

## IPv6 Security Course Preview

SEE 7

Massimiliano Stucchi - Timisoara - 18th June 2018



#### **Overview**



**Basic IPv6 Protocol Security** 

(Extension Headers, Addressing)

IPv6 Associated Protocols Security (NDP, MLD)









Learning/ understanding




Attacker



Protecting








Reason:

RFC 4294 - IPv6 Node Requirements: IPsec MUST

- RFC 6434 IPv6 Node Requirements: IPsec SHOULD
- IPSec available. Used for security in IPv6 protocols





• I'm exposed to attacks from Internet

#### Reason:

End-2-End paradigm. Global addresses. No NAT

- Global addressing does not imply global reachability
- You are responsible for reachability (filtering)





#### Reason:

- Common LAN/VLAN use /64 network prefix
- 18,446,744,073,709,551,616 hosts

- Brute force scanning is not possible [RFC5157]
- New scanning techniques




#### Reason:

Lack of knowledge about IPv6 (it's happening!)

- There are tools, threats, attacks, security patches, etc.
- You have to be prepared for IPv6 attacks





• There is nothing new

#### Reason:

Routing and switching work the same way

- Whole new addressing architecture
- Many associated new protocols

# Reality:

- IPv6 support is not a yes/no question
- Features missing, immature implementations, interoperability issues

# **IPv6 Security Myths**



#### Reason:

- Q: "Does it support IPv6?"
- A: "Yes, it supports IPv6"



# IPv6 Security Myths 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 My network is IPv4 only IPv6 is not a security problem

#### Reason:

Networks only designed and configured for IPv4

- IPv6 available in many hosts, servers, and devices
- Unwanted IPv6 traffic. Protect your network.





Lack of resources and features

#### Reason:

- Considering IPv6 completely different than IPv4
- Think there are no BCPs, resources or features

- Use IP independent security policies
- There are BCPs, resources and features





A change of mindset is necessary

#### IPv6 is not more or less secure than IPv4

#### Knowledge of the protocol is the best security measure




# Basic IPv6 Protocol Security



# **IPv6 Extension Headers**

## **IPv6 Extension Headers (1)**





- Fixed: Types and order
- Flexible use
- Processed only at endpoints
  - Exceptions: Hop-by-hop (and Routing)
- Only appear once
  - Exception: Destination Options

- \* Options for IPs in routing header
- \*\* Options for destination IP

Massimiliano Stucchi | SEE7 | 18th June 2018

#### **IPv6 Extension Headers (2)**



• Flexibility means complexity for security

 Security devices/software should be able to process the full chain of headers


- Firewalls:
  - Must deal with standard EHs
  - Able to filter based on EH




#### **Extension Headers Threats (1)**



- Routing Header (Type 0): RH0 can be used for traffic amplification over a remote path
- RH0 Deprecated [RFC 5095]
  - RH1 deprecated, RH2 (MIPv6) & RH3 (RPL) still valid






## **Extension Headers Threats (3)**




- Trying to bypass security mechanisms
  - Example: fooling RA filtering (RA-Guard)
- Any EH





#### **Extension Headers Solutions**





 Require security tools to inspect Header Chain properly


Massimiliano Stucchi | SEE7 | 18th June 2018



# IPv6 Addressing Architecture

#### Introduction





340,282,366,920,938,463,463,374,607,431,768,211,456

## **IPv6 Network Scanning (1)**






- Network Prefix determination (64 bits)
  - Common patterns in addressing plans
  - DNS direct and reverse resolution
  - Traceroute

- IID determination (64 bits)
  - "brute force" no longer possible



# **IPv6 Network Scanning (2)**






- IID generated by the node (\* except DHCPv6)
- Consider IID bits "opaque", no value or meaning [RFC7136]
  - How to generate [RFC7217]
  - This method is widely used and standardised [RFC8064]



#### **IPv6 Network Scanning (3)**







# **Security Tips**



- Use hard to guess IIDs
  - RFC 7217 better than EUI-64
  - RFC 8064 establishes RFC 7217 as the default
- Use IPS/IDS to detect scanning
- Filter packets where appropriate
- Use "default" /64 size IPv6 subnet prefix



# IPv6 Associated Protocols Security




# NDP

## **Introduction (1)**









#### Introduction (2)




• Hop Limit = 255, if not, discard

- NDP has vulnerabilities
  - [RFC3756] [RFC6583]

NDP specification: use IPsec -> impractical, not used

- SEND (SEcure Neighbour Discovery): Not widely available
  - [RFC3971]






# NDP Threats (2)




Unsolicited NA: Redirection / DoS



## NDP Threats (3)



DAD DoS Attack






## NDP Threats (4)



#### Malicious Last Hop Router





## NDP Threats (5)



Bogus Address Configuration Prefix

- Attacker sends RA with prefix for SLAAC
- Hosts using SLAAC will auto-configure an address using that prefix


• Return packets never reach the host

DoS attack

### NDP Threats (6)




#### Spoofed Redirect Message



## NDP Threats (7)









## First Hop Security (1)





Security implemented on switches

- There is a number of techniques available:
  - RA-GUARD
  - DHCPv6 Guard
  - IPv6 Snooping (ND inspection + DHCPv6 Snooping)
  - IPv6 Source/Prefix Guard
  - IPv6 Destination Guard (or ND Resolution rate limiter)
  - MLD Snooping

### First Hop Security (2)








#### **IPv6 Source/ Prefix Guard**



#### **RA-GUARD**



- RA-GUARD [RFC6105] easiest and available solution
- Only allows RAs on legitimate port(s) on L2 switches



- Requires support on switches
- EHs were used to go through RA-Guard [RFC7113]

#### **Conclusions / Tips**



• NDP is an important, powerful and vulnerable protocol

Some solutions are available to protect NDP

- Recommended: use available ones
  - Check availability and configure them

Detection (IDS/IPS) could be easier and recommended



# Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD)

#### Introduction



- Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD) is:
  - Multicast related protocol, used in the local link
  - Two versions: MLDv1 and MLDv2
  - Uses ICMPv6
  - Required by NDP and "IPv6 Node Requirements"


• IPv6 nodes use it when joining a multicast group








#### Mandatory for all IPv6 nodes (MUST)



#### MLDv2



- Strongly recommended for all IPv6 hosts (SHOULD)
- Interoperable with MLDv1
- Adds Source-Specific Multicast filters:
  - Only accepted sources; or
  - All sources accepted except specified ones






## MLD Threats (1)



- Flooding of MLD messages Solutions
   Lots of REPORTs
   CPU Exhaustion
   Bate limit MLD states
   Rate limit MLD messages
   Disable MLD (if not needed)
- Traffic Amplification







### **MLD Threats (2)**



Network scanning





#### **MLD Solutions (1)**



MLD built-in security

Link-local source address

Hop Limit = 1

Router Alert option in Hop-by-Hop EH

**Discard non compliant messages** 

MLD Snooping [RFC4541]

Switch listens to REPORTs

MLD Table: maps multicast groups to ports that requested

Only allow multicast traffic on ports with listeners

#### **MLD Solutions (2)**



- Only allow QUERIES on router's port
  - Kind of MLD-Guard



- Protecting routers
  - Rate limit REPORTs from each host
  - Disable multicast/MLD functionality if not using inter-domain multicast routing



# **IPv6 Security Tips**

#### Introduction




- Best security tool is knowledge
- IPv6 security is a moving target, keep updated

• IPv6 is happening: need to know about IPv6 security

• IPv6 quite similar to IPv4, many reusable practices


#### **Overview: Devices**

#### • Different categories (from RIPE-554):



#### **Overview: Network Example**





#### **RIPE NCC Academy**






**Graduate to the next level!** 

#### http://academy.ripe.net







## @TrainingRIPENCC

Massimiliano Stucchi | SEE7 | 18th June 2018



# Questions

