

DNS amplification attacks

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
DNS amplification attacks

- Attacks using IP spoofed dns query
 - generating a traffic overload
 - bandwidth attack
 - similar to 'smurf attacks'
- Components are:
 IP spoofing
 DNS amp

IP spoofing + DNS amp


- IP spoofing
 - IP spoofed dns query
 - to use reflections
- DNS amp
 - UDP (no 3way handshake)
 - good amplification ratio =~ 60
 - distributed by full/stub-resolver (dns cache)

reflection




amplification


1. multiple replies




2. bigger reply




DNS amplification




DNS amplification attack



attack relations




view of bot #1




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
view of bot #2




view of stub-resolver




view of full-resolver



view of victim





Disable Open Recursive DNS

- There are many 'open relay' resolvers.
 - ISP cache servers
 - customers' dns servers
 - DSL routers (dns proxy as stub-resolver)

Source Address Validation

• BCP38/RFC2827

 All providers of Internet connectivity are urged to implement filtering described in this document to prohibit attackers from using forged source addresses...

IIJ/AS2497's case

 IIJ to Introduce Source Address Validation to all its Connectivity Services

- http://www.iij.ad.jp/en/pressrelease/2006/0308.html

• IIJ is adopting uRPF and ACLs.

IIJ's policy upstream ISP peer ISP IIJ/AS2497 customer ISP single homed multi homed static customer uRPF strict mode static customer uRPF loose mode Copyright (C) 2006 Internet Initiative Japan Inc. 2006/04/25


CISCO uRPF configuration


uRPF strict mode

interface GigabitEthernet0/0 ip verify unicast source reachable-via rx

uRPF loose mode interface GigabitEthernet0/0 ip verify unicast source reachable-via any

Juniper uRPF configuration





reference

- AL-1999.004 DoS attacks using the DNS
 - http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?it=80
- The Continuing DoS Threat Posed by DNS Recursion
 - http://www.us-cert.gov/reading_room/DNS-recursion033006.pdf
- SAC008 DNS Distributed DDoS Attacks
 - http://www.icann.org/committees/security/dns-ddos-advisory-31mar06.pdf



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