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Re: [dns-wg] one more effort on the NTIA response

  • To: "Jim Reid" jim@localhost
  • From: "Ondřej Surý" <ondrej.sury@localhost
  • Date: Wed, 12 Nov 2008 18:38:09 +0100

> #
> #       $Id: ntia-draft,v 1.8 2008/11/09 17:28:20 jim Exp $
> #
>
> The RIPE community (or DNS WG?) thanks the NTIA for its consultation
> on proposals to sign the root and is pleased to offer the following
> response to that consultation. We urge the adoption of a solution that
> leads to the prompt introduction of a signed root zone. Our community
> considers the introduction of a signed root zone to be an essential
> enabling step towards widespread deployment of Secure DNS, DNSSEC.
>
> It is to be expected that a community as diverse as RIPE cannot have a
> unified set of detailed answers to the NTIA questionnaire. However several
> members of the RIPE community will be individually responding to that
> questionnaire. We present the following statement as the consensus
> view of our community (or the DNS Working Group?) about the principles
> that should form the basis of the introduction of a signed DNS root.
>
> 1. Secure DNS, DNSSEC, is about data authenticity and integrity and
> not about control.
>
> 2. The introduction of DNSSEC to the root zone must be made in such a
> way that it is accepted as a global initiative.
>
> 3. Addition of DNSSEC to the root zone must be done in a way that does
> not compromise the security and stability of the Domain Name System.
>
> 4. When balancing the various concerns about signing the root zone,
> the approach must provide an appropriate level of trust and confidence
> by offering an optimally secure solution.
>
> 5. Deployment of a signed root should be done in a timely but not
> hasty manner.
>
> 6. Updates from TLD operators relating to DNSSEC should be aligned
> with the operational mechanisms for co-ordinating changes to the root
> zone.
>
> 7. If any procedural changes are introduced by the deployment of
> DNSSEC they should provide sufficient flexibility to allow for the
> roles and processes as well as the entities holding those roles to be
> changed after suitable consultations have taken place.
>
> 8. Policies and processes for signing the root zone must be
> transparent and trustworthy, making it straightforward for TLDs to
> supply keys and credentials so the delegations for those TLDs can
> benefit from a common DNSSEC trust anchor, the signed root.
>
> 9. There is no technical justification to create a new organisation to
> oversee the process of signing of the root.
>
> 10. No data should be moved between organisations without appropriate
> authenticity and integrity checking, particularly the flow of keying
> material between a TLD operator and the entity that signs the root.
>
> 11. The public part of the key signing key must be distributed as
> widely as possible.
>
> 12. The organisation that generates the root zone file must sign the
> file and therefore hold the private part of the zone signing key.
>
> 13. Changes to the entities and roles in the signing process must not
> necessarily require a change of keys.

I support this text as a reply to NTIA.

Ondrej.
-- 
 Ondřej Surý
 technický ředitel/Chief Technical Officer
 -----------------------------------------
 CZ.NIC, z.s.p.o.  --  .cz domain registry
 Americká 23,120 00 Praha 2,Czech Republic
 
http://nic.cz/ sip:ondrej.sury@localhost tel:+420.222745110 mob:+420.739013699 fax:+420.222745112 -----------------------------------------

 

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