[address-policy-wg] 200 customer requirements for IPv6

[Marc van Selm <]

Following up on the discussion during RIPE-51, I have not heard much 
discussion on "200 customer requirement for IPv6" rule. So I would like to 
hear your views on this.

During RIPE-51 the proposal to remove the rule caught serious objections. I 
can sympathise with those but I do have an issue that I'd like feedback on.

I am investigating how NATO should acquire IPv6 address space. NATO will use 
multiple transmission providers, NATO owned transmission and national 
networks. Also transmission contracts will have to be opened for bidding 
every few years. That makes requesting IP space from an ISP a non starter. So 
we explore the LIR route. Note that NATO has a service provider under its 
umbrella that provides service towards the other NATO organisations. They 
operate independently and are like an ISP (and more) for that matter. They 
are just not selling outside NATO.

At this time it is reasonably hard to specify the 200 /48 that will be given 
out for the "IPv6 Initial Allocation Request". Having reached about 130 or so 
on my list (not finished yet) I can't help wondering why RIPE-NCC should care 
about a list of sites that they only a vague clue of what they are and have 
no means of verification if the list is correct. Having said that, I get the 
feeling that the 200 rule only ads admin overhead and has limited actual 
power. Now NATO could include a summarised version in the Initial Allocation 
and do something like:

Subnet: /48	1 year 	5 regional sites (/48 per site = 5x /48)
Subnet: /48	1 year	20 subordinate sites to the 5 regional sites (/48 per site 
= 5x 20x /48 = 100 /48)
Subnet: /48	2 year	40 deployed elements (/48 per site = 40x /48)
Subnet: /48	2 year	70 Crisis Response Operation locations (/48 per location = 
70 x /48)
Total: 215x /48

Note that the numbers are fiction but they are not very unrealistic as we also 
need to include standby elements that are ready to go (power up, aim dish and 
run) systems. Although close to the truth, RIPE-NCC would have no way of 
verifying this and providing a detailed list would bury RIPE-NCC in details 
that they don't care about and also cannot verify.

I can't help feeling this rule is written for ISPs but will be counter 
productive for NATO and organisations with a very large privately operated 
enterprice network. I also can't help the feeling that its a paper tiger. So 
isn't there another way to achieve the same result as this rule was intended 
for?

Any views?

Marc
-- 
Marc van Selm
NATO C3 Agency
CIS Division
E-mail: marc.van.selm@localhost (PGP capable)