Re: hierarchical route objects, part 1
- Date: Fri, 10 Jan 1997 17:39:16 -0500
In message <637.852810211@localhost>, Steven Bakker writes:
> ==> From: Gabor Kiss kissg@localhost
> ==> Thu, 9 Jan 1997 11:28:52 +0100
>
> CA> I disagree that this is a good idea. If I register the following route
> CA> object (which actually exists):
> CA>
> CA> route: 128.0.0.0/1
> CA> descr: HALF-DEFAULT-ONE
> CA> origin: AS1800
> CA> advisory: AS690 1:1800 2:1239
> CA> mnt-by: MAINT-AS1800
> CA> mnt-lower: MAINT-AS1800
> CA>
> CA> nobody else can register any route objects.
>
> GK> This can be prevented by this object
> GK> route: 0.0.0.0/0
> GK> descr: for authorisation purposes
> GK> origin: AS0
> GK> mnt-lower: MAINT-INTERNIC
> GK> etc.
> GK>
> GK> Internic (or whatever else) may delegate maintainer rights as well
> GK> as allocates address ranges.
>
> That still doesn't help you if the 128.0.0.0/1 is already registered (which
> it is); I imagine the proposed auth scheme would look for the most
> specific enclosing route object, which is 128.0.0.0/1 and not 0.0.0.0/0
> (for most routes nowadays anyway).
>
> Steven
128.0.0.0/1 is obviously bogus so remove it. It was placed there for
no reason other than to be disruptive and try to undermine the IRR.
If the registry that holds 128.0.0.0/1 won't remove it, then the
community that is using the IRR may have to exclude that registry.
[big hint sent in Merit's direction].
Curtis
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