

## **Presentation Title**

**Presentation Subtitle** 

Name | Date | Event



## Section Title

Section subtitle







## RIRs are responsible for:

- Keeping the registry up to date, correct, and secure
- Using hierarchical allocations
- Maintaining neutrality towards all members














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
## Internet building blocks






# Internet building blocks Autonomous System






## Routing on the Internet





#### **Route Propagation**





## **Accidents Happen**



- Fat Fingers
  - 2 and 3 are really close on our keyboards....

- Policy Violations (leaks)
  - Oops, we did not want this to go on the public Internet
  - Infamous incident with Pakistan Telecom and YouTube

#### **Incidents Are Common**




- 2019 Routing Security Review
  - 12,600 incidents
  - 4,4% of all ASNs affected
  - 3,000 ASNs are victims of at least one incident
  - 1,300 ASNs caused at least one incident

Source: https://bgpstream.com

## Routing on the Internet



"Internet Routing Registry"



#### **Problem Statement**




- Some IRR data can not be fully trusted
  - Accuracy
  - Incomplete data
  - Lack of maintenance

- Not every RIR has an IRR
  - Third party databases need to be used
  - No verification of who holds IPs/ASNs

### **Problem Statement**







## Section Title

Section subtitle

## Resource Public Key Infrastructure




- Ties IP addresses and ASNs to public keys
- Follows the hierarchy of the registries
- Authorised statements from resource holders
  - "ASN X is authorised to announce my Prefix Y"
  - Signed, holder of Y

#### **RPKI Certificate Structure**




Certificate hierarchy follows allocation hierarchy




#### **RPKI Chain of Trust**






#### Two elements of RPKI





#### **RPKI Chain of Trust**





#### **Hosted RPKI**



RIR hosts a CA and signs all ROAs


Automate signing and key rollovers

Allows you focus on creating and publishing

**ROAs** 

## **Route Origin Authorisation**






**Prefix** 

is authorised to be announced by

**AS Number** 






Source: https://stat.ripe.net/NL#tabId=routing

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


Source: https://stat.ripe.net/NL#tabId=routing


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## **Hosted or Delegated RPKI**





**Member-X CA** 



Member

**Member-Y CA** 




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
#### Two elements of RPKI






## **Trust Anchor Locator (TAL)**






## **Relying Party**





## **Relying Party**






#### **BETTER ROUTING DECISIONS**

## Routing on the Internet





RPKI Webinar

#### Status of Transit and Cloud



Name	Type	Details	Status
Telia	Transit	Signed & Filtering	Safe
Cogent	Transit	Signed & Filtering	Safe
GTT	Transit	Signed & Filtering	Safe
NTT	Transit	Signed & Filtering	Safe
Hurricane Electric	Transit	Signed & Filtering	Safe
Tata	Transit	Signed & Filtering	Safe
PCCW	Transit	Signed & Filtering	Safe
RETN	Transit	Partially Signed &	Safe
Cloudflare	Cloud	Signed & Filtering	Safe
Amazon	Cloud	Signed & Filtering	Safe
Netflix	Cloud	Signed & Filtering	Safe
Wikimedia	Cloud	Signed & Filtering	Safe
Scaleway	Cloud	Signed & Filtering	Safe

Source: isbgpsafeyet.com

## What We're Working On



- Repository Resiliency: Cloud
- Security: Audit Framework, different security assessments
- Improving Q&A
- Reporting on our findings
- Doing RPKI ourselves!



# Questions

