Re: [db-wg] Re: [ncc-services-wg] X.509 authentication in the RIPE Database

[Patrik Fältström <]

On torsdag, jul 17, 2003, at 13:48 Europe/Stockholm, Randy Bush wrote:

> > > someone getting at the root CA key at an RIR
> > There would still be the very similar issue of someone getting at the
> > certificate that the RIR bought from the third party CA.
> no, as that would not be installed in my browser to be absolutely
> trusted.
A friend explained it like this (more people on this list might know 
Dirk-Willem van Gulik).

   paf

> You do have to separate completely the server->client auth and the
> client->server auth; they do not really over lap; though are rather
> identical; and traditionally shared certs. But do not have to.
>
> I.e.
>
> o The web server _may_ have a cert A.
>
>   A may be signed by A or by B.
>
> o The browser talks to the web server. It may check that A
>   is on a list of cert's it trusts; or that A is signed
>   by a cert which is on a list of cert's its trust. Such as
>   'B'. And so on up the chain. Until it runs out or finds
>    a cert it trusts.
>
> o A user _may_ have a cert C1.
>
> o That cert may be signed by C1 or by D.
>
> o A web server can deceide to ONLY allow access to people which
>   have a cert it has on a list (i.e. C1, C2, C3.. ) or
>   those that are signed by a cert on a list (D, ..) and
>   so on up the chain. And perhaps check it is still valid
>   time wise and not on a revocation list.
>
> At any point it is _easier_ if they all end up being signed by some 
> root
> CA; as then you do not have to keep your own long lists (A, C1, C2, C3)
> about all the servers and clients you trust on either side. And as a 
> user
> you just need a few root CA's.
>
> I.e. in the web server you need to configure
>
> ->	your own cert pub and private
>
> ->	and add all the pub's in your signing chain up to
> 	the top (as in the SSL protocol you may be asked
> 	for them by the client).
>
> And in order to check your clients you need
>
> ->	A (list of) cert you trust, i.e. the C1..C4
> 	or a cert which signed C1..C4 or higher up.
>
> ->	And perhaps valid/revoc lists.
>
> Likewise on the client side you need to keep
>
> ->	A list of all the root CA's you ultimately trust.
>
> ->	Your own client cert
>
> ->	and all certs up the chain as oyu may be asked
> 	for it.
>
> But ultimately and over time; some of your root CA's go bad; so a user
> needs to remove them from his browser list; and ultimately you need
> to revocate so you need to keep some sort of admin lists of C1, C2.. 
> etc.