email and fax, that need to be combined in order to reset the "admin" account's password.

For the Online CA, the same mechanism is used as described for hosted End User CAs, individual identity is delegated to the LIR Portal account associated with the  delete: <strong> organisation delete: </strong>  object referenced in the PI assignment. For more information, please refer to the documentation on  delete: <a data-val="f1d8169da0084d3bac4bd46139744a26" href="../../../resolveuid/f1d8169da0084d3bac4bd46139744a26" data-linktype="internal"> RPKI for End Users delete: </a> . delete: </p> delete: <p> delete: <strong> Production CA and ACA delete: </strong> delete: </p> delete: <p> For the Production CA and the ACA, the mechanism for hosted CA users is used. However, it member CA users. It should be noted noted, however, that these users require an additional role that cannot can not be set through the public user management interface. Maintenance can also be performed through the internal admin interface. delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815751"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62822970"> delete: </a> 3.2.4. insert: </p>

insert: <h4 class="western">

3. 2. 4. Non-verified subscriber information

No non-verified subscriber data is included in certificates issued under this certificate policy, except for Subject Information Access (SIA) extensions [ delete: <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6487"> RFC 6487 delete: </a> ]. delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815752"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62822971"> delete: </a> 3.2.5. policy. insert: </p>

insert: <h4 class="western">

3. 2. 5. Validation of authority

The procedure to verify Access to the Offline CA is restricted to a Developer that an individual claiming to represent the subscriber is authorised to represent the subscriber for different CAs is as follows: delete: </p> delete: <ul> delete: <li> Access to the Offline CA is restricted to a RIPE NCC engineer with has access to the UNIX Unix account on the server. In addition, the HSM key cards are protected by pass phrases known only to the individual CA Operators (see Section 5.2.3. insert: <a> insert: <span> section 5. 2. 3 insert: </span> insert: </a> for a description of the CA Operator role). delete: </li> delete: <li> insert: </p>

insert: <p>

Access to the Production CA and ACA Online CA is restricted to RIPE NCC CA Operators using internal admin interface. delete: </li> delete: <li> For access the LIR Portal to log in and having an additional role enabled by the administrators of the single sign-on system (this role can not be set by others). insert: </p>

insert: <p>

Access to the hosted CA, see Section 3.2.3. above. delete: </li> delete: </ul> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815753"> member CA is restricted to users of the LIR Portal that have the "certification" role enabled by the "admin" user for their registry. insert: </p>

insert: <h4 class="western">

insert: <a name="Criteriaforinteropera"> delete: <a name="_Toc62822972"> delete: </a> 3.2.6. 3. 2. 6. Criteria for interoperation

The RPKI is not intended or designed to interoperate with any other PKI. delete: </p> delete: <h3> delete: <a name="_Toc62815754"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62822973"> delete: </a> 3.3. PKI at this stage. insert: </p>

insert: <p>

The function of the Online CA will be extended in the future to interoperate with the other four RIRs and RIPE NCC Members operating their own CAs. insert: </p>

insert: <h3 class="western">

3. 3. Identification and Authentication for Re-key Re-Key Requests

delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815755"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62822974"> delete: </a> 3.3.1. insert: <h4 class="western">

3. 3. 1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key

The procedure to ensure that a subscriber requesting routine re-key is the legitimate holder of the Certificate is as follows: delete: </p> delete: <ul> delete: <li> For the Offline CA and ACA, Online CA the same identification and authentication mechanisms apply as described in Section 3.2.3. delete: </li> delete: <li> insert: <a> insert: <span> section 3. 2. 3 insert: </span> insert: </a> . insert: </p>

insert: <p>

For hosted CAs, member CAs routine re-keys are automated by the software and no explicit authentication is required. A routine re-key is initiated whenever the current key for a hosted member CA is older than five years. insert: </p>

insert: <p>

The key rollover roll over algorithm is described in [ delete: <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6489"> RFC 6489 insert: <a> insert: <span> [RFC6489] insert: </span> ]. delete: </li> delete: <li> Non-hosted CAs will have to handle re-keys on their own, as the private key is unknown to the RIPE NCC. delete: </li> delete: </ul> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815756"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62822975"> delete: </a> 3.3.2. . insert: </p>

insert: <h4 class="western">

3. 3. 2. Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation

The old key can be revoked as the final step in key rollover algorithm [ delete: <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6489"> RFC 6489 insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#RFC6489"> insert: <span> [RFC6489] insert: </span> ], once , after a new key has been activated.

In the RIPE NCC’s our implementation, old keys are not automatically revoked after a routine re-key. Explicit revocation of old keys can be done by CA Operators of the Offline CA and the Online CA. CA Operators for the Online CA can also revoke old keys for specific hosted member CAs. Identification and authentication for these roles is has been described in Section 3.2.3. delete: </p> delete: <p> This insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#Authenticationofindiv"> insert: <span> section 3. 2. 3 insert: </span> insert: </a> . insert: </p>

insert: <p>

The RIPE NCC implementation may change after further following discussion of the key rollover standard, which as the standard is currently unclear about whether revocation of the old key should be revoked done immediately. The current Current belief is that there is no reason for (security or operational) why old keys should not to be automatically revoked after a successful re-key. This re-key, so that may therefore well be updated implemented in the near future.

delete: <h3> delete: <a name="_Toc62815757"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62822976"> delete: </a> 3.4. insert: <h3 class="western">

3. 4. Identification and Authentication for Revocation Request

For hosted CAs, the holder of the INRs can contact the RIPE NCC Registry Services Department to request the certificate revocation. It member CAs it should be also noted that user actions in the interface may result in revocation of EE certificates used for objects (such as ROAs) that should be invalidated.

delete: <p> For non-hosted CAs, the holder can request the revocation in the user interface. delete: </p> delete: <h2> delete: <a name="_Toc62815758"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62822977"> delete: </a> insert: <h2 class="western">

4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements

delete: <h3> delete: <a name="_Toc62815759"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62822978"> delete: </a> 4.1. insert: <h3 class="western">

4. 1. Certificate Application

delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815760"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62822979"> delete: </a> 4.1.1. insert: <h4 class="western">

4. 1. 1. Who is able to can submit a certificate application

Any RIPE NCC member or End User holding INRs distributed by the RIPE NCC Member may submit a certificate application to this CA.  delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815761"> request a certificate. insert: </p>

insert: <h4 class="western">

insert: <a name="Enrolmentprocessandr"> delete: <a name="_Toc62822980"> delete: </a> 4.1.2. 4. 1. 2. Enrolment process and responsibilities

For the Offline CA, an Engineer CA a Developer can configure and initialise the CA on a server controlled by the RIPE NCC (see Section 5.2.1. insert: <a> insert: <span> section 5. 2. 1 insert: </span> insert: </a> for a description of the Engineer Developer role).

For the ACA and the Production CA, an Engineer Online CA a Developer can install and initialise the application. When this has been done, done a CA Operator can log in and initialise the ACA and the Production Online CA.

For hosted CAs, any member CAs: RIPE NCC Members may use a hosted member or End User may choose to use a RIPE NCC-hosted Certification Authority or may choose to set up their own non-hosted CA. delete: </p> delete: <p> CA hosted by the RIPE NCC as part of the RIPE NCC LIR portal. In order to activate the hosted CA, member CA an "Admin" or “Regular” "admin" user must log in to the LIR Portal. and grant the "certification" role to a normal user. This user must then log in and ensure that a client certificate has been generated for them (or generate one if this is missing). delete: </p> delete: <p> The user that has the "certification" role will then be able to click through on a link labelled "RPKI Dashboard". labeled "Certification". This link will take the user to a page where they must explicitly opt in to the hosted CA service. The user does member CA service - they do this by clicking "Yes, I want to activate my hosted member CA". After activation, an a mostly automated hosted member CA will be created. Authentication and authorisation for further automated processes should be considered transitive from the moment that user opts-in and activates opted-in and activated the hosted CA. delete: </p> delete: <h3> delete: <a name="_Toc62815762"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62822981"> delete: </a> 4.2. member CA, as described here. insert: </p>

insert: <h3 class="western">

4. 2. Certificate Application Processing

For hosted CAs, member CAs an initial CA certificate should be is requested automatically by an the system when the authorised representative through the RPKI Dashboard in the LIR Portal. delete: </p> delete: <p> The requester will be asked to choose the type of the CA as described in Section 4.1.2. and agree to the  delete: <a data-val="57095a23-e0ed-448f-84b2-f53e2a3c28dd" href="../../../resolveuid/57095a23-e0ed-448f-84b2-f53e2a3c28dd" data-linktype="internal"> RIPE NCC Certification Service Terms and Conditions delete: </a> . delete: </p> delete: <p> In the case of a hosted CA, the system will automatically create the certificate in the LIR Portal. The subscriber will need to accept the RIPE NCC Certification Service Terms and Conditions by clicking “I accept. Create my Certification Authority”. This way, the subscriber confirms that they have read, understood, and agree to be bound by these terms and conditions. delete: </p> delete: <p> For non-hosted CA, the requester will need to upload the identity .xml file generated by their CA software. delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815763"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62822982"> delete: </a> 4.2.1. user chooses to opt in to the service. insert: </p>

insert: <h4 class="western">

4. 2. 1. Performing identification and authentication functions

See Section 3.2.3. for identification and authentication practice of certificate applicants. delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815764"> insert: <a> insert: <span> section 3. 2. 3 insert: </span> delete: <a name="_Toc62822983"> . insert: </p>

insert: <h4 class="western">

insert: <a name="Approvalofcertificate"> 4.2.2. 4. 2. 2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications

The online CA will issue certificates to hosted member CAs that are valid until with a validity time to the end of the calendar year, plus a further six-month six months grace period to allow for renewal before the certificate expires.

All Provider Aggregatable (PA) resources registered to a the RIPE NCC member Member at the time of issuance will be included in the certificate. All Provider Independent (PI) insert: </p>

insert: <p>

For hosted member CAs, the system will automatically request renewal of the CA certificate that lists all eligible resources registered to the End User at the when new resources are received by the RIPE NCC Member and/or a new validity time of issuance will be included in the certificate. delete: </p> delete: <p> Certificates cannot be issued when: delete: </p> delete: <ul> delete: <li> The RIPE NCC member does not hold any Internet number resources delete: </li> delete: <li> Service level for a RIPE NCC member has been suspended (e.g.  delete: <a href="http://www.ripe.net/participate/billing/procedure" data-linktype="external" data-val="http://www.ripe.net/participate/billing/procedure"> due to non-payment delete: </a> ). delete: </li> delete: </ul> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815765"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62822984"> delete: </a> 4.2.3. is applicable. insert: </p>

insert: <h4 class="western">

4. 2. 3. Time to process certificate applications

Certificates are generated automatically upon request by a The RIPE NCC member or End User delete: </p> delete: <p> and processed immediately. delete: </p> delete: <p> In case the automated process is not functional, a RIPE NCC member or End User can request will issue a certificate manually, via a  delete: <a data-val="b52147b8f01347f7a3ac36a266768ab2" href="../../../resolveuid/b52147b8f01347f7a3ac36a266768ab2?topic=rpki" data-linktype="internal"> request form delete: </a>  on the RIPE NCC website. These requests will be processed attesting to resource allocations within one business day. delete: </p> delete: <h3> delete: <a name="_Toc62815766"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62822985"> delete: </a> 4.3. day of approval of the certificate application. insert: </p>

insert: <h3 class="western">

4. 3. Certificate Issuance

delete: <h4> delete: <a id="4-3-1"> delete: </a> 4.3.1. insert: <h4 class="western">

4. 3. 1. CA actions during certificate issuance

The Offline CA will produce a response message that includes all publishable certificates and other objects after the certificate has been issued. This message can be physically transferred to the Production CA and the ACA, Online CA, where it is published.

The Production CA and the ACA, as well as Online CA and hosted CAs, member CAs make all subordinate certificates and objects available for publication. While In practice, the system will make a best effort to publish these materials as soon as possible, but as described in insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#TimeoorFFrequencyofPub"> insert: <span> section 2. 3 insert: </span> insert: </a> , publication should happen within no later more than eight 24 hours after issuance (as described in Section 2.3.) delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815767"> of issuance. insert: </p>

insert: <h4 class="western">

insert: <a name="Notificationtosubscri"> delete: <a name="_Toc62822986"> delete: </a> 4.3.2. 4. 3. 2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate

For Publication of a certificate in the repository operated by RIPE NCC member and End User CAs, there is no active notification to is the means by which a subscriber about is notified of certificate issuance. The approved and published certificate is visible in the RPKI Dashboard in the LIR Portal and in the RIPE NCC-hosted repository. delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815768"> This procedure is employed by all CAs covered by this CPS. insert: </p>

insert: <h4 class="western">

insert: <a name="Notificationofcertifi"> delete: <a name="_Toc62822987"> delete: </a> 4.3.3. 4. 3. 3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities

Publication of a certificate in the repository operated by the RIPE NCC is the means by which other entities are notified of certificate issuance.

delete: <h3> delete: <a id="4-4"> delete: </a> 4.4. insert: <h3 class="western">

4. 4. Certificate Acceptance

delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815769"> insert: <h4 class="western">

insert: <a name="Conductconstitutingce"> delete: <a name="_Toc62822988"> delete: </a> 4.4.1. 4. 4. 1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance

When A subscriber is presumed to have accepted a certificate is issued, issued by any of the Certificate Authorities covered by this CPS and published in the RIPE NCC CA will publish it in the repository. delete: </p> delete: <p> After the Certificate is issued, repository unless the subscriber can see the updated number of issued certificates under “Certified Resources” in the RPKI Dashboard in the LIR Portal. delete: </p> delete: <p> Certificate acceptance by the subscriber is not part of the process. delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815770"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62822989"> delete: </a> 4.4.2. contacts the RIPE NCC. insert: </p>

insert: <h4 class="western">

4. 4. 2. Publication of the certificate by the CA

Certificates will be published in the repository system within eight hours one business day of being issued by any of the CAs covered by this CPS.

delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815771"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62822990"> delete: </a> 4.4.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities delete: </h4> delete: <p> There are no entities other than the subscriber who are notified when a certificate is issued. delete: </p> delete: <h3> delete: <a name="_Toc62815772"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62822991"> delete: </a> 4.5. insert: <h3 class="western">

4. 5. Key Pair and Certificate Usage

A summary of the use model for the RPKI IP Address and AS Number PKI is provided below.

delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815773"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62822992"> delete: </a> 4.5.1. insert: <h4 class="western">

4. 5. 1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage

The hosted member CAs receive CA certificates from the Online CA. This means that these certificates could in principal be used to issue subordinate CA certificates. However, the hosted system does not provide this functionality. The hosted member CA certificates will only be used (by the system) to issue EE certificates used for RPKI-signed objects (such as ROAs) and manifests. The private key associated with each of these certificates is used to sign subordinate (CA or EE) certificates and CRLs. delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815774"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62822993"> delete: </a> 4.5.2. insert: </p>

insert: <h4 class="western">

4. 5. 2. Relying party public key and certificate usage

Reliance on a certificate must be reasonable under the circumstances. If the circumstances indicate a need for additional assurances, the relying party must obtain such assurances in order for such reliance to be deemed reasonable.

Before any act of reliance, relying parties independently: delete: </p> delete: <ul> delete: <li> Verify MUST independently (1) verify that the certificate will be used for an appropriate purpose that is not prohibited or otherwise restricted by this CPS (see insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#CPSAdministration"> insert: <span> section 1.4.) delete: </li> delete: <li> Assess 1. 5 insert: </span> insert: </a> ), and (2) assess the status of the certificate and all the CAs in the chain (terminating at the RIPE NCC Trust Anchor) that issued the certificates relevant to the certificate in question (terminating at the RIPE NCC Trust Anchor accepted by the Relying arty). question. If any of the certificates in this the certificate chain have been revoked or have expired, revoked, the relying party is solely responsible for determining whether reliance on a digital signature to be verified by the certificate in question is acceptable. Any such reliance is made solely at the risk of the relying party, as defined by the  delete: <a data-val="22d4440d-d129-428f-9b98-808f1c0e6ccf" href="../../../resolveuid/22d4440d-d129-428f-9b98-808f1c0e6ccf" data-linktype="internal"> RIPE NCC Certification Repository Terms and Conditions delete: </a> . delete: </li> delete: </ul> party. insert: </p>

If a relying party determines that use of the certificate is appropriate, the relying party must utilise appropriate software and/or hardware to perform digital signature verification as a condition of relying on the certificate. Moreover, Moreover the relying party must MUST validate the certificate in a manner consistent with the RPKI certificate profile [ delete: <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6487"> RFC 6487 insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#RFC6487"> insert: <span> [RFC6487] insert: </span> ], , which specifies the extended validation algorithm for RPKI certificates.

delete: <h3> delete: <a name="_Toc62815775"> insert: <h3 class="western">

insert: <a name="CertificaterRenewal"> delete: <a name="_Toc62822994"> delete: </a> 4.6. 4. 6. Certificate Renewal

Note that the hosted member CAs do not issue CA certificates to subordinate CAs and there is no need for certificate renewal for EE certificates used for signed objects. However, hosted member CAs are mentioned a few times in this section as children of the Production CA and the ACA. delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a id="4-6-1"> delete: </a> 4.6.1. Circumstances Online CA. insert: </p>

insert: <h4 class="western">

4. 6. 1. Circumstance for certificate renewal

A For hosted member CAs: When new Internet number resources are associated with a RIPE NCC Member or a new validity time is applicable (see insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#Approvalofcertificate"> insert: <span> section 4. 2. 2 insert: </span> insert: </a> ) a certificate will be renewed for hosted CAs when new INRs are associated with a RIPE NCC member or End User, or a new validity period is applied (see Section 4.2.2). renewed.

Note that if INRs in case Internet number resources are no longer associated with a RIPE NCC member or End user, the Production CA and the ACA Member the Online CA will re-issue a new certificate – certificate, minus those Internet number resources – resources, and revoke overclaiming certificates, as described in Section 4.9. delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62822995"> insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#CertificateRevocationaan"> insert: <span> section 4. 9 insert: </span> 4.6.2. . insert: </p>

insert: <h4 class="western">

4. 6. 2. Who may request renewal

For hosted member CAs, the requests for renewal process is are fully automated, which means that the subscriber cannot initiate renewal. automated.

For the Production CA and the ACA, a Online CA, RIPE NCC Engineer staff with the Online CA Administrator role can request renewal from the Offline CA.

For the Offline CA, Internet number resources may have to be added to the self-signed certificate. A RIPE NCC Engineer staff with the appropriate role may perform this action.

delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815777"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62822996"> delete: </a> 4.6.3 insert: <h4 class="western">

4. 6. 3. Processing certificate renewal requests

See 4.6.1. delete: </p> delete: <p> For hosted CAs, the system will automatically request renewal of the CA certificate that lists all eligible INRs when new resources are received by a RIPE NCC member or End User, or a new validity period is applicable. delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815778"> The same stipulations listed in insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#Approvalofcertificate"> insert: <span> section 4. 2. 2 insert: </span> delete: <a name="_Toc62822997"> delete: </a> 4.6.4. apply here. insert: </p>

insert: <h4 class="western">

4. 6. 4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber

See Section 4.3.2. (Notification to Subscriber by the CA of Issuance of Certificate). delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815779"> insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#Notificationtosubscri"> insert: <span> section 4. 3. 2 insert: </span> delete: <a name="_Toc62822998"> delete: </a> 4.6.5. . insert: </p>

insert: <h4 class="western">

4. 6. 5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate

See Section 4.4.1. (Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance). delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815780"> insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#Conductconstitutingce"> insert: <span> section 4. 4. 1 insert: </span> delete: <a name="_Toc62822999"> delete: </a> 4.6.6. . insert: </p>

insert: <h4 class="western">

4. 6. 6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA

The Both the Offline CA, Production CA, and the ACA, CA and Online CA will all publish renewed subordinate CA certificates within eight hours one business day of issuance.

delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815781"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823000"> delete: </a> 4.6.7. insert: <h4 class="western">

4. 6. 7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities

See Section 4.3.2. (Notification to Subscriber by the CA of Issuance of Certificate). delete: </p> delete: <h3> delete: <a id="4-7"> insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#Notificationtosubscri"> insert: <span> section 4. 3. 2 insert: </span> 4.7. . insert: </p>

insert: <h3 class="western">

4. 7. Certificate Re-Key  Re-Key

Hosted Note that the hosted member CAs do not issue CA certificates to subordinate CAs and there is no need for certificate re-key for EE certificates used for signed objects. However, However hosted member CAs are mentioned a few times in this section as children of the Online CA.

delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815782"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823001"> delete: </a> 4.7.1. insert: <h4 class="western">

4. 7. 1. Circumstance for certificate re-key

Re-key As per the RPKI CP, re-key of a certificate should will be performed only when required, requested, based on:

delete: <ul> insert: <ol>

1. Confirmed/suspected insert: <p>

   Knowledge or suspicion of compromise or loss of the associated private key key, or insert: </p>

2. insert: <p>

   Expiration of the cryptographic lifetime of the associated key pair insert: </p>

delete: </ul> insert: </ol>

If a certificate is revoked to replace the resource extensions (see  delete: <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc3779.pdf"> RFC 3779 (see insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#rescertificateprofile"> insert: <span> [res-certificate-profile] insert: </span> ), , the replacement certificate will incorporate the same public key (not key, not a new key). key, unless the subscriber requests a re-key at the same time. If the re-key is based on a suspected compromise, then the previous certificate will be revoked.

Section 5.6 of [ delete: <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6484"> RFC 6484 delete: </a> ] the Certificate Policy notes that when a CA signs a certificate, the signing key should have a validity period which that exceeds that the validity period of the certificate. This places additional constraints on when a CA should request a re-key.

delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815783"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823002"> delete: </a> 4.7.2. insert: <h4 class="western">

4. 7. 2. Who may request certification of a new public key

For hosted member CAs, an automated key roll over is performed when the key has been in use for five years. Authentication and authorisation for this is considered transitive from opt in (see insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#Enrolmentprocessandr"> insert: <span> section 4. 1. 2 insert: </span> insert: </a> ). insert: </p>

insert: <p>

For the RIPE NCC Hosted Online CA, Production CA, and the ACA, there is no scheduled a manual key rollover. rollover is planned to be performed every five years. This manual rollover can be initiated by a RIPE NCC Engineer in the event of an outage. delete: </p> delete: <p> The RIPE NCC may also initiate a re-key based on a verified compromise report. delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815784"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823003"> delete: </a> 4.7.3. staff in the Online CA Administrator role. insert: </p>

insert: <h4 class="western">

4. 7. 3. Processing certificate re-keying requests

The procedure in Section 4.2.2 applies same stipulations listed in insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#Approvalofcertificate"> insert: <span> section 4. 2. 2 insert: </span> insert: </a> apply here.

delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815785"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823004"> delete: </a> 4.7.4. insert: <h4 class="western">

4. 7. 4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber

See insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#Notificationtosubscri"> insert: <span> section 4.3.2. delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815786"> 4. 3. 2 insert: </span> delete: <a name="_Toc62823005"> delete: </a> 4.7.5. . insert: </p>

insert: <p>

4. 7. 5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate delete: </h4> insert: </p>

See insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#Conductconstitutingce"> insert: <span> section 4.4.1. delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815787"> 4. 4. 1 insert: </span> delete: <a name="_Toc62823006"> delete: </a> 4.7.6. . insert: </p>

insert: <h4 class="western">

4. 7. 6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA

For all CAs Certificate Authorities covered by this CPS, a re-keyed certificate will be published in the repository system within eight hours one business day of being issued by this CA.

delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815788"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823007"> delete: </a> 4.7.7. insert: <h4 class="western">

4. 7. 7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities

See insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#Notificationofcertifi"> insert: <span> section 4.3.3. delete: </p> delete: <h3> delete: <a id="4-8"> 4. 3. 3 insert: </span> 4.8. . insert: </p>

insert: <h3 class="western">

4. 8. Certificate Modification

delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815789"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823008"> delete: </a> 4.8.1. insert: <h4 class="western">

4. 8. 1. Circumstance for certificate modification

Certificate modification is not applicable to the CAs described here. Renewal is used when new resources are being to be certified, or a new validity period is applicable (Section 4.6). time is applicable, as described in insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#CertificaterRenewal"> insert: <span> section 4. 6 insert: </span> insert: </a> . Re-issuance and revocation is used when resources are no longer held by an entity (Section 4.9.). delete: </p> delete: <h3> delete: <a name="_Toc62815790"> entity, as described in insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#CertificateRevocationaan"> insert: <span> section 4. 9 insert: </span> delete: <a name="_Toc62823009"> . insert: </p>

insert: <h3 class="western">

insert: <a name="CertificateRevocationaan"> 4.9. 4. 9. Certificate Revocation and Suspension

delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815791"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823010"> delete: </a> 4.9.1. insert: <h4 class="western">

4. 9. 1. Circumstances for revocation

Certificates must can be revoked for several reasons:

• insert: <p>

  A signed object needs to be invalidated insert: </p>

  insert: </li>
insert: <li>
• insert: <p>

  One or more listed INRs Internet number resources are no longer associated with the RIPE NCC member or End User Member insert: </p>

• insert: <p>

  As a the last step steps when doing a planned re-key (clean up) insert: </p>

delete: </ul> insert: <li>

• As a the last step steps when doing an unplanned re-key because a loss or compromise of the old key has come to light

  delete: <ul> delete: <li> The RIPE NCC member violates the RIPE NCC Certification Service Terms and Conditions

delete: <p> A certificate may be revoked if a signed object needs to be invalidated. delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815792"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823011"> delete: </a> 4.9.2. insert: <h4 class="western">

4. 9. 2. Who can request revocation

For Hosted and Delegated the hosted member CAs, revocation of their CA certificate can be performed automatically via the RPKI Dashboard in the LIR Portal, by RIPE NCC staff on request or when RIPE NCC staff have reason to believe the keys have been are compromised. In the latter case this latter case, this would will always be performed as the final step of an emergency key rollover for the hosted member CA. delete: </p> delete: <p> For Delegated CAs, the revocation request can be done via the RPKI Dashboard in the LIR Portal. delete: </p> delete: <p> The other circumstances for revocation, most notably when ROA objects need to be invalidated because a user of the hosted member CA changes the specification, are managed automatically by the system.

For the Production CA and the ACA, Online CA, the RIPE NCC may manually request revocation of the old CA certificate as soon as a key rollover has been performed. Related events, most notably the revocation of the EE certificates used for manifests, are managed by the system.

delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815793"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823012"> delete: </a> 4.9.3. insert: <h4 class="western">

4. 9. 3. Procedure for revocation request

When one or more of the INRs Internet number resources listed in a certificate are no longer associated with a RIPE NCC member or End User, Member, the Online CA will:

• insert: <p>

  Re-issue a new certificate that retains certificate, minus the lost Internet number resources, but maintaining all other properties (minus the affected INRs) insert: </p>

• insert: <p>

  Publish the new certificate using the same publication point as before, thus replacing the old certificate insert: </p>

• insert: <p>

  Revoke any non-expired certificates held by the hosted member CA that list the affected INRs, lost Internet number resources, thus invalidating any signed objects (such as ROAs) that refer to these resources Internet number resources. insert: </p>

delete: <p> For Delegated CAs, a new certificate not be issued automatically once the revocation request has been completed. This will have to be requested again via the LIR Portal. delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815794"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823013"> delete: </a> 4.9.4. insert: <h4 class="western">

4. 9. 4. Revocation request grace period

Any party or operators who can that is able to identify a the need for revocation that is not already handled by the system are and operators is expected to notify the RIPE NCC as soon as possible. delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815795"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823014"> delete: </a> 4.9.5. within one business day. insert: </p>

insert: <h4 class="western">

4. 9. 5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request

The RIPE NCC will process a revocation request within eight hours one business day of receipt and validation of the request.

delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815796"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823015"> delete: </a> 4.9.6. insert: <h4 class="western">

4. 9. 6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties

As per [ delete: <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6484"> RFC 6484 delete: </a> ], whenever the CP, a relying party validates a certificate, it is responsible for acquiring and checking the most recent, scheduled CRL from the issuer of the certificate delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815797"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823016"> delete: </a> 4.9.7. certificate, whenever that relying party validates a certificate. insert: </p>

insert: <h4 class="western">

4. 9. 7. CRL issuance frequency

Each CRL contains a “Next Update” value, will carry a nextScheduledUpdate value and a new CRL will be published at or before that time. The RIPE NCC will set the “Next Update” nextScheduledUpdate value when it issues a CRL to signal when the next scheduled CRL will be issued. delete: </p> delete: <p> delete: <strong> The CAs covered by this CPS use different values: delete: </strong> delete: </p> delete: <table class="table"> delete: <colgroup> delete: <col width="&quot;20%"> delete: <col width="80%"> delete: </colgroup> delete: <tbody> delete: <tr> delete: <td> insert: </p>

Offline CA: delete: </p> delete: <p>      delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> 3 months from the moment of issuance

delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: <tr> delete: <td> delete: <p> CA:      delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> insert: <p>

Online CA: 24 hours from the moment of issuance

delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: <tr> delete: <td>

Hosted CAs:   delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> member CAs: 24 hours from the moment of issuance

delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: <tr> delete: <td> delete: <p> ACA delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> 24 hours from the moment of issuance delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: </tbody> delete: </table>

As a matter of good operational practice, sense, all CAs covered by this CPS will aim strive to republish and re-issue a new CRL before the next scheduled update value, to allow value in time to deal with any operational problems.

It should be noted that the values listed here may be used by relying parties to determine the need to fetch an updated CRL. delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815798"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823017"> delete: </a> 4.9.8. In particular this means that a possible revocation by the Offline CA may go unnoticed for three months - this should not be a problem since the production keys are protected by an HSM. A revoked ROA for a hosted member CA may not be noticed for 24 hours. The values here should be regarded as a compromise between various aspects, including the operational burden of re-signing (for Offline CA), time needed to be able to do an emergency restore, efficiency of caching in the global RPKI, propagation time of revocation in the global RPKI. insert: </p>

insert: <h4 class="western">

4. 9. 8. Maximum latency for CRLs

A CRL will be published posted to the repository system within one hour of their generation. delete: </p> delete: <h3> delete: <a name="_Toc62815799"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823018"> delete: </a> 4.10. issuance. insert: </p>

insert: <h4 class="western">

4. 9. 9. On-line revocation/status checking availability [OMITTED] insert: </h4>

insert: <h4 class="western">

4. 9. 10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED] insert: </h4>

insert: <h4 class="western">

4. 9. 11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available [OMITTED] insert: </h4>

insert: <h4 class="western">

4. 9. 12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED] insert: </h4>

insert: <h4 class="western">

4. 9. 13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED] insert: </h4>

insert: <h4 class="western">

4. 9. 14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED] insert: </h4>

insert: <h4 class="western">

4. 9. 15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED] insert: </h4>

insert: <h4 class="western">

4. 9. 16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED] insert: </h4>

insert: <h3 class="western">

4. 10. Certificate Status Services

The RIPE NCC will only issue CRLs and does These CAs do not support Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) or the Server-Based (OCSP), but rather use Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP). delete: </p> delete: <h2> delete: <a name="_Toc62815800"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823019"> delete: </a> Revocation Lists (CRLs). insert: </p>

insert: <h4 class="western">

4. 10. 1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED] insert: </h4>

insert: <h4 class="western">

4. 10. 2. Service availability [OMITTED] insert: </h4>

insert: <h4 class="western">

4. 10. 3. Optional features [OMITTED] insert: </h4>

insert: <h3 class="western">

4. 11. End of Subscription [OMITTED] insert: </h3>

insert: <h3 class="western">

4. 12. Key Escrow and Recovery [OMITTED] insert: </h3>

insert: <h4 class="western">

4. 12. 1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED] insert: </h4>

insert: <h4 class="western">

4. 12. 2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED] insert: </h4>

insert: <h2 class="western">

5. Facility, Management and Operational Controls

delete: <h3> delete: <a name="_Toc62815801"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823020"> delete: </a> 5.1. insert: <h3 class="western">

5. 1. Physical Controls

delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815802"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823021"> delete: </a> 5.1.1. insert: <h4 class="western">

5. 1. 1. Site location and construction

For the Offline CA, operations are conducted within the physically-protected a physically protected area of a data centre where an office building in which the RIPE NCC is a tenant. This building is located at:

Equinix AM3 delete: <br /> Science Park 610 delete: <br /> 1098 XH Singel 258 insert: </p>

insert: <p>

1016AB Amsterdam delete: <br /> insert: </p>

insert: <p>

The Netherlands

The RIPE NCC space within this facility includes offices and meeting spaces and two machine rooms. insert: </p>

insert: <p>

For the Production CA and hosted member CAs, core cryptographic operations are performed by virtual two machines and their respective HSMs physically located in two different data centres centers in a load balanced (and fail-over) fail over) set up. insert: </p>

insert: <p>

The two data centres centers are:

Equinix AM3 delete: <br /> Nikhef: insert: </p>

insert: <p>

Science Park 610 delete: <br /> 1098 XH 105 insert: </p>

insert: <p>

1098XG Amsterdam delete: <br /> insert: </p>

insert: <p>

The Netherlands

Equinix AM5 delete: <br /> Schepenbergweg 42 delete: <br /> 1105 AT insert: </p>

insert: <p>

Telecity 2: insert: </p>

insert: <p>

Kuiperbergweg 13 insert: </p>

insert: <p>

1101AE Amsterdam delete: <br /> insert: </p>

insert: <p>

The Netherlands

delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815803"> insert: <h4 class="western">

insert: <a name="Physicalaccess"> delete: <a name="_Toc62823022"> delete: </a> 5.1.2. 5. 1. 2. Physical access

For both Equinix AM3 and AM5, the Offline CA, physical access is restricted to the RIPE NCC's IT staff and senior managers. The access system relies on personal smart cards. Access to areas is logged every moment of the day on our access system, this data is mirrored at the same moment to another server, located in another building. CCTV is in operation and recordings are kept for one week. insert: </p>

insert: <p>

For Nikhef, physical IT staff may request access for themselves. IT management may request access for others. Access is logged by the reception and the electronic access system. The server is physically located in one of five racks rented by the RIPE NCC. The racks are kept locked and have their own key set. They are located in a machine room that includes rack space rented by third parties. insert: </p>

insert: <p>

For Telecity2, IT staff may request access for themselves. IT management may request access for others. The server is physically located in one of four racks that are rented by the RIPE NCC. These The racks are housed in a special suite that is suite, dedicated to the RIPE NCC only. delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a id="5-1-3"> delete: </a> 5.1.3. Only Telecity2 staff can open the suite for us and access is logged by the reception. insert: </p>

insert: <h4 class="western">

5. 1. 3. Power and air conditioning

The offline CA server is located in an air conditioned server room in the RIPE NCC office building. At the moment of writing we do not monitor power, but we are running a project to overcome this. It should be noted that power outages are not expected to have an impact on this CA since it is kept offline when not in use. insert: </p>

insert: <p>

For Nikhef, power consumption and air conditioning are monitored by the provider. Should power consumption exceed the maximum allowance, the RIPE NCC will receive an invoice, but power will not be cut. Nikhef has an uninterruptible power supply (UPS) to overcome immediate power failures, and a generator with enough fuel to cover for arrival of more fuel and/or fixing the power failure. insert: </p>

insert: <p>

For Telecity2, power consumption and air conditioning are monitored by the provider. Should power consumption exceed the maximum allowance, the RIPE NCC will receive an invoice, but power will not be cut. Telecity2 has a UPS to overcome immediate power failures, and a generator with enough fuel to cover for arrival of more fuel and/or fixing the power failure. insert: </p>

insert: <h4 class="western">

5. 1. 4. Water exposures insert: </h4>

insert: <p>

The RIPE NCC server room used by the Offline CA is located on the second floor of the office building. This is above sea level. insert: </p>

insert: <p>

The server room located at Nikhef is located on the first floor of their building. This is above sea level. insert: </p>

insert: <p>

The server room located at Telecity2 is located on the first floor of their building. insert: </p>

insert: <h4 class="western">

5. 1. 5. Fire prevention and protection insert: </h4>

insert: <p>

The RIPE NCC server room used by the Offline CA has fire extinguishing equipment that is sufficient for any fire in the server rooms. The server rooms are located on the first floor of the building, which is above sea level. Power to the data centres comes from the public grid, supported monitored by internal back-up generator infrastructure. More information on the  delete: <a href="https://www.equinix.nl/data-centers/design/standards-compliance/"> ISO standards applicable to Equinix AM3 and Equinix AM5 data centres delete: </a>  is available. delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815804"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823023"> delete: </a> 5.1.4. Water exposures delete: </h4> delete: <p> The server rooms located at Equinix AM3 and Equinix AM5 are both located on the first floor of their building or higher, which is above sea level. delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815805"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823024"> delete: </a> 5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection delete: </h4> delete: <p> The server room at Equinix AM3 has two-stage our security company, and in case of fire detection system: Aspiration and VESDA, on a head-per-head basis. The server room at Equinix AM5 has VESDA and HI-FOG as water mist they will contact the fire suppression and double knock fire activation. delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815806"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823025"> delete: </a> 5.1.6. brigade of Amsterdam. insert: </p>

insert: <h4 class="western">

5. 1. 6. Media storage

Whenever the Offline CA is operated, all data is backed up to a USB stick (and encrypted (encrypted where needed). needed) to a network filesystem that is mirrored between the Nikhef and Telecity2 datacenters. In addition this data is backed up off-site nightly (see insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#Offsitebackup"> insert: <span> section 5. 1. 8 insert: </span> insert: </a> ). insert: </p>

insert: <p>

For the Online CA and hosted Cas, member CAs all data is stored (encrypted where needed) on a network filesystem that is mirrored between the Equinix AM3 and Equinix AM5 datacentres. Nikhef and Telecity2 datacenters. In addition, addition this data is backed-up off-site nightly and across both data centres (see Section 5.1.8.). delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815807"> insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#Offsitebackup"> insert: <span> section 5. 1. 8 insert: </span> delete: <a name="_Toc62823026"> delete: </a> 5.1.7. ). insert: </p>

insert: <h4 class="western">

5. 1. 7. Waste disposal

When servers reach their end of life, the hard disks are physically destroyed by RIPE NCC staff. insert: </p>

insert: <p>

Key cards that will be destroyed if they are found to be broken will be destroyed. broken. If a key card is lost, lost a new card set will be generated and all HSM keys will be migrated to this the new set, to render card set in order to ensure that the lost card is rendered useless. delete: </p> delete: <p> Once the HSM is decommissioned, the device is destroyed by a designated third party.

There is no other waste that may contain sensitive data.

delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815808"> insert: <h4 class="western">

insert: <a name="Offsitebackup"> delete: <a name="_Toc62823027"> delete: </a> 5.1.8. 5. 1. 8. Off-site backup

The network filesystem, used to store the data from the CAs, is backed up every night to another fileserver. This second fileserver is also backed up every night to another backup server. delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815809"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823028"> delete: </a> 5.2. server, located in Ede, the Netherlands. The distance between this site and Amsterdam is approximately 70km. Ede is above sea level. insert: </p>

insert: <h3 class="western">

5. 2. Procedural Controls delete: </h4> delete: <p> Below are the procedural security controls used for certificate management. delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815810"> insert: </h3>

insert: <h4 class="western">

insert: <a name="Trustedroles"> delete: <a name="_Toc62823029"> delete: </a> 5.2.1. 5. 2. 1. Trusted roles

delete: <strong> For the Offline CA: delete: </strong> delete: </p> delete: <table class="table"> delete: <colgroup> delete: <col width="&quot;20%"> delete: <col width="80%"> delete: </colgroup> delete: <tbody> delete: <tr> delete: <td> insert: </p>

System Operator delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> Has access to the server. Ensures system is set up correctly. Can perform restore using quorum of Administrative Card Set used to protect the keys. See Section insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#TechnicalSecurityControls"> insert: <span> section 6 insert: </span> insert: </a> for more details on card set controls used for the HSM.

CA Operator Has access to one out of ten key cards from the Operator Card Set (OCS) needed to operate the Offline CA. Three out of ten key operators must be present to provide a quorum for operations involving the offline CA.

delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: <tr> delete: <td> delete: <p> CA Operator delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td>

There are ten CA Operators. insert: </p>

insert: <p>

Five of these the CA operators also have access to one of five cards from the Administrative Card Set (ACS) that initialised the HSM. Three of these cards are needed for a restore operation (see Section 6.). delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: <tr> delete: <td> delete: <p> Engineer delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#TechnicalSecurityControls"> insert: <span> section 6 insert: </span> insert: </a> ). insert: </p>

insert: <p>

Developer Has access to the source code used to run the Offline CA. Is responsible for developing, testing and deploying new releases.

The Engineer also In addition, the Developer has de-facto technical knowledge of the set-up and will therefore facilitate specific Offline CA operations, including:

delete: <p> - insert: <ul>

insert: <li>
• insert: <p>

  Transferring outstanding request (certificate and/or revocation) from the Online CA to the Offline CA

  delete: <p> - insert: </li>
insert: <li>
• insert: <p>

  Providing technical knowledge for operating the Offline CA

  delete: <p> - insert: </li>
insert: <li>
• insert: <p>

  Transferring the response to the Online CA and making sure the response is properly processed

  delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: </tbody> delete: </table> delete: <p> delete: <strong> insert: </li>
insert: </ul>

insert: <p>

For the Online CA and ACA: delete: </strong> delete: </p> delete: <table class="table"> delete: <colgroup> delete: <col width="&quot;20%"> delete: <col width="80%"> delete: </colgroup> delete: <tbody> delete: <tr> delete: <td> CA: insert: </p>

System Operator delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> Same as for Offline CA.

delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: <tr> delete: <td> delete: <p> Engineer delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> insert: <p>

Developer Has access to the source code used to run the Online CA. Is responsible for developing, testing and deploying new releases.

In addition, the Engineer addition the Developer can configure values used by the software, such as publication frequency.

delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: <tr> delete: <td>

CA Operator delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> Has access to the user interface. Can perform key re-key operations, revoke old keys, and has access to the system status page that allows switching on/off of the background services for the Online CA.

delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: <tr> delete: <td> delete: <p> Security Officers delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> The Security Officers receive insert: <p>

ACS Card holder The ACS Card Holder receives one of five cards making up the ACS for the HSMs used for the Online CA and hosted member CAs. Three of these five cards are needed to perform a restore. insert: </p>

insert: <p>

There are five ACS Card Holders.

delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: </tbody> delete: </table> delete: <p> delete: <strong> insert: <p>

For the hosted member CAs: delete: </strong> delete: </p> delete: <table class="table"> delete: <colgroup> delete: <col width="&quot;20%"> delete: <col width="80%"> delete: </colgroup> delete: <tbody> delete: <tr> delete: <td> insert: </p>

System Operator delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> Same as for Offline CA.

delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: <tr> delete: <td> delete: <p> Engineer delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> insert: <p>

Developer Same as for Online CA.

delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: <tr> delete: <td>

CA Operator delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> Has access to the user interface. This The system automates all cryptographic operations, operations such as creating and revoking EE certificates, publication, publication etc.

The CA Operator can perform the following actions only:

delete: <p> - insert: <ul>

insert: <li>
• insert: <p>

  Activate the hosted CA delete: </p> delete: <p> - member CA insert: </p>

  insert: </li>
insert: <li>
• insert: <p>

  Create/update/delete ROA configurations (the objects themselves are managed by the system)

  delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: <tr> delete: <td> insert: </li>
insert: </ul>

RIPE NCC Operator delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> This role is available to all CA Operators for the Online CA. It allows access to all actions that a member CA Operator could perform. In addition, addition it allows re-key operations and revocation of old keys. The role also has access to the system status page that allows switching on/off of the background services for hosted member CAs.

delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: </tbody> delete: </table> delete: <p> delete: <strong> For the Delegated CA: delete: </strong> delete: </p> delete: <table class="table"> delete: <colgroup> delete: <col width="&quot;20%"> delete: <col width="80%"> delete: </colgroup> delete: <tbody> delete: <tr> delete: <td> delete: <p> System Operator delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> Follows the procedure as defined internally by the RIPE NCC member or End User. delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: <tr> delete: <td> delete: <p> CA Operator delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> Follows the procedure as defined internally by the RIPE NCC member or End User. delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: </tbody> delete: </table> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815811"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823030"> delete: </a> 5.2.2. insert: <h4 class="western">

5. 2. 2. Number of persons required per task

For all roles and CAs listed in the above section, section only one person is required per task, except for CA operations for the Offline CA (here, CA; here three out of ten persons are required). delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815812"> required. insert: </p>

insert: <h4 class="western">

insert: <a name="Identificationandauth"> delete: <a name="_Toc62823031"> delete: </a> 5.2.3. 5. 2. 3. Identification and authentication for each role

delete: <strong> For the Offline CA: delete: </strong> delete: </p> delete: <table class="table"> delete: <colgroup> delete: <col width="&quot;20%"> delete: <col width="80%"> delete: </colgroup> delete: <tbody> delete: <tr> delete: <td> insert: </p>

System Operator delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> Access Root access to the server running the Offline CA is limited to RIPE NCC IT staff. Since the system does not accept any incoming network traffic, traffic this requires that the IT staff to have access to the server room (see insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#Physicalaccess"> insert: <span> section 5. 1. 2 insert: </span> insert: </a> ) in order to log in (see Section 5.1.2.). delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: <tr> delete: <td> in. insert: </p>

CA Operator delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> Has no account on the server server, but will be asked by the Engineer Developer to present their key card and enter their pass phrase passphrase for authentication and authorisation of the operation.

delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: <tr> delete: <td> delete: <p> Engineer delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> Engineers insert: <p>

Developer The Developers can login to the UNIX Unix account that is used to run the Offline CA software.

delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: </tbody> delete: </table> delete: <p> delete: <strong> insert: <p>

For the Production CA and ACA: delete: </strong> delete: </p> delete: <table class="table"> delete: <colgroup> delete: <col width="&quot;20%"> delete: <col width="80%"> delete: </colgroup> delete: <tbody> delete: <tr> delete: <td> CA: insert: </p>

System Operator delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> Access to the server running the Production CA and the ACA is limited to RIPE NCC IT staff. For some operations, IT staff need access to the server room to log in (see Section 5.1.2.). delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: <tr> delete: <td> delete: <p> Engineer delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> Engineers Same as for Offline CA. insert: </p>

insert: <p>

Developer The Developers have access to the UNIX Unix account that is used to run the software.

delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: <tr> delete: <td>

CA Operator delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> The CA operator uses the RIPE NCC admin interface single sign-on system to log in. in to the user interface. The login process requires that a username, password, and SSL password and client certificate are presented and valid. delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: </tbody> delete: </table> delete: <p> delete: <strong> presented. In addition, the CA Operator must be a member of a specific group that is not available to public users of the LIR Portal. insert: </p>

insert: <p>

For the delete: </strong>   delete: <strong> hosted member CAs: delete: </strong> delete: </p> delete: <table class="table"> delete: <colgroup> delete: <col width="&quot;20%"> delete: <col width="80%"> delete: </colgroup> delete: <tbody> delete: <tr> delete: <td> insert: </p>

System Operator delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> Access to the server running the Production CA and the ACA is limited to RIPE NCC IT staff. For some operations, IT staff needs access to the server room (see section 5. 1. 2) to log in. delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: <tr> delete: <td> delete: <p> Engineer delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> The Engineers have access to the UNIX account that is used to run the software. delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: <tr> delete: <td> Same as for Online CA. insert: </p>

insert: <p>

Developer Same as for Online CA. insert: </p>

CA Operator delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> The CA operator uses the RIPE NCC single sign-on system to log in to the user interface. The login process requires a username and a password. The that a username, password and client certificate are presented. In addition the CA Operator must also have either an “Admin” or “Regular” role be made a member of the "certification" group by the "admin" user for their LIR in the LIR Portal.

delete: <p> In case of End Users, the log in credentials for the LIR Portal must be associated with the maintainer of the respective organisation in the RIPE Database. delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: </tbody> delete: </table> delete: <p> delete: <strong> For the Delegated CA: delete: </strong> delete: </p> delete: <table class="table"> delete: <colgroup> delete: <col width="&quot;20%"> delete: <col width="80%"> delete: </colgroup> delete: <tbody> delete: <tr> delete: <td> delete: <p> System Operator delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> Follows the procedure as defined internally by the RIPE NCC Member or End User. delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: <tr> delete: <td> delete: <p> CA Operator delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: <td> delete: <p> Follows the procedure as defined internally by the RIPE NCC Member or End User. delete: </p> delete: </td> delete: </tr> delete: </tbody> delete: </table> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815813"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823032"> delete: </a> 5.2.4. insert: <h4 class="western">

5. 2. 4. Roles requiring separation of duties

The CA Operator role for the Offline CA is performed by RIPE NCC staff from various departments. The people fulfilling these roles have no other roles in the CAs operated by the RIPE NCC.

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5. 3. Personnel Controls

delete: <p> Below are the personnel security controls employed for individuals associated with certificate management. delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815815"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823034"> delete: </a> 5.3.1. insert: <h4 class="western">

5. 3. 1. Qualifications, experience and clearance requirements

Staff members are assigned to the roles mentioned in insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#Trustedroles"> insert: <span> section 5. 2. 1 insert: </span> insert: </a> only if supervisory personnel deem them to be sufficiently trustworthy and only after they have undergone in-house training for the role.

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5. 3. 2. Background check procedures

All RIPE NCC staff undergo normal employment reference checks.

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5. 3. 3. Training requirements

The RIPE NCC provides its CA staff with training upon assignment to a System Operator, CA operator or an Engineer role. It also arranges CA role as well as on-the-job training as needed to perform their job responsibilities competently.

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5. 3. 4. Retraining frequency and requirements

The RIPE NCC provides its CA staff with re-training as needed to continue performing their job responsibilities competently.

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5. 3. 5. Job rotation frequency and sequence

There are no requirements for enforced job rotation among staff in fulfilling trusted CA roles.

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5. 3. 6. Sanctions for unauthorised actions

It has been established that if a If RIPE NCC staff member performs are determined to have performed activities inconsistent with the organisation’s RIPE NCC RPKI policies and procedures, appropriate disciplinary action will be taken.

delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815821"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823040"> delete: </a> 5.3.7. insert: <h4 class="western">

5. 3. 7. Independent contractor requirements

Independent contractors and consultants may be part of the development team but cannot constitute more than 50% of the total team. delete: </p> delete: <p> No independent contractor or consultant is used to perform any of the roles for the CAs covered by this document. Contractors who are required to perform any maintenance functions on CA severs or cryptographic modules must be accompanied escorted and directly supervised by RIPE NCC staff at all times when in sensitive areas.

delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815822"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823041"> delete: </a> 5.3.8. insert: <p>

Independent contractors and consultants may be part of the development team, but never constituting more than 50% of the total team. insert: </p>

insert: <h4 class="western">

5. 3. 8. Documentation supplied to personnel

Training for staff assigned to a trusted CA role is primarily via mentoring. An internal wiki is maintained by RIPE NCC staff as a further training aid.

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5. 4. Audit Logging Procedures

delete: <p> Below is the description of how RIPE NCC implements audit logging. delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815824"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823043"> delete: </a> 5.4.1. insert: <h4 class="western">

5. 4. 1. Types of events recorded

For the Offline CA, CA no audit logging is implemented.

Audit records are generated for operations performed by the CA Operators for the Production CA, ACA operators for the Online CA and hosted member CAs. These Audit records include the date, time, responsible user and summary content data relating to the event. Records are stored in a database and are visible through the user interface.

The physical access control system separately maintains separate logs for access to the areas housing sensitive CA equipment.

delete: <p> Auditable events include, but are not limited to, the following: delete: </p> delete: <ul> delete: <li> Access to CA computing equipment (e.g. log-in, log-out) delete: </li> delete: <li> Messages received requesting CA actions (e.g. certificate requests, certificate revocation requests, compromise notifications) delete: </li> delete: <li> Certificate creation, modification, revocation, or renewal actions delete: </li> delete: <li> Posting of any material to a repository delete: </li> delete: <li> Any attempts to change or delete audit data delete: </li> delete: <li> Key generation delete: </li> delete: <li> Software and/or configuration updates to the CA delete: </li> delete: </ul> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815825"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823044"> delete: </a> 5.4.2. insert: <h4 class="western">

5. 4. 2. Frequency of processing log

Logs will be reviewed analysed during general audits or after a suspected incident.

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insert: <a name="Retentionperiodforau"> delete: <a name="_Toc62823045"> delete: </a> 5.4.3. 5. 4. 3. Retention period for audit log

Audit records for the Production CA and the ACA, as well as Online CA and hosted CAs, member CAs are included in the nightly database back-up and retained off-site for a minimum of two years.

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5. 4. 4. Protection of audit log

At the moment, no additional measures are taken to protect the audit logs, as compared to normal back-up procedures. delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815828"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823047"> delete: </a> 5.4.5. This process is currently under review, and may change in the near future. insert: </p>

insert: <h4 class="western">

5. 4. 5. Audit log backup procedures

See Section 5.4.3. delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a id="5-4-6"> insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#Retentionperiodforau"> insert: <span> section 5. 4. 3 insert: </span> 5.4.6. . insert: </p>

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5. 4. 6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external) [OMITTED]

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5. 4. 7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED]

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5. 4. 8. Vulnerability assessments

The RIPE NCC uses a third party employs an outside firm to perform periodic vulnerability assessments of for computer and network systems and of the software that is was developed in house to operate the CAs covered by this CPS. These reports are provided to the RIPE NCC Security Officer and the RIPE NCC Managing Director.

delete: <h3> delete: <a id="5-5"> delete: </a> 5.5. Records Archival [OMITTED] delete: </h3> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815830"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823049"> delete: </a> 5.6. insert: <h3 class="western">

5. 5. Key Changeover delete: </h4> insert: </h3>

The Offline CA currently acts as a Trust Anchor. If necessary, the RIPE NCC can issue a new An emergency key pair for the Trust Anchor and issue a new Trust Anchor Locator (TAL) and make this publicly available. For the Production CA, the ACA, and the hosted CA, rollover has been practiced for the current set-up. insert: </p>

insert: <p>

The Online CA key pair changes are not performed on a scheduled basis. If a key-roll is required, a procedure as The algorithm used is described in [ delete: <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6489"> RFC6489 insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#RFC6489"> insert: <span> [RFC6489] insert: </span> ] will be followed. delete: </p> delete: <p> . Initiating the re-key is a manual action initiated by a Production CA and the ACA Online CA Operator via the user interface.

delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815831"> insert: <p>

The hosted member CAs perform an automated re-key using the algorithm described in insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#RFC6489"> insert: <span> [RFC6489] insert: </span> delete: <a name="_Toc62823050"> delete: </a> 5.7. Compromise and Disaster Recovery delete: </h4> delete: <p> In the event of a key-pair compromise, a key-rollover can be performed on demand for Production CA, ACA and Hosted CA. delete: </p> delete: <p> As part of disaster recovery, backups are used. delete: </p> delete: <p> For the Trust Anchor, in case of key-pair compromise a key-rollover will be performed and a new Trust Anchor Locator (TAL) will be published. delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a id="5-8"> delete: </a> 5.8. .This happens whenever a key has been in use for five years. insert: </p>

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5. 6. CA or RA Termination delete: </h4> insert: </h3>

The RIPE NCC has been granted sole authority by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) to manage the allocation of IP address space and AS Numbers in its Number resources in the RIPE NCC service region, which includes Europe, the Middle East and parts of Central Asia. The RIPE NCC has established the RPKI for its region consistent with this authority. There are no provisions for termination and transition of the CA function to another entity.

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insert: <a name="TechnicalSecurityControls"> 6. Technical Security Controls

This section describes the security controls used by the RIPE NCC.

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6. 1. Key Pair Generation and Installation

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6. 1. 1. Key pair generation

For the RIPE NCC RPKI and hosted member CAs operated by the RIPE NCC, key pairs are generated using a hardware cryptographic module. The module used for this purpose is certified as complying with FIPS 140-2 level 3. The hardware cryptographic module employed for this process is nShield Connect 6000. delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815835"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823054"> delete: </a> 6.1.2. the nCipher nShield9000e. insert: </p>

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6. 1. 2. Private key delivery to subscriber

Private keys cannot can not be extracted from the HSM in unencrypted form. The Offline CA, the ACA and the production CA and Online CA only require the public key from their subscribers. Hosted The hosted member CAs have no subscribers.

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6. 1. 3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer

For the Offline CA, a custom mechanism has been developed to transfer of certificate sign requests and/or revocation requests that include the ACA Online CA public key hash are hash. Since the Offline CA server is not connected to a network, the transfer is done using XML files on a USB stick, because the Offline CA server is not connected to a network. stick (a.k.a. sneaker net).

The hosted CA, the ACA, and the production member CAs and Online CA are all managed by the same software. Therefore, the ACA Therefore the Online CA has direct access to the production CA member public keys. delete: </p> delete: <p> The Production CA, in turn, has direct access to the hosted CA public keys. For this reason, keys and no key delivery is involved.

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6. 1. 4. CA public key delivery to relying parties

For the ACA, the production Online CA and hosted CA, member CAs, public keys are included in CA and EE certificates issued by these CAs. The keys are delivered to relying parties by publication of the CA certificates and signed objects that include EE certificates (ROAs and manifests) in to the repository.

The Offline CA is intended to be used as a Trust Anchor by relying parties. The Its Trust Anchor Locator [ delete: <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6490"> RFC 6490 insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#RFC6490"> insert: <span> [RFC6490] insert: </span> ] is described in Section 2.2. delete: </p> delete: <p> insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#PublicationofCertificati"> insert: <span> section 2. 2 insert: </span> insert: </a> . The RIPE NCC will publish this Trust Anchor Locator at: delete: <br /> delete: <a data-val="0ad80e18b06946f7ac660fbab8903900" href="../../../resolveuid/0ad80e18b06946f7ac660fbab8903900" data-linktype="internal"> https://www.ripe.net/manage-ips-and-asns/resource-management/certification/ripe-ncc-rpki-trust-anchor-structure insert: </p>

insert: <p>

insert: <a href="http://www.ripe.net/certification/validation"> insert: <span> http://www.ripe.net/certification/validation insert: </span>

It may also publish this via other mechanisms, such as printed material, RIPE Meeting presentations or training courses. delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a id="6-1-5"> delete: </a> 6.1.5. in Member Updates. insert: </p>

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6. 1. 5. Key sizes

The As per insert: <a> insert: <span> [RFC6485] insert: </span> insert: </a> , the CAs covered by this CPS use a 2048-bit RSA key sizes for all keys, including the keys used in this PKI are as specified in [ delete: <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7935"> RFC 7935 delete: </a> ]. delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815838"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823057"> delete: </a> 6.1.6. for EE certificates. insert: </p>

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6. 1. 6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking

delete: <p> The public key algorithms and parameters used in this PKI are as specified in [ delete: <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7935"> RFC 7935 delete: </a> ]. delete: </p>

The nCipher HSMs used by the CAs covered by this CPS were certified as complying with FIPS 140-2 level 3. Though the details of the key generation implementation used by these modules are not known by the RIPE NCC, the RIPE NCC trusts that this certification implies that key generation and quality checking by the modules is sufficiently safe.

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6. 1. 7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)

The key usage extension bit values employed in RPKI certificates are specified in [ delete: <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6487"> RFC 6487 delete: </a> ]. delete: </p> delete: <p> The key usage extension bit values are consistent with [ delete: <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6818"> RFC 6818 insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#RFC5280"> insert: <span> [RFC5280] insert: </span> ]. . For the RIPE NCC RPKI CA certificates, the keyCertSign and cRLSign bits are set TRUE. All other bits (including digitalSignature) are set FALSE, and the extension is marked critical.

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6. 2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls

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insert: <a name="Cryptographicmodulest"> delete: <a name="_Toc62823060"> delete: </a> 6.2.1. 6. 2. 1. Cryptographic module standards and controls

The Offline CA is operated under FIPS 140-2 level 3, requiring three out of ten operator keys to be presented for key pair generation and signing operations.

The ACA, the production CA, Online CA and hosted member CAs employ a cryptographic module evaluated under FIPS 140-2 level 3 [ delete: <a href="https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-2.pdf"> FIPS insert: <a> insert: <span> [FIPS] insert: </span> ]. . However, because these systems need to be running 24/7 and need to be able to perform key generation and signing operations without human intervention, they are operated under FIPS 140-2 level 2 to allow unattended operation.

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6. 2. 2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control

As described in Section 6.2.1, insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#Cryptographicmodulest"> insert: <span> section 6. 2. 1 insert: </span> insert: </a> , three out of ten CA Operators are required to operate the Offline CA. insert: </p>

insert: <p>

For the ACA, Production Online CA and hosted CA, member CAs no multi-person control is used during normal operation.

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6. 2. 3. Private key escrow

No private key escrow procedures are required for this PKI.

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insert: <a name="Privatekeybackup"> delete: <a name="_Toc62823063"> delete: </a> 6.2.4. 6. 2. 4. Private key backup

For all CAs covered by this CPS, the private keys are stored in the database that feeds on disk by the HSM using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption with a key that is protected by a three-out-of-five 3-out-of-5 Administrative Card Set.

For the Offline CA, the files containing the encrypted private key is and other necessary information are copied to fileshare that is duplicated between the Nikhef and Telecity2 data centres after every operation. These files are backed up off-site on a nightly basis to a remote site located in Ede, the Netherlands, 70 km from Amsterdam. insert: </p>

insert: <p>

For the Online CA and hosted member CAs, all encrypted private keys and other necessary information are stored in the local file system by the HSM, using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815845"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823064"> delete: </a> 6.2.5. on a fileshare that is duplicated between the Nikhef and Telecity2 data centers after every operation. These files are backed up off-site on a nightly basis to a remote site located in Ede, the Netherlands, 70 km from Amsterdam. insert: </p>

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6. 2. 5. Private key archival

See sections 6.2.3. and 6.2.4. delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a id="6-2-6"> delete: </a> 6.2.6. There will be no archive of private keys by this CA. insert: </p>

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6. 2. 6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module

The encrypted private keys and other information described in Section 6.2.4. insert: <a> insert: <span> section 6. 2. 4 insert: </span> insert: </a> may be restored to another HSM. In order to do this, a system administrator must have access to a quorum of the Administrative Card Set (ACS); in this case three-out-of-five three out of five cards are needed.

Also note that this mechanism allows multiple HSMs to share the same internal key and encrypted managed keys stored on a network file system. This allows for the load balancing and fail-over set-up that is used for the ACA, the production CA, and hosted Online CA and member CAs.

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6. 2. 7. Private key storage on cryptographic module

The private keys for all CAs covered by this CPS may be temporarily stored in inside the cryptographic module and will be protected from unauthorised use in accordance with the [ delete: <a href="https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-2.pdf"> FIPS 140-2 delete: </a> ] requirements applicable to the module.

Long term storage is done by storing the keys on a to disk in an encrypted form, as described above.

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insert: <a name="Methodofactivatingpr"> delete: <a name="_Toc62823066"> delete: </a> 6.2.8. 6. 2. 8. Method of activating private key

For the Offline CA, activating the keys requires that three-out-of-five three out of five Operator cards are presented by individual senior staff, as described in Section 6.2.1. insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#Cryptographicmodulest"> insert: <span> section 6. 2. 1 insert: </span> insert: </a> .

For the ACA, Production CA, Online CA and hosted member CAs, the private keys can be used by all processes with access to the nShield Connect 6000. delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815848"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823067"> delete: </a> 6.2.9. that run on the physical servers that host the nCipher nShield9000e PCI cards. insert: </p>

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6. 2. 9. Method of deactivating private key

The Offline CA keys are de-activated as soon as processing is finished. Subsequent operation will require re-activation as described above. In addition, addition the server is physically turned off when not in use. As soon as processing is done, the server is backed up and is shut down again.

The cryptographic modules for the RIPE NCC ACA, Production CA, RPKI CA and hosted member CAs will operate in an unattended mode, on a 24/7 basis.

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6. 2. 10. Method of destroying private key

Keys are not stored long-term inside the hardware security modules used by the CAs covered by this CPS. The HSMs store the keys on disk in encrypted form. Keys are deleted when they When keys are no longer in use. use they are deleted from disk. Since they were encrypted in the first place, no additional action is taken to zero the bytes or purge them from long term back-up.

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6. 2. 11. Cryptographic module rating Module Rating

The cryptographic module(s) used by all CAs covered by this CPS are certified under FIPS 140-2, at level 3 [ delete: <a href="https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-2.pdf"> FIPS insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#FIPS"> insert: <span> [FIPS] insert: </span> ]. .

For the ACA, the production CA, Online CA and hosted member CAs, these modules are operated at FIPS-140-2 level 2, 2 to allow for automatic processing.

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6. 3. Other Aspects of Key Pair Management

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6. 3. 1. Public key archival

Because this PKI does not support non-repudiation, there is no need to archive public keys delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815852"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823071"> delete: </a> 6.3.2. keys. insert: </p>

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6. 3. 2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods

For the Offline CA that is intended to be used as a Trust Anchor by relying parties, the RIPE NCC is committed to support the same key pair for at least five years. This may change if a new RFC is implemented that affects this process, or if the keys are compromised, which makes the CA unable to support the same years after 1 Jan 2011. insert: </p>

insert: <p>

For the Online CA and hosted member CAs, key pair. delete: </p> delete: <p> For the ACA, production CA, and hosted CAs, there is no pairs have an intended validity period. delete: </p> delete: <h3> delete: <a name="_Toc62815853"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823072"> delete: </a> 6.4. interval of five years. insert: </p>

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6. 4. Activation Data

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6. 4. 1. Activation data generation and installation

For the Offline CAs, the three-out-of-five 3/5 Administrative Card Set (ACS) and the three-out-of-ten 3/10 Operator Card Set (OCS) were generated following the procedures described in the HSM manual. The cards were distributed among five-of-the-ten five of the ten Offline CA Operators described in Section 5.1.2. insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#Physicalaccess"> insert: <span> section 5. 1. 2 insert: </span> insert: </a> .

For the ACA, production CA, Online CA and the hosted member CAs, the three-out-of-five 3/5 Administrative Card Set was generated following the procedures described in the HSM manual. The cards were distributed between the five Offline CA Operators described in Section 5.1.2. delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815855"> insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#Physicalaccess"> insert: <span> section 5. 1. 2 insert: </span> delete: <a name="_Toc62823074"> delete: </a> 6.4.2. . insert: </p>

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6. 4. 2. Activation data protection

See insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#Methodofactivatingpr"> insert: <span> section 6.2.8. delete: </p> delete: <h4> delete: <a name="_Toc62815856"> 6. 2. 8 insert: </span> delete: <a name="_Toc62823075"> delete: </a> 6.4.3. . insert: </p>

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6. 4. 3. Other aspects of activation data

None.

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6. 5. Computer Security Controls

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6. 5. 1. Specific computer security technical requirement insert: </h4>

The Offline CA is kept offline when not in use. It is only switched on when in use and is never connected to any network. All data (requests, responses, backups) are transferred using otherwise empty USB sticks.

The ACA, Production CA, Online CA and hosted member CAs are operated on machines in the RIPE NCC internal service VLAN. The user interface is made available through a firewall that load balances requests to two different back-end proxy servers. delete: </p> delete: <h3> delete: <a name="_Toc62815858"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823077"> delete: </a> 6.6. These will delegate requests for the "certification" section only to the back-end machines. insert: </p>

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6. 5. 2. Computer security rating [OMITTED] insert: </h4>

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6. 6. Life Cycle Technical Controls

delete: <h4> delete: <a id="6-6-1"> insert: <h4 class="western">

insert: <a name="Systemdevelopmentcont"> 6.6.1. 6. 6. 1. System development controls

The software for all CAs covered by this CPS was developed in-house by the RIPE NCC, working together with external consultants. The RIPE NCC software development follows an "agile" methodology that includes test-driven development. Unit test coverage of at least 75% and succeeding functional tests were required for all components. All software is developed and maintained under a revision control system (git) (subversion) and releases are tagged. Continuous integration is triggered for each commit and release, which each release and ensures that any possible broken tests come to light before a release is made final. delete: </p> delete: <p> Code is subject to a code review during development. The RIPE NCC Software Development department software development uses bug and issue tracking software for all software development. Prior to deployment to the production service, code is versioned and deployed to a standalone platform for integration tests. The same packages used for these integration tests are then deployed to the production service, provided that no problems are were found.

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6. 6. 2. Security management controls

The RIPE NCC uses the same access policy for the servers used to run the Offline CA, the ACA, the Production CA, and hosted CAs; CA and the Online and member CAs: only staff from the responsible departments have SSH access. SSH access is limited to the RIPE NCC office and VPN networks. Access to the systems is logged.

In addition, it It should be noted that in addition, the Offline CA server is physically switched off when not in use.

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6. 6. 3. Life cycle security controls

Section 6.6.1 contains See insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#Systemdevelopmentcont"> insert: <span> section 6. 6. 1 insert: </span> insert: </a> for a description of the software life cycle, including testing prior to release. Deployment of new software releases is on demand, scheduled, with planned roll-back, back-out, and post-deployment testing of service.

Host operating systems are maintained to current patch levels, and CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team) and other security advisories are tracked for relevant vulnerabilities.

Hosts and network infrastructure are physically maintained and replaced in a duty cycle averaging four years. Onsite maintenance contracts cover normal business hours support for this hardware.

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6. 7. Network Security Controls

The vLAN used for the servers that host the CAs covered by this CPS is protected by router Access Control Lists (ACLs) and/or by firewall rules. This applies both to incoming and outgoing traffic from/to other vLANs, and the same applies for the Internet at large. We do not currently have a dedicated vLAN for these servers, though we plan to look into this in the near future.

Sensitive data is protected by at least one of TLS or SSL with client and server certificates, and with SSH version 2 with 1024-bit keys, or better. delete: </p> delete: <h3> delete: <a name="_Toc62815860"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823079"> delete: </a> 6.8. Time-stamping Extra care is taken for private data: PGP encryption is mandatory. insert: </p>

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6. 8. Time-Stamping

The RPKI operated by the RIPE NCC does not make use of time-stamping. delete: </p> delete: <h2> delete: <a name="_Toc62815861"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823080"> delete: </a> or provide a Time Stamping Authority as defined by RFC3161. insert: </p>

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7. Certificate and CRL Profiles [OMITTED]

 See [ delete: <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc6487.pdf"> RFC 6487 Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile insert: <a class="anchor-link" href="#RFC6487"> insert: <span> [RFC6487] insert: </span> ]. delete: </p> delete: <h2> delete: <a id="8"> delete: </a> . insert: </p>

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8. Compliance audit Audit and Other Assessments

The RIPE NCC employs third parties an outside firm to perform periodic vulnerability and compliance assessments for computer and network systems, including those that are part of the RPKI CA.

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8. 1. Frequency or Circumstances of Assessment

Assessments are initiated upon request at the behest of the Information Security Officer, Business Owner (Service Manager) or RIPE NCC Senior Management.

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8. 2. Identity/Qualifications of Assessor insert: </h3>

insert: <p>

The outside firm engaged to perform the assessment is performed every two years; CPS is reviewed every two years; compliance assessment every three years and the procedural assessment is done every three years. delete: </p> delete: <h3> delete: <a name="_Toc62815863"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823082"> delete: </a> 8.2. Identity/Qualifications of Assessors delete: </h3> delete: <p> All third parties engaged to perform the assessment are entities a commercial entity specialising in IT security assessment.

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8. 3. Assessor's Relationship to Assessed Entity

All third parties The outside firm engaged to perform assessments are the assessment is a paid contractors, preferably contractor with no other relationships with to the RIPE NCC.

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8. 4. Topics Covered by Assessment

The external vulnerability assessment performed on RIPE NCC IT systems covers a variety of topics including (but not limited to): to) network port scanning, testing of web application interfaces, review of user authentication and authorisation mechanisms. delete: </p> delete: <p> The procedural assessment covers a variety of topics including (but not limited to): mechanisms, logging and auditing, network security, and configuration management and key signing ceremonies. delete: </p> delete: <p> The compliance assessment covers a variety of topics including (but not limited to): the cryptographic compliance with the current applicable RFCs. delete: </p> delete: <p> CPS assessment covers review of the current version of the text including implementation of the findings of the above-mentioned assessments. delete: </p> delete: <h3> delete: <a name="_Toc62815866"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823085"> delete: </a> 8.5 Actions management. insert: </p>

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8. 5. Actions Taken as a Result of Deficiency

The RIPE NCC Security Officer and Business Owner (Service Manager) will review reviews all recommendations made by the external assessors and assessor and will advise on remedial actions as appropriate.

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8. 6. Communication of Results

External The external vulnerability reports are provided to all relevant stakeholders within the RIPE NCC including (but including, but not limited to): to the Business Owner, Information Security Officer and Senior Management. When deemed necessary, this information may also be shared with external stakeholders. delete: </p> delete: <h2> delete: <a name="_Toc62815868"> delete: </a> delete: <a name="_Toc62823087"> delete: </a> insert: </p>

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9. References

insert: <a name="RFC5280"> insert: </a> [RFC5280] D. Cooper, S. Santesson, S. Farrell, S. Boeyen, R. Housley, W. Polk, W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", May 2008.

[RFC6818] P. Yee, “Updates to the internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile, January 2013 delete: </p> delete: <p> insert: </p>

insert: <p>

insert: <a name="RFC6484"> insert: </a> [RFC6484] Seo, K., Watro, R., Kong, D., and Kent, S. , "Certificate Policy (CP) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), February 2012 delete: </p> delete: <p> for the Internet IP Address and AS Number PKI", work in progress, July 2007. insert: </p>

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insert: </p>

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insert: <a name="RFC6487"> insert: </a> [RFC6487] Huston, G., Loomans, R., Michaelson, G., "A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", February 2012 delete: </p> delete: <p> [RFC7318] Newton, A, Huston, G, “Policy Qualifiers in Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Certificates” July 2014 delete: </p> delete: <p> work in progress, June 2007. insert: </p>

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insert: <a name="RFC6481"> insert: </a> [RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., Michaelson, G., "A Profile for Resource Certificate Repository Structure", February 2012 delete: </p> delete: <p> work in progress, May 2010. insert: </p>

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insert: <a name="RFC6482"> insert: </a> [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., Kong, D., "A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", February 2012 delete: </p> delete: <p> work in progress, November 2010. insert: </p>

insert: <p>

insert: </p>

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insert: <a name="RFC6488"> insert: </a> [RFC6488] Lepinski, M., Chi, A., Kent, S., "Signed Object Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)”, February 2012 delete: </p> delete: <p> Infrastructure", work in progress, October, 2010 insert: </p>

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insert: </p>

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insert: <a name="RFC6486"> insert: </a> [RFC6486] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., Lipinski, M., "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)”, February 2012 delete: </p> delete: <p> Infrastructure", work in progress, November 2010 insert: </p>

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insert: </p>

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insert: <a name="RFC6489"> insert: </a> [RFC6489] Huston, G., Michealson, G., Kent, S., "Certification Authority (CA) "CA Key Rollover in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)” , February 2012 delete: </p> delete: <p> RPKI", December 2010 insert: </p>

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insert: </p>

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insert: <a name="RFC6490"> insert: </a> [RFC6490] Huston, G., Weiler, S., Michealson, G., Kent, S., "Resource Public Key Infrastructure Certificate PKI (RPKI) Trust Anchor Locator", February 2012 delete: </p> delete: <p> work in progress, November 2010 insert: </p>

insert: <p>

insert: </p>

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insert: <a name="RFC6485"> insert: </a> [RFC6485] Huston, G., “The "A Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)”, February 2012 delete: </p> delete: <p> Infrastructure", work in progress, November 2010 insert: </p>

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insert: </p>

insert: <p>

insert: <a name="RFC4387"> insert: </a> [RFC4387] P. Gutmann, Ed., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure - Operational Protocols: Certificate Store Access via HTTP", February Feb 2006.

[RFC6492] insert: </p>

insert: <p>

insert: <a name="rescertificateprofile"> insert: </a> [res-certificate-profile] Huston, G., Loomans, R., Michaelson, G., "A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates". insert: </p>

insert: <p>

insert: </p>

insert: <p>

insert: <a name="updown"> insert: </a> [up/down] G. Houston, R. Loomans, Loomis, B. Ellacott, R. Austein, Austien, "A Protocol for Provisioning Resource Certificates”, February 2012 delete: </p> delete: <p> Certificates," insert: </p>

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insert: </p>

insert: <p>

insert: <a name="BGP4"> insert: </a> [BGP4] Y. Rekhter, T. Li (editors), A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4). IETF RFC 1771, March 1995. insert: </p>

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insert: </p>

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insert: <a name="FIPS"> insert: </a> [FIPS] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 (FIPS PUB 140-2), "Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules", Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology, May 25, 2001.

insert: </p>

insert: <p>

insert: <a name="RSA" data-val="2dbeabacefe07f1872db88bebe60cc1a" data-linktype="internal"> insert: </a> [RSA] Rivest, R., Shamir, A., and Adelman, L. M. 1978. A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems. Commun. ACM 21, 2 (Feb.), 120-126.

insert: <div>