Re: [dns-wg] DNSSEC Policy Development Process
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To: Randy Bush <>
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From: Jim Reid <>
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Date: Mon, 29 Aug 2005 15:10:14 +0100
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Cc: Edward Lewis <>, Marcos Sanz/Denic <>,
On Aug 26, 2005, at 21:26, Randy Bush wrote:
In principle IAB could sign .arpa tomorrow, assuming someone was
able
and willing to hold its KSKs.
Don't forget "in-addr.arpa." and "ip6.arpa." - they delegate some of
NCC's zones.
and don't forget that this does not scale.
Randy, you've confused me. What aspect of DNSSEC specifically "does
not scale"? Do you mean having everyone embed trust anchors in their
name server configurations for every signed TLD while we wait for the
root to be signed? If so, I agree that's not scalable. But that's not
what was under discussion here. At least I hope it wasn't.
manual coordination to maintain trusted keys for 292 tlds just
does not work. and that assumes that the tlds are signed, not
counting all the thrid and ninth level zones that make noise
when the zones above them are not signed.
I raised the prospect of getting .arpa signed, not 292 tlds. If this
was done, there would be one trust anchor for infrastructure zones
and that should simplify things in the context of the NCC's proposals
for deploying DNSSEC. Perhaps that might help the other RIRs to
follow the NCC's lead. It should also allow us to get operational
experience in handling keying material, signing policies and so on
that could inform the discussion on getting the root signed. ie Once
the layer-9 stuff about that stopped (if it ever will), the lessons
learned from gradually deploying DNSSEC in .arpa could provide a
valuable knowledge base of practical experience to draw on.
this does not fly until the root is signed. and that does not
fly until there is a key management plan and technology for it.
Well yes. But somebody has to start somewhere. IMO signing .arpa
could/should be a stepping stone towards that goal.
Please note these are my personal opinions and the usual disclaimers
apply.
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