



**RIPE NCC**

RIPE NETWORK COORDINATION CENTRE

# Recent developments in RPKI

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# What is RPKI




- Public key infrastructure for route origin validation (ROV)
- Certification Authority hierarchy with
  - 5 RIR trust anchors
  - 2 ASO trust anchors from APNIC and LACNIC
- Signed objects with different payloads
  - ROA with VRRP (used for ROV)
  - ASPA with VAP (in development)
- Currently only ROAs are of active practical use

# Statistics



- RPKI covers about 37% of IPv4 and 32% of IPv6
  - <https://ftp.ripe.net/pub/stats/ripencc/nro-adoption/latest>
- About 2800 installations of RPKI validators in the world
- About 2300 unique /24 or /48 running RPKI validators
- Still steady growth of adoption and number of ROAs
  - <https://certification-stats.ripe.net/>

# Statistics



# RPKI validators are mature



- Much better than 5 years ago
- Installation, configuration, documentation is way better
- Big research work on vulnerabilities in 2021
  - <https://arxiv.org/pdf/2203.00993.pdf>
  - Multiple fixes in all validators
  - Mostly addressing potential DoS attacks

# RPKI validators are mature



- Risk of monoculture, so run different ones
  - <https://rov-measurements.nlnetlabs.net/stats/>
  - Routinator - 80%
  - rpki-client - 8%
  - OctoRPKI - 6%
  - Fort - 3%
  - RIPE NCC RPKI Validator 3 - 3% **[STOP USING IT IF YOU STILL DO]**

# Trendy: Publication as a service



- There are two flavours of RPKI
  - **Hosted:** RIR maintains key pairs and objects and publishes them for you
  - **Delegated:** you maintains key pairs objects and publish them in your repository
- Publication as a service is an in-between flavour
  - You maintain key pairs and objects and send them to RIR
  - RIR publishes your objects in its repository
- Supported by APNIC, ARIN, RIPE NCC, NIRs
  - AKA “Publication in parent” or “Hybrid RPKI”

# Trendy: Publication as a service



- Win-Win for smaller delegated CAs
- Availability numbers are way better for RIR repositories
- RIRs have vast experience with maintaining consistency
  - Well documented and easy to set up
- Fun fact: even then you don't need 100% availability
  - ARIN did a test with simulated outage of ~60 minutes
  - Validators cache everything anyway
  - RFC 9286 aligns validators' behaviour in such cases
  - Objects do not expire for hours



# What's coming: ASPA



- Autonomous System Provider Authorisation
  - a draft, about to become an RFC
- Validation of AS\_PATH
- Already supported in a couple of validators out there
- Supported by RIPE NCC's API in pilot environment
  - Planned support in portal UI
- RPKI-to-Router support — RFC 8210bis, final draft
- Support in OpenBGPD and NIST BGP-SRx

# What's coming: One ROA per prefix



- RFC (draft) prescribing to generate one ROA per prefix
  - Mainly for preventing issues for delegated CAs when resources change
- Will likely result in changes in some CA software
- No changes in validators necessary
- Performance impact up to ~3 times more ROAs overall
  - More CPU, more storage, probably more memory
  - Some validator installations might start running out of resources

# Others features



- BGPSec certificates are usable
  - Usable in PaaS or self-hosted
- RSC (RPKI Signed Checklists)
  - Usable in PaaS or self-hosted



# Conclusion

- RPKI has become a mature ecosystem
- ROV + ASPA prevents large fraction of hijacks and route leaks
- RPKI deployment effort is not that big
- Go for it if you still did not



# Questions



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