



RIPE NCC

RIPE NETWORK COORDINATION CENTRE

IP Blocklisting **Basics**

1 hour

July 2025

RIPE NCC Learning & Development



**This session is
being recorded**

Goals

- Explain **why** an IP address can get blocklisted
- **Prevent** IP address blocks from being blocklisted
- **Remove** IP addresses from blocklists using specific techniques
- Implement **best practices** for preventing IP addresses from being blocklisted



Agenda


1. Internet, IPs, ASNs, Routing, etc.

2. IP and ASN Blocklists

3-7. How and why an IP prefix or ASN can be blocklisted

8-9. Best Practices:

- How to prevent IPs and ASNs from being blocklisted
- How to remove IPs and ASNs from blocklists







Internet, IPs, ASNs, etc.

Section 1 of 9

How do we address nodes on the Internet?




Focus on these numbers:



What can go wrong?

How can somebody **abuse** or **misuse** resources on the Internet?

Choose all possible situations in the poll, and tell us your experience in the chat window.



IANA and the 5 Regional Internet Registries (RIRs)



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
The RIPE NCC and its 20k+ LIRs



Local Internet Registries (LIRs) are responsible for:

- Distributing Internet Number resources (IP addresses and ASNs) **to End Users**
- Registering them in the **RIPE Database**
- Keeping the registry up-to-date

The Big Picture




The legitimate holder
(the RIPE NCC, LIR, etc.)
registers their assignments,
(sub)-allocations, and ASNs.

Other Internet users or ISPs
can query who is the legitimate
holder of a resource.


Can AS 3333 announce 193.0.0.0/24?

- **AS 3333** is assigned to the ORG-RIEN1-RIPE
- **193.0.0.0/24** is also assigned to ORG-RIEN1-RIPE

Please choose the correct answer.



The prefix holder can create a ROUTE object!



For legitimate prefix holders...

Why is registering ROUTE objects **important** for the stability of the Internet?

Hint: which AS is allowed to announce **2001:67c:64::/48**?


Please choose your answer, and type in the answer for BONUS in the chat window.



Let's investigate a prefix

Which network shall we investigate?

Demo






Our Focus: Blocklisting


Section 2 of 9



IP Blocklisting in Action



IP Blocklisting in Action



Tell us your experience

Have you ever **blocklisted anybody**, or were blocklisted **yourself**?

Please choose your answer, or type it in the chat window

 1 min.





Blocklists can be private and **public**

1. Administrators have full control over a **private blocklist** (e.g. ACLs)
2. **Public blocklists** have different policies for how IPs/ASNs are added and removed


We're going to focus
on **PUBLIC** blocklists



Passive Spam Block List (**PSBL**)

.. and many more

**So... How somebody
might end up on a
blocklist?**





Reason #1: Spam

Section 3 of 9

What is Spam?

There are many names for **unsolicited** messages sent **in bulk by email**:

- Email **spam**
- **Junk** emails
- **UBE** = Unsolicited Bulk Email



Why spamming is unacceptable

- **Interferes** with the operation of the Internet
- Creates **unwanted traffic** for the recipients
- Creates **support overhead** for ISPs

There is no global framework
regulating spamming.




What would you do?

You're a system administrator of a small company with no extra budget to spend on IT.

One day, your colleagues start receiving **dozens of weird emails** from a foreign prince asking you for help to retrieve his fortune.

What would you do?

Please choose your answers, or type them in the chat window



I need help

But the prince might have **spoofed** the sender's IP address...

How would you check who is the **legitimate holder** of an IP address?

Please choose the correct options.





Reason #2: Misconfigurations

Section 4 of 9

Can wrongdoing be unintentional?






Open Mail Relay: anybody can abuse it!

- Open Mail Relays are NOT recommended by RFC 5321 (which defines SMTP)

Accept and forward only **authenticated** & **authorised** messages

.. or the Mail Server may be abused and/or **blocklisted**






Reason #3: Malware and Botnets

Section 5 of 9


What is a botnet?



Botnet can use spoofed IPs
(which can then be blocklisted)



How to avoid being blocklisted?



What would you do..

.. if you were an ISP, and one of your customers insisted on running a service that could be **abused** by others?

Please choose your answer, or type in your answer in the chat widow

 1 min.

```
telnet
telnet -zsh
Last login: Wed May 19 15:15:52 on ttys000
user@computer-pro ~ % telnet smtp.example.com 25
Trying 192.168.100.25.
Connected to smtp.example.com.
Escape character is '^]'
220 smtp.example.com ESMTP Sendmail 8.12.9/8.12.9; Wed, 19 May 202
```





Reason #4: Unwanted content, service or software

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Example: Open Mail Relay

- .. is an SMTP server which allows **anybody** on the Internet to send emails through it

Can be abused by spammers!


- NOT recommended by RFC 5321 (defines SMTP)
- .. a valid reason for the server to be **blocklisted**

```
telnet
telnet -zsh
Last login: Wed May 19 15:15:52 on ttys000
user@computer-pro ~ % telnet smtp.example.com 25
Trying 192.168.100.25.
Connected to smtp.example.com.
Escape character is '^]'
220 smtp.example.com ESMTP Sendmail 8.12.9/8.12.9; Wed, 19 May 202
```




Example: Open Recursive DNS Resolver


- Can be used in a DNS amplification attack
- There are some public DNS servers: **1.1.1.1**, **8.8.8.8**, **2001:4860:4860::8888**



What can an ISP/LIR do...

.. to prevent IPs from being **blocklisted** due to undesirable content or services?

Please choose your answer, and share with us your experience in the chat window.





Reason #5: IP prefix's history

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You received a prefix there're 2 options:



or



... all IPv4 prefixes come from **recycled** space

... as a receiving LIR you might want to **investigate the prefix** before signing off the transfer

Previous holder's actions may lead to your IP's being **blocklisted**

How IP addresses are quarantined at the RIPE NCC



Step 1: **De-registration** → all related RIPE Database objects deleted, ROAs cleared

Step 2: **Quarantine** → for six months or as long as the space is globally routed

Step 3: **Allocation to a new LIR**

What exactly the RIPE NCC is doing during de-registration:

<https://www.ripe.net/manage-ips-and-asns/resource-management/quarantine-for-returned-internet-number-resources>

Resource Quality Assurance before re-allocating IP prefixes:

<https://www.ripe.net/manage-ips-and-asns/resource-management/ripe-ncc-resource-quality-assistance>

Use RIPEstat for transfers


One of the services to use when investigating **the previous usage** of a prefix or ASN:

- Who was the legitimate holder in the past?
- Who was announcing the prefix in the past?

...

But there is **NO GUARANTEE**
that no changes will be detected after the transfer,
or after you just finished investigating

Demo





Questions






How to prevent IPs and ASNs from being blocklisted

Section 8 of 9



1. Know your infrastructure and customers


- Separate prefixes used for different services/networks/customers
- Separate the LIR's prefix from the customer's resources





2. Implement proper security measures


- Follow RFC 5321 for mail servers
- Do not operate open DNS resolvers if possible
- Implement measures against amplification attacks, e.g. response rate-limiting





3. Prevent address space hijacking


- Maintain RIPE Database objects and keep them **up-to-date**
- Create **ROAs** for your prefixes
- Detect spoofed IP addresses in the ingress traffic: implement **BCP-38**



4. Investigate the prefix




- Investigate how the prefix was used in the past before assigning it to a critical service





5. Monitor your reputation

- **Monitor** how your prefixes are used
- Look for **abnormalities** in the traffic



How to **prevent** your IPs from being blocklisted:

What is **the most important** measure?

Please choose an option or type in your answer in the chat window.





How to remove IPs and ASNs from blocklists

Section 9 of 9


1. Don't panic, investigate first



Find out **where** you're blocklisted, and **for what**.

- Check security measures
- Check traffic logs
- Scan for vulnerabilities

...



2. Take care of the reasons and contact blocklists



Remove malware, fix misconfiguration, etc, and **explain** to blocklists what was done.



How to **remove** your IPs from public blocklists:

What is **the most challenging** thing to do?

Please choose an option or type in your answer in the chat window.



Wrap-Up

1. Stay **up-to-date**: sign up for mailing lists
2. **Know** the services you and your customers are providing
3. Implement **security measures** for infrastructure and services
4. Create and update assignments in the **RIPE Database**
5. Prevent address space hijacking: use BGP security measures for your prefixes





Questions



We want your feedback!



What did you think about this session? Take our survey at:

<https://www.ripe.net/feedback/ip-blocklisting-basics>






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- ❖ IP Blocklisting Basics (1 hr)
- ❖ Anti-Abuse (1.5 hrs)



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
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Fim	Slut				Τέλος
					Pabaiga





Fighting Spam

Good Practice In Minimising Email Abuse: <https://www.ripe.net/publications/docs/ripe-409>

The History of Spam: <https://www.internetsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/History20of20Spam.pdf>

Combating Spam: Policy, Technical and Industry Approaches:

<https://www.internetsociety.org/resources/doc/2012/combating-spam-policy-technical-and-industry-approaches/>

Anti-Spam Recommendations for SMTP MTAs: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2505>

Email Submission Operations: Access and Accountability Requirements (BCP-134):

<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5068>

Botnets Prevention

Botnet Remediation Overview & Practices:

https://www.internetsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/ota_2013_botnet_remediation_best_practices.pdf

Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks (BCP-140): <https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5358.txt>



Prevent hijacking

Maintain the RIPE DB objects up-to-date: <https://apps.db.ripe.net/db-web-ui/myresources/overview>

Create ROAs: <https://my.ripe.net/#/rpki>

Network Ingress Filtering: Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source Address Spoofing (BCP-38):
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp38>

Join the MANRS: <https://www.manrs.org/isps/>



RIPE NCC procedures

Reusing Recovered Internet Number Resources:

<https://www.ripe.net/manage-ips-and-asns/resource-management/quarantine-for-returned-internet-number-resources>

Resource Quality Assurance before re-allocating IP prefixes:

<https://www.ripe.net/manage-ips-and-asns/resource-management/ripe-ncc-resource-quality-assistance>

Useful tools for investigation

RIPEstat Historical Whois: <https://stat.ripe.net/widget/historical-whois>

RIPEstat Allocation History: <https://stat.ripe.net/widget/allocation-history>

RIPEstat Routing History: <https://stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-history>

Transfer Statistics: <https://www.ripe.net/manage-ips-and-asns/resource-transfers-and-mergers/transfer-statistics>

Anti-Abuse Working Group (WG): <https://www.ripe.net/participate/ripe/wg/active-wg/anti-abuse>

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