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Re: [address-policy-wg] 2007-08 New Draft Document Published (Enabling Methods for Reallocation of IPv4 Resources)
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To: Nigel Titley nigel@localhost
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From: Eliot Lear lear@localhost
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Date: Wed, 08 Oct 2008 20:20:48 +0200
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Nigel,
V3 of the policy was explicitly issued to address the main ETNO
concern, that is the "need" requirement. If you carefully look at V3
you will see that the RIPE NCC now has to apply exactly the same
checking and approval process that it does for a "normal" allocation.
This brings 2007-08 closer to ARIN's 2008-2, and in fact "improves" on
it by not prohibiting disaggregation. While you very reasonably point
out that the routing table could explode under such circumstances,
having such a prohibition along with needs justification can lead to
perverse impacts where holders of large blocks are only able to unload
them to large users like ISPs.
Are there additional mechanisms that could be put into play to limit
that explosion? For instance, could one cap the deaggregation rate per
aggregated block to some number per anum? What work has been done in
this area.
Regards,
Eliot Lear
Cisco Systems
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