Re: Deletion of .de domain objects
- Date: Fri, 30 Jun 2000 12:31:27 +0200
- Mail-followup-to: Daniel Roesen noc@localhost, lir-wg@localhost,db-wg@localhost
On Fri, Jun 30, 2000 at 11:32:53AM +0200, Nils Jeppe wrote:
> It will greatly help with the consistency of Person objects.
> Several of our customers have several RIPE Handles - Just because
> each is mnt-by a different provider.
AFAIK this will not change es DENIC-handles will be tied to
DENIC-members, too. Correct me if I'm wrong, please.
> OBVIOUSLY since the Person handles have not yet been migrated, the person
> data in denic's database is not authoritive.
But it gets delivered to querying clients. Without any information
about the data being non-authoritative and people should query RIPE.
> So WHY did you NOT set your own maintainer before Denic did so?
Thats another question. What DENIC did I would call "hijacking". Not
everyone knows the DENIC-P password.
> You do realize that a person without a maintainer can be changed by
> ANYBODY?
You do realize that he's not able to change his data anymore but DENIC?
> This is a serious security risk and could lead to the loss of
> domains, etc.
DENIC is not responsible for the security of RIPE person/role objects.
This is plain insolent.
Do you think CRYPT-PW are secure? C'mon...
Do you think DENICs methods to "protect" things are secure?
NOW we can use PGP-AUTH to protect our data.
Best regards,
Daniel
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