

**NLNET LABS?**



*Purveyors of fine  
open source software  
since 1999*





**NSD**



**unbound**



**ROUTINATOR**

**RPKI**

# DELEGATED RPKI

- Run Certificate Authority (CA) as a child of the RIR/NIR/LIR
- Install and maintain software yourself
- Generate your own certificate, have it signed by the parent CA
- Publish signed objects yourself, or ask a third party to do it for you
  - When a relying party connects to the Trust Anchor, it will automatically follow the chain down to your publication point

# WHY RUN DELEGATED RPKI?

- Manage RPKI for all your resources in a single system, because:
  - You represent multiple organisations under a single RIR
  - You have address space in multiple RIR regions
- You want to delegate RPKI management to business units or customers
- You will be the only one in possession of the private key

Free and  
open source



Certificate Authority **NLnetLabs**

 ROAs **Parents** Repository

 Download CSV  Show BGP info

| ASN     | Prefix             | State    |  |
|---------|--------------------|----------|--|
| 1133    | 2001:7fc::/47-47   | NOT SEEN |  |
| 1133    | 151.216.0.0/23-23  | NOT SEEN |  |
| > 8587  | 2a04:b900::/29-29  | SEEN 1   |  |
| > 8587  | 185.49.140.0/22-22 | SEEN 1   |  |
| 14618   | 2a04:b902::/32-32  | NOT SEEN |  |
| 14618   | 151.216.0.0/23-23  | NOT SEEN |  |
| 14618   | 185.49.143.0/24-24 | NOT SEEN |  |
| ∨ 16509 | 2001:7fc::/47-47   | SEEN 1   |  |

Authorizes 1 announcements

| ASN   | Prefix        |
|-------|---------------|
| 16509 | 2001:7fc::/47 |

Disallows 0 announcements

| ASN | Prefix  |
|-----|---------|
|     | No data |

asn

|    |                                   |
|----|-----------------------------------|
| v4 | 151.216.0.0/23<br>185.49.140.0/22 |
| v6 | 2001:7fc::/47<br>2a04:b900::/29   |

# CORE FUNCTIONALITY

- ✓ Seamlessly operate under multiple parent CAs
- ✓ Act as a parent CA for customers and subdivisions
- ✓ Manage Route Origin Authorisations (ROAs)
- ✓ Stand-alone publication server
- ✓ Allow remote publication

# ESSENTIALS

- ✓ Installation from Debian/Ubuntu packages, Docker or source
- ✓ User Interface, Command Line Interface and a REST-like HTTPS API
- ✓ Prometheus monitoring and alerting
- ✓ Multi-user support based on OpenID Connect
- ✓ Audit log

# USER INTERFACE

- ✓ Multi-language support
- ✓ Parent CA and Publication Server configuration
- ✓ ROA suggestions and alerting based on BGP route collectors
  - Invalid announcements (incorrect ASN or prefix length), too permissive ROAs, redundant ROAs, etc.

# 2021 ROADMAP

- BGP listener: manage ROAs based on your own router's view
- Hardware Security Module (HSM) support: PKCS#11 and KMIP
- User interface refinements: audit log, bulk editing, etc.
- Your favourite thing?

# SEPARATE COMPONENTS

**CERTIFICATE  
AUTHORITY**

*Certificates  
&  
ROAs*



**PUBLICATION  
SERVER**

# RPKI PUBLICATION

- Publish yourself:
  - Using your own HTTPS + rsyncd server
  - Let customers / business units publish on yours
- Publish with a third party:
  - Currently, APNIC and NIC.br offer RPKI publication as a service
  - Other RIRs and cloud providers may start offering this as well

**SO, DO YOU CHOOSE  
HOSTED OR DELEGATED?**

# WHATEVER YOU CHOOSE, GO ALL IN!

- It's better to create **no** ROAs than **bad** ones
- Once you start create ROAs, **maintain** them!
- Make RPKI part of standard operations
- Set up monitoring and alerting
- Train your first line help desk

# SHOULD I CHOOSE DELEGATED RPKI?


- Is Delegated RPKI more secure? No!
  - The RIR giveth, the RIR taketh away; they can always revoke your certificate anyway
- Is Delegated RPKI more convenient? It depends...
- How many prefixes do you manage (across the globe) and how often do they change?
- Is the pain of running your own software less than clicking around one or more web interfaces at 3AM

# WHAT IF IT BREAKS?

- No DNSSEC horror story; e.g. unavailable zone due to signing mishap
- RPKI provides a positive statement on routing intent
- Lose your keys? Hardware failure?  
Publication server being DDOSed?

*All routes will eventually fall back to the “NotFound” state, as if RPKI were never used*

# ORGANISATIONS RUNNING DELEGATED RPKI WITH KRILL



# YOU MAKE A DIFFERENCE

- Dropping RPKI Invalid routes has gained significant momentum in the last year

Telia Carrier, Cogent, GTT, NTT,  
Cloudflare, Hurricane Electric, Netflix,  
Scaleway, Wikimedia Foundation, TATA,  
PCCW, AT&T and many more...

source: [rpkisecurity.com](https://rpkisecurity.com/)

# VIBRANT ECOSYSTEM

- [rpki.readthedocs.io](https://rpki.readthedocs.io) – Documentation and FAQ
- [JDR](#) – A tool to help you explore, inspect and troubleshoot anything RPKI
- [rpki@lists.nlnetlabs.nl](mailto:rpki@lists.nlnetlabs.nl) – Mailing list with 500+ subscribers

 @krillrpki & @routinator3000