Minutes from RIPE 36
| RIPE Meeting: 36 |
|
| Working Group: DNS |
|
| Status: |
1st Draft |
| Revision Number: |
1 |
18 May 2000
Chair: Rudiger Volk
Scribe: Vesna Manojlovic
Agenda:
0. Agenda bashing
1. David Conrad, ISC: BIND 9
2. Bill Manning: Preparing for DNS evolution
-=-
coffee break
-=-
3. Report from CENTR DNSSEC workshop
4. IETF - Randy Bush
5. AOB
5.1. Fernando - Document about re-delegation
5.2. RIPE documents published since the previous meeting
1. David Conrad gave quick update of current status of BIND
BIND9
* complete rewrite of code
* includes support for everything
- full IPv6 support
- DNSSEC support
- not supporting EDNS1
- multi-lingual support
- MS interoperablity
* RFC compliant (first time, cheers from the audience :)
- first time it has lot of documentation :)
* 1.2 mil $ to develop
* release - 30.6.
* availability now - beta
David was asking the audience for help :
- to support INN (BIND and DHCP are supported by Nominum)
- from people with NT experience to debug NT port of BIND 8.2.3
- to test BIND9
- performance
- IPv6 support in BIND 9
- DNSSEC
2. Bill Manning -- Wither DNS?
PPT presentation available on
http://www.ripe.net/ripe/meetings/ripe-36/presentations/
Current assumptions:
- constant MTU
- ascii
- BIND (UNIX based)
- single authority (server)
- hierarchy
- zone management
- static behaviour (client)
- merged server and resolver
- reachability: reliable network (up, end-to-end)
On the horizon:
dnssec
ipv6
dynamic dns
integration with other applications - database back-end
(LDAP,Oracle,mail) I18N (internationalisation)
DNS version diffusion survey Q&A session:
Q: how is this taken?
A: exhaustive search of inaddr tree.
Q: is it biased?
A (audience): it is security biased! they are not responding if
they are security conscious => shows higher % of vulnerable
Q: how big is the percentage of the servers that are blocked by
firewall and therefore not included?
A: few years ago - 20%. recently - 25%
Conclusion: people are moving into new code but not (as) fast (as ... )
Discussion about IPv6 inverse tree
Randy Bush: Is IPv6 inaddr tree going to be set-up separately?
(rfc 2826)
Bill: That is the suggestion (to use separate set of root nameservers)
Randy: That would cause technical and other problems. Other
possibility is to take one of existing root servers.
-= coffee break =-
3. Report from DNSSEC workshop
Workshop was initiated by CENTR, held in NLnet labs in Amsterdam.
One report was already done by [ ] in CENTR DNR-wg;
technical report - here.
The goal was to check resources needed for introducing DNSSEC on the
level of TLD zones.
Result of the previous previous attempts was: it is still hard
work, not feasible at this time. This new workshop gave different
results.
In Europe, .de tld zone is chosen as the worst case. Experiment
was done with the shelf PC, with extra configuration of memory.
"Signer" software was provided by Nominum.
Two test runes were done:
1. on original data
signing -- ~ 14 hours CPU time
4.4 expansion factor (of adding all the dnssec data)
2. modified zone
(taken out mx & A records; left just ns)
runtime -- 3.2 hours of CPU time
117 mb -> 380 mb
Conclusion: you need some resources, but it's within the reach
current hw and sw people with much larger zone that that will have
more work, but they have more revenues.
Q: Does it mean a recommendation to DEnic to get rid of mx only
domains?
Q: Compared with Swedish workshops?
Liman: different, smaller results. Bigger times & data. Used
signer from bind8.
Q: What do you consider normal zones?
A: Less then million records. (.de = 3,000,000 RR)
Liman: Does it makes a difference if you have to sing ns or mx/a
records?
David: Not significant.
David: Wildcards in the sign zone makes signing 2 orders of
magnitude more difficult. We don't support them!
Liman: Only in DNSSEC?
David: Yes, only if you try to sign them; we either ignore them or
generate an error.
4. Randy Bush: DNS from IETF perspective
What features are important?
For a log time, specifications were stable, code was fairly
unstable. Now we are in period when specifications are fairly
stable, and the code is little unstable.
The increased features that are being specified will cause code
instability that will last forever (you can't have all this sugar
and not be unhealthy).
Main new features: security / DNSSEC & multi-lingual support / IPv6
Security problem:
For example: the size of the root zone sign becomes larger then
bits in the MTU of the standard UDP packet and therefore all the
sessions will fall back to TCP and cause 6 times bigger amount of
traffic.
Multi-lingual problem:
It's not really the DNS problem, but application problem - what is
my web browser going to be able to read. i like to call it not
internationalisation but localisation, which can cause that our
customers not able to do e-commerce with Japanese customers
David: stability of the code: bind9 _designed_ and not _evolved_ ;
therefore more stable. architectured much better.
Bill: operational community has to find the way to provide the
feedback to engineering community. this forum might be a right
place for it.
Randy: yes - we need operators back in ietf. protocols became
designed without taking a consideration operational issues.
David(?): ietf is quite large cumbersome. having smaller groups of
operational people come to some consensus, and then having
spokesperson is probably a better solution.
Chair: in communities like this there is opportunity to keep
information flow in both directions.
The survey was conducted by Bill to check who is using which
version of BIND.
Results: [ ]
5.1. Document about re-delegation
Draft paper on how to help re-delegation was presented in RIPE #33
in Vienna by Fernando [ ].
Paper was describing the case of DNS transfer of customers from
one ISP to another - how that can be done without losing the
service, how to minimise problems, including variations of cases
of (non)cooperating ISPs.
Help is needed about transfer procedures in ccTLD zones other then
.es .
Question from the audience: Wouldn't CENTR think they should take
part in it? Since large amount of these re-delegations problems
are from ccTLD registrars.
Chair: Indication of involvement should come from CENTR. However,
administrative procedures in many registrars are much worse then
they should be; we should push CENTR in the right direction.
Liman: There should be one document describing technical issues
(in which order what.. ), which are the same all over the world;
then, what are the implications of administrative models; and in
the different part of the same document, point to possible
pitfalls.
ACTION on Fernando to sent index/draft to the DNS-WG mailing list;
make appendix about procedures in the registries/registrars that
we know about.
5.2. RIPE documents published since the previous meeting
- Recommendations for DNS SOA Values (RIPE-203)
- Simple DNS Configuration Example (RIPE-192)
There is work in progress on more detailed documentation. Peter
Koch was encouraged to work more on it.
Chair invited everyone to express their need for new documents.
Q: There is confusion about old and new minimum value in bind4
and bind8.
Liman: Dummy guide is meant for "the newest version of BIND".
Comments about other versions are welcome, but should be published
as separate document.
Please mail
comments/suggestions on:
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