# ARouteServer

IXP automation made easy

 "A route server redistributes BGP routes received from its BGP clients to other clients according to a prespecified policy" (RFC7948)

#### Benefits:

- One BGP session, many peers;
- Instantly get lot of routes.

#### Drawbacks:

- May be a SPoF (traffic blackhole);
- May interfer with traffic engineering policies;
- Outsourced routing / To trust or not to trust the route server.

Lot of routes sent to clients: are they actually good?

```
inet.0: 630929 destinations, 967236 routes (630926 active, 1 holddown, 32 hidden)
Prefix Nexthop MED Lclpref AS path
37.18.122.0/23 80.249.212.148 58291 174 42755 58272 I
62.93.195.0/24 80.249.208.212 13237 200093 1299 174 20756 I
81.24.160.0/20 80.249.212.81 15704 12321 3356 6739 20973 24799 I
```

source: "Moving to default Routeserver IRR filtering"

RIPE74 presentation by Erik Bais, A2B Internet

(Tier-1 ASNs in the middle of the AS\_PATH)

Lot of routes sent to clients: are they actually good?

```
4651 45328 23456
80.249.210.15 from 80.249.209.0 (80.249.209.0)
Origin IGP, metric 0, localpref 100, valid, external, best Community: 3856:53500
Last update: Mon May 1 08:07:12 2017
```


(The reserved AS\_TRANS ASN as origin)

Lot of routes sent to clients: are they actually good?

```
12989 33724 64512
80.249.209.70 from 80.249.208.255 (80.249.208.255)
Origin IGP, metric 0, localpref 100, valid, external
Community: 3856:53500
Last update: Mon May 1 08:10:10 2017
```

(A private ASN as an Origin AS)


Lot of routes sent to clients: are they actually good?



http://peering.exposed


(Job Snijders / Samer Abdel-Hafez)


• Do I totally lose control of how my routes are propagated?



### Overview: ARouteServer

- Goal: to help IXs to simplify operations needed to run useful and trustworthy route servers.
- ARouteServer automatically builds configs for route servers...
  - secure and feature-rich configurations!
- ... and it also allows to validate them
  - Docker / KVM -based "live test" framework.
- Currently, BIRD and OpenBGPD are supported.





 Two YAML files are used to configure vendor-agnostic high-level policies and clients definitions.

```
cfg:
    rs_as: 64496
    router_id: "192.0.2.2"
    filtering:
        next_hop:
        policy: "same-as"
    blackhole_filtering:
        policy_ipv4: "rewrite-next-hop"
        ...
```


```
clients:
    - asn: 64511
    ip:
    - "192.0.2.11"
    - "2001:db8:1:1::11"
    irrdb:
        as_sets:
        - "RIPE::AS-F00"
    ...
```

- External sources are used to gather additional info:
  - IRRDBs for filters based on prefixes and origin ASNs;
  - PeeringDB for max-prefix limits and AS-SETs;
  - Euro-IX JSON member list files to build clients list automatically.



- Finally, the route server configuration is automatically generated.
- Custom scripts can be used to validate it and






```
$ arouteserver bird --ip-ver 4 -o /etc/bird/bird4.new && \
    bird -p -c /etc/bird/bird4.new && \
    cp /etc/bird/bird4.new /etc/bird/bird4.conf && \
    birdcl configure
```

### Configuration

- Policies can be set on a global scope.
- Clients inherit global policies;
  - client-specific options override inherited ones.
- Client list can be automatically generated from Euro-IX JSON file;
  - this allows an easy integration with <u>IXP-Manager</u>.
- Custom, site-specific behaviours and configurations can be implemented using "hooks" and local files.


### Routes filtering

- NEXT\_HOP enforcement: strict or same AS.
- Min/max prefix length & max AS\_PATH length.
- AS\_PATH sanitation:
  - leftmost ASN;
  - private/invalid ASNs;
  - "transit-free" ASNs.
- Bogons and IRR-based filters.
- RPKI BGP Origin Validation.




## Filtering: NEXT\_HOP enforcement

 "Strict" mode: accept only routes whose NEXT\_HOP is the IP address of the announcing client.




### Filtering: NEXT\_HOP enforcement

 "Same-AS" mode: allows the NEXT\_HOP to be any address among those used by the announcing AS to connect to the IXP.



### Filtering: AS\_PATH sanitation

Leftmost ASN in the AS\_PATH must match the ASN of the client.




Private/invalid ASNs must not appear in the AS\_PATH.




### Filtering: AS\_PATH sanitation

 "Transit-free" ASNs must not appear in the AS\_PATH - unless they are in the first position.




### Filtering: prefix validation

 IRR databases are used to get the list of allowed prefixes and origin ASNs on the basis of client's AS-Macros (bgpq3).



### Filtering: prefix validation


- Authoritative data from the ARIN Whois database is also used to get a list of prefixes for which a specific ASN has been authorized to announce routes for.
- Improvement on filters accuracy: 23% (YYCIX data).



source: https://teamarin.net

### Filtering: prefix validation

RPKI ROAs (Route Origin Authorisations) are used for Prefix Origin



#### Services for the clients

- Blackhole filtering support:
  - optional NEXT\_HOP rewriting to allow Layer-2 level filtering.
- Route propagation control (via BGP communities):
  - announce / do not announce to any / specific peer;
  - prepend to any / specific peer;
  - add NO\_EXPORT / NO\_ADVERTISE to any / specific peer.
- GRACEFUL\_SHUTDOWN support (<u>RFC8326</u>).
- Full list of features available on <u>GitHub</u>.

### Project status

- Actively developed. Both BIRD and OpenBGPD users.
- Feedback from real life is strongly needed and encouraged.

Source code and examples available on GitHub:

https://github.com/pierky/arouteserver

Full documentation:

https://arouteserver.readthedocs.io/

Pier Carlo Chiodi - <a href="https://pierky.com/">https://pierky.com/</a>



# Questions?

