



RIPE NCC
RIPE NETWORK COORDINATION CENTRE

IPv6 & Security

March 2023



Today & Tomorrow

Reaching the next billion: w/ IPv4?



- Around 5,168 billion Internet users now
 - around 65.6 % of all people in the world
- Phones, IP Cameras, “Smart” devices / Gateways are Internet devices
- The Internet of Things
 - How will the Internet look like in 5 - 10 years?

The Internet of Things




Libelium Smart World



http://www.libelium.com/top_50_iot_sensor_applications_ranking
© Libelium Comunicaciones Distribuidas S.L.

IANA IPv4 Pool



IPv4 run-out



“Today, at 15:35 (UTC+1) on 25 November 2019, we made our final /22 IPv4 allocation from the last remaining addresses in our available pool. We have now run out of IPv4 addresses.”



Our Reality: The Waiting List



1. Submit the IPv4 allocation request form at the LIR Portal (/24)
2. Wait



IPv6 is Happening...




▼ RANK	IPV6%	COUNTRY / REGION
1	100%	Bahrain
2	55.7%	Montserrat
3	55.7%	Saudi Arabia
4	54.9%	India
5	53.9%	Uruguay
6	53%	France
7	53%	Malaysia
8	52.1%	Germany
9	50.7%	Greece
10	50.4%	United States
11	50.1%	Puerto Rico
12	50%	Viet Nam
13	48.6%	Belgium
14	46.4%	Japan

Show 10 entries Search:

Rank	Participating Network	ASN(s)	IPv6 deployment
1	RELIANCE JIO INFOCOMM LTD	55836, 64049	92.58%
2	Comcast	7015, 7016, 7725, 7922, 11025, 13367, 13385, 20214, 21508, 22258, 22909, 33287, 33489, 33490, 33491, 33650, 33651, 33652, 33653, 33654, 33655, 33656, 33657, 33659, 33660, 33661, 33662, 33664, 33665, 33666, 33667, 33668, 36732, 36733	73.62%
3	Combined US Mobile Carriers	3651, 6167, 10507, 20057, 21928, 22394	87.74%
4	Charter Communications	7843, 10796, 11351, 11426, 11427, 12271, 20001, 20115, 33363	56.41%
5	ATT	6389, 7018, 7132	72.32%
6	T-Mobile USA	21928	92.31%
7	Deutsche Telekom AG	3320	74.48%
8	Orange Business Services	3215	74.08%
9	Verizon Wireless	6167, 22394	83.58%
10	Claro Brasil	4230, 28573	74.53%

Showing 1 to 10 of 345 entries

First Previous 1 2 3 4 5 Next Last




Source: <http://worldipv6launch.org/measurements/> (22/3/2023)

... and So Are IPv6 Security Threats!




ReputationAuthority At Work


Unwanted Email & Web Traffic



Rejected At Perimeter



Suspect Traffic Analysis



Top Offending IP Address

	IP Address	Country
1	2a01:4f8:c17:2052::2	Germany
2	2a01:4f8:c17:42f8::2	Germany
3	2a01:4f8:c17:3fe7::2	Germany
4	2a01:4f8:c17:49fa::2	Germany
5	2a01:4f8:c17:3fe5::2	Germany
6	2a01:4f8:c17:1799::2	Germany
7	2a01:4f8:c17:3d8c::2	Germany
8	2a01:4f8:c17:3d83::2	Germany
9	2a01:4f8:c17:2ddf::2	Germany
10	103.18.244.67	Malaysia

Phishing By Top Level Domains

	LTD	Location	Phishing / 10,000
1	hk	Hong Kong	112.9
2	th	Thailand	53.8
3	li	Liechtenstein	44.1
4	ro	Romania	13.0
5	cl	Chile	11.4
6	bz	Belize	11.3
7	tw	Taiwan	10.6
8	lt	Lithuania	10.1
9	ee	Estonia	9.4
10	cz	Czech Repub	8.9

Top Virus Threats

	IP Address	Country
1	60.250.172.197	Taiwan, Province D
2	188.94.11.162	Spain
3	198.74.61.67	United States
4	80.67.18.3	Germany
5	2a02:408:7722:1:77:222:40:221	Russian Federation
6	2a02:408:7722:1:77:222:62:66	Russian Federation
7	170.169.130.68	Mexico
8	216.168.135.166	United States

DDoS attacks in IPv6?



JUST IN INTEL CHIP FLAW LETS HACKERS EASILY HIJACK FLEETS OF PCS

First IPv6 Distributed Denial of Service Internet attacks seen

You know IPv6 must finally be making it: The first IPv6 Distributed Denial of Service Internet attacks have been spotted in the wild.



By Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols for [Networking](#) February 20, 2012 - 14:48 GMT (14:48 GMT) | Topic: [Networking](#)



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The Register®



{* NETWORKS *}

It's begun: 'First' IPv6 denial-of-service attack puts IT bods on notice

Internet engineers warn this is only the beginning

[Kieren McCarthy](#) in San Francisco


Sat 3 Mar 2012 // 09:30 UTC



IPv6 Concepts and Investment



340,282,366,920,938,463,463,374,607,431,768,211,456



Filtering in IPv6 is very Important!



- Global Unicast Addresses
- No NAT anymore, **Firewalls are needed**
- **Good news;** most of the **existing firewalls** support IPv6 already
- A good **addressing plan** → **Easier filtering!**

Investment for IPv6(Security)



- Most of the current deployments support IPv6 already
- Network operators will need to have a **IPv4/IPv6 feature parity check.**
- No NAT; **Firewalls are needed**
- FHS features may be needed for switches in the LANs

- The best investment is for **knowledge!**



How to Deploy & Secure IPv6?

Justification of IPv6 deployment



- Actual price of the new IPv4 (needed for new projects ie. Network expansion)
- CAPEX&OPEX for NAT
- Hidden costs of NAT (ie. troubleshooting, keeping logs)
- Cost of postponing the unavoidable transition
- Potential price of the existing IPv4 base (ie. It can be sold)



How to get started

- Change purchasing procedure (feature parity)
 - Vendors and system integrators must have engineers knowledgeable about IPv6
- Check your current hardware and software
- Plan every step and test
- One service at a time
 - face first
 - core
 - customers



Don'ts for Deployment

- Don't separate IPv6 features from IPv4
- Don't do everything in one go
- Don't appoint an IPv6 specialist
 - do you have an IPv4 specialist?
- Don't see IPv6 as a product
 - the Internet is the product!

For good level of IPv6 security...



1	Best security tool is knowledge
2	IPv6 security is a moving target
3	IPv6 is happening: need to know about IPv6 security
4	Cybersecurity challenge: Scalability IPv6 is also responsible for Internet growth

Up to date information



<i>Information category</i>	Standardisation Bodies	Vulnerabilities Databases	Security Tools	Cybersecurity Organisations	Vendors	Public Forums
<i>Sub-categories</i>	IETF, 3GPP, Broadband Forum		Vulnerability Scanners	CSIRTs / CERTs Gov. / LEAs		Mailing Lists Groups of Interest Security Events
<i>Information in this category</i>	Security considerations Protocol updates Security recommendations	Vulnerability ID (CVE-ID, other) Severity (CVSS, other) Description Affected systems Solutions and workarounds	Vulnerability ID (CVE-ID, other) Severity (CVSS, other) Description Affected systems Solutions and workarounds Affected devices in your network	Vulnerability ID (CVE-ID, other) Severity (CVSS, other) Description Affected systems Solutions and workarounds "0 Day" vulnerabilities	Vulnerability ID (CVE-ID, other) Severity (CVSS, other) Description Affected systems Solutions and workarounds "0 Day" vulnerabilities	"0 Day" vulnerabilities News Trends Lessons learned
<i>Examples</i>	RFCs, I-Ds	NVD, CVE	OpenVAS	CERT-EU ENISA EUROPOL/EC3	Cisco, Juniper, MS, Kaspersky, etc.	NOGs, IETF, IPv6 Hackers, Reddit, Troopers, etc.



RIPE-772 Document

- “Requirements for IPv6 in ICT Equipment”
 - Best Current Practice describing what to ask for when requesting IPv6 Support
 - Useful for tenders and RFPs
 - Original version was ripe-554
 - Ripe-554 Originated by the Slovenian Government
 - Adopted by various others (Germany, Sweden)

Link to the document:

<https://www.ripe.net/publications/docs/ripe-772>

Devices Categories (RIPE-772)



Host	Switch	Router	Security Equipment	CPE
IPSec (if needed)	HOST +	HOST +	HOST +	Router
RHO [RFC5095]	IPv6 ACLs	Ingress Filtering and RPF	Header chain [RFC7112]	Security Equipment
Overlapping Frags [RFC5722]	FHS	DHCPv6 Relay [RFC8213]	Support EHs Inspection	DHCPv6 Server Privacy Issues
Atomic Fragments [RFC6946]	RA-Guard [RFC6105]	OSPFv3	ICMPv6 fine grained filtering	
NDP Fragmentation [RFC6980]	DHCPv6 guard	Auth. [RFC4552] or / and [RFC7166]	Encapsulated Traffic Inspection	
Header chain [RFC7112]	IPv6 snooping	IS-IS	IPv6 Traffic Filtering	
Stable IIDs [RFC8064][RFC7217] [RFC7136]	IPv6 source / prefix guard	[RFC5310] or, less preferred, [RFC5304]		
Temp. Address Extensions [RFC8981]	IPv6 destination guard	MBGP		
Disable if not used: LLMNR, mDNS, DNS-SD, transition mechanisms	MLD snooping [RFC4541]	TCP-AO [RFC5925]		
	DHCPv6-Shield [RFC7610]	MD5 Signature Option [RFC2385] <i>Obsoleted</i>		
		MBGP Bogon prefix filtering		

Conclusions



A change of mindset is necessary

- IPv6 is not more or less secure than IPv4
- Knowledge of the protocol is the best security measure





Learn something new today!
academy.ripe.net






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<https://getcertified.ripe.net/>



Änn Соңы An Críoch پايان Y Diwedd
Vége Endir Finvezh Ende Koniec
Son டாசாஸ்ருலி қтырз Kінецъ Finis
Lõpp Amaia תסוה Tmiem Kraja
Sfârșit Loppu Slutt Liðugt Kraj
Kraj النهاية Конец Fund
Fine Fin Fí Konec Τέλος
Einde Край
Slut Pabaiga
Fim Beigas

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