


# **BGP Routing Security** Lab Activity Guide

Version: 5/4/24

# **Introduction and Topology**

As network administrator of Sandbox Inc.'s IPv6 network, you're responsible for its design and maintenance, and for making sure it's always fully operational, resilient, and protected. As such, you decide to implement some of the Best Current Practices (BCPs) of BGP Routing Security.



The trainer will assign you a number (X) that will be used for AS numbers and prefixes.

Your network gets transit service from AS20, it has one private peer (ASX12) and several public peers (AS10 and AS11) via an IXP. Sandbox Inc. (ASX00) has three customers, Customer A, Customer B and Customer C, which have their own IPv6 address blocks and AS numbers and run BGP. As an upstream provider, Sandbox network provides a transit service to its customers and connects them to the Internet.

In the following activities, you'll be using the shown network topology diagram. You'll do configurations on your routers: R1, R2 and R3, and on the R12 router of your private peer, ASX12. The rest of the routers run eBGP and are already preconfigured with BGP routing policies to send and receive prefixes.

# **Enter the Lab Environment**

Go to https://workbench.ripe.net. The trainer will tell you which lab to use:

# WORKBENCH

Please ask the trainer which Lab should you use.



The trainer will also assign you a number (Number X) which will be your **username** to access the lab environment, and will be used for your AS number and IPv6 prefix. The **password** will be provided by the trainer.

Choose "BGP Routing Security" lab and click on the Access button.

You will see a web page with terminals available. Each terminal corresponds to one of the routers you'll be configuring.

The commands that you will need to type are shown in **blue**. Your number assigned by the trainer and some important outputs that need to be emphasised are shown in **orange**.

The routers in the lab network are running an open-source routing software, FRR (Free Range Routing) version 8.4.2 (https://frrouting.org).

# **IP Allocations and AS numbers**

Your AS number:	AS X00
Your IPv6 allocation:	2001:db8:X00::/48

# Lab Activity 1: Securing BGP Sessions

In this lab activity, you will implement two techniques to protect BGP sessions:

- MD5
- GTSM and BGP TTL security

# Activity 1.1: BGP session protection with MD5 authentication

In this lab activity, you'll configure MD5 authentication on a TCP connection between two BGP peers. You must configure the same password on both sides.

# Step 1: Check your BGP sessions in R1

R1 has six BGP sessions in total: iBGP sessions with R2 and R3, and eBGP sessions with the transit provider, private peer and IXP route servers (R8 and R9).

# Before starting the activity make sure that all your BGP sessions are up and running.

The output below shows the sessions are up for several minutes (check **Up/Down**) and R1 sends and/or receives prefixes from some of its peers (check **PfxSnt** and **PfxRcd**).

u0X-R1# show bgp summary											
IPv6 Unicast Summary (VRF default): BGP router identifier X.1.1.1, local AS number X00 vrf-id 0 BGP table version 20 RIB entries 31, using 5952 bytes of memory Peers 6, using 4303 KiB of memory											
Neighbor	V	AS	MsgRcvd	MsgSent	TblVer	InQ	OutQ	Up/Down	State/PfxRcd	PfxSnt	Desc
2001:db8:30:30::8	4	30	16372	14331	0	0	0	01w2d22h	14	(Policy)	N/A
2001:db8:30:30::9	4	30	16384	14331	0	0	0	01w2d22h	14	(Policy)	N/A
2001:db8: <mark>X</mark> 00::2	4	<mark>X</mark> 00	14331	14338	0	0	0	01w2d22h	0	15	N/A
2001:db8: <mark>X</mark> 00::3	4	<mark>X</mark> 00	14331	14338	0	0	0	01w2d22h	0	15	N/A
2001:db8: <mark>X</mark> 00:17::7	4	20	14334	14331	0	0	0	01w2d22h	6	(Policy)	N/A
2001:db8: <mark>X</mark> 00:112::12	2 4	<mark>X</mark> 12	14332	14331	0	0	0	01w2d22h	(Policy)	(Policy)	N/A
Total number of neighbors 6											

# Step 2: Configure MD5 authentication in R1 with R12 (private peer)

```
u0X-R1# conf t
u0X-R1(config)# router bgp X00
```

u0X-R1(config-router)# neighbor 2001:db8:X00:112::12 password Test123! u0X-R1(config-router)# end

#### Step 3: On R1, check your BGP sessions again

Check the state of the BGP sessions with your private peer's router. Is the eBGP session with R12 still up?

#### u0X-R1# show bgp summary

IPv6 Unicast Summary BGP router identifie BGP table version 20 RIB entries 26, usin Peers 6, using 4303	r`X g 49	.1.1.1, loca 92 bytes of		ber X00 vr	F-id Ø						
Neighbor	v	AS	MsgRcvd	MsgSent	TblVer	TnΟ	011+0	Un/Down	State/PfxRcd	PfxSnt	Desc
2001:db8:30:30::8	4	30	16385	14343	0	- 100	•	01w2d23h		(Policy)	
2001:db8:30:30::9	4	30	16397	14343	õ	0		01w2d23h			
2001:db8:X00::2	4	×00	14342	14349	0	0	0	01w2d22h	0		N/A
2001:db8:X00::3	4	×00	14342	14349	0	0	0	01w2d22h	0	15	N/A
2001:db8: <mark>X</mark> 00:17::7	4	20	14346	14343	0	0	0	01w2d23h	6	(Policy)	N/A
2001:db8:X00:112::12	4	<mark>X</mark> 12	14341	14341	0	0	0	00:02:40	Connect	. 0	N/A
Total number of neighbors 6											

No, it's not. An eBGP session with R12 fails and it stays in Connect state. This is because MD5 is enabled on one side of the BGP session only, on R1, but not on the peer router. You must configure the same password on both sides, otherwise the BGP session will never come up!

#### Step 4: Configure MD5 on R12

Go to R12 and enable MD5 with the same password. You can find R12 in the **Private Peer** tab in the left hand menu of the lab.

u0X-R12# conf t u0X-R12(config)# router bgp X12 u0X-R12(config-router)# neighbor 2001:db8:X00:112::1 password Test123! u0X-R12(config-router)# end

#### Step 5: On R1, check the BGP session with R12 again

From the output you can see that the BGP session is established and MD5 authentication is enabled!

```
u0X-R1# show bgp neighbors 2001:db8:X00:112::12
BGP neighbor is 2001:db8:X00:112::12, remote AS X12, local AS X00, external link
```

```
Local Role: undefined
  Remote Role: undefined
Hostname: u0X-R12
  BGP version 4, remote router ID X.12.12.12, local router ID X.1.1.1
  BGP state = Established, up for 00:00:44
BGP state = Established, up for 00:01:10
  Last read 00:00:10, Last write 00:00:10
  Hold time is 180 seconds, keepalive interval is 60 seconds
  Configured hold time is 180 seconds, keepalive interval is 60 seconds
  Configured conditional advertisements interval is 60 seconds
  Neighbor capabilities:
   4 Byte AS: advertised and received
.
Local host: 2001:db8:X00:112::1, Local port: 179
Foreign host: 2001:db8:X00:112::12, Foreign port: 53200
BGP connection: shared network
BGP Connect Retry Timer in Seconds: 120
Peer Authentication Enabled
Read thread: on Write thread: on FD used: 31
```

#### Summary

In this activity, you enabled MD5 authentication between R1 and your private peer's BGP speaker R12, and configured them with the same pre-shared secret key.

Since MD5 is configured, both routers will generate MD5 digest for each segment sent on a TCP connection and verify it to ensure the originality of the message. Although TCP-MD5 is widely deployed in many networks due to its availability in vendors' equipment, it has some limitations which made it obsolete by TCP-AO.

It's recommended to use TCP-AO to secure BGP sessions if it's supported by your vendor. In the lab network, we're running Free Range Routing (FRR) software which is a Linux-based routing implementation. It doesn't support TCP-AO yet since it's waiting for TCP-AO support in the kernel to offer it for routing protocols.

# Activity 1.2: BGP session protection with GTSM and BGP TTL security

In this activity, you will implement the Generalised TTL Security Mechanism (GTSM) in an eBGP session. Like MD5 protection, TTL security must be configured on both ends of a BGP session.

### Step 1: Enable GTSM on R1

Go to R1 and enable GTSM on the eBGP session with R12.

```
u0X-R1# conf t
u0X-R1(config)# router bgp X00
u0X-R1(config-router)# neighbor 2001:db8:X00:112::12 ttl-security hops 1
u0X-R1(config-router)# end
```

#### Step 2: Check your eBGP session with R12

In R1, check your eBGP session with R12 and see if GTSM is enabled in the output. Is the session up?

```
u0X-R1# show bgp neighbors 2001:db8:X00:112::12
BGP neighbor is 2001:db8:X00:112::12, remote AS X12, local AS X00, external link
Local Role: undefined
Remote Role: undefined
Hostname: u0X-R12
BGP version 4, remote router ID 0.0.0.0, local router ID X.1.1.1
BGP state = Active
Last read 00:01:38, Last write 00:01:38
Hold time is 180 seconds, keepalive interval is 60 seconds
.
Last reset 00:00:40, Waiting for peer OPEN
External BGP neighbor may be up to 1 hops away.
BGP Connect Retry Timer in Seconds: 120
Next connect timer due in 82 seconds
Peer Authentication Enabled
Read thread: off Write thread: off FD used: -1
```

No, it's not up. In the output you can see that the BGP session with R12 fails as it is in **Active** state. There is also another log added to the output: "**External BGP neighbour may be up to 1 hops away.**" This indicates that GTSM is enabled and the eBGP peer must be directly connected. This makes it impossible for remote attackers to deliver spoofed packets with TTL=255 via interfaces that are not directly connected.

Do not forget to configure GTSM on R12 as well. Remember that GTSM should be applied on a per-peer basis to provide protection against spoofed BGP messages. When enabled, the eBGP session is secured in the incoming direction only and has no effect on outgoing IP packets or the remote device.

## Step 3: Enable GTSM on R12 router

On R12 router, enable GTSM on the eBGP session with R1.

u0X-R12# conf t
u0X-R12(config)# router bgp X12
u0X-R12(config-router)# neighbor 2001:db8:X00:112::1 ttl-security hops 1
u0X-R12(config-router)# end

#### Step 4: Check your eBGP session with R12 again

Check the eBGP session with R12 again on R1. It may take a little longer than usual for the session to get established. You can clear the session to speed up the process.

```
u0X-R1# clear bgp 2001:db8:X00:112::12
u0X-R1# show bgp neighbors 2001:db8:X00:112::12
BGP neighbor is 2001:db8:X00:112::12, remote AS X12, local AS X00, external link
  Local Role: undefined
  Remote Role: undefined
Hostname: u0X-R12
  BGP version 4, remote router ID X.12.12.12, local router ID X.1.1.1
  BGP state = Established, up for 00:00:17
  Last read 00:00:15, Last write 00:00:15
 Hold time is 180 seconds, keepalive interval is 60 seconds
  Configured hold time is 180 seconds, keepalive interval is 60 seconds
  Configured conditional advertisements interval is 60 seconds
  Neighbor capabilities:
   4 Byte AS: advertised and received
    Extended Message: advertised and received
 External BGP neighbor may be up to 1 hops away.
Local host: 2001:db8:X00:112::1, Local port: 58426
Foreign host: 2001:db8:X00:112::12, Foreign port: 179
```

#### **Summary**

In this activity, you enabled GTSM and TTL security on the eBGP session in R1 with your Private Peer, R12. Enabling GTSM protects a router's control plane from CPU utilisation-based attacks caused by forged IP packets. It checks the TTL (IPv4) or Hop-limit (IPv6) of incoming IP packets and makes sure that they have not been spoofed.

# Lab Activity 2: Creating BGP Prefix Filters

In the following activities, you'll create BGP filters with your transit provider, public/private peers, and your customers, based on the recommendations we have seen in the course for the different peering relationships. During those activities you'll also see different filtering methods such as prefix-list filters and filtering based on BGP communities.

# Activity 2.1: Filtering with Transit Providers and Peers

As we have seen on the course, the recommendation for full routing networks is to apply filtering policies on border routers for each eBGP session. This will protect your network and your peers even if misconfigured. On the **inbound** direction, if the full routing table (FRT) is desired from the transit provider, the recommendation is to filter prefixes that are not globally routable, prefixes not allocated by IANA (IPv6 only), routes that are too specific, your own prefixes, IXP LAN prefixes, and the default route (if not requested from transit provider).

The same recommendation is valid for the routes received from public and private peers.

On the **outbound** direction, you should only send prefixes that belong to your network and your customer's networks to your eBGP peers. To prevent routing issues due to misconfiguration, you should also filter the following in your outbound policies:

- Prefixes that are not globally routable
- Prefixes that are too specific
- IXP LAN prefixes, and the default route

In our lab, you get transit service from AS20 (Transit Provider), which connects you to the rest of the Internet. Also, your company exists at the IXP location (AS30) and has two public BGP peers through the eBGP connection with IXP route servers (R8 and R9). In addition to public peers, you also have one private peer, ASX12.

The R1 router has eBGP sessions with transit provider (R7) and IXP route servers (R8 and R9). On those eBGP sessions, a default inbound policy is applied which accepts any route so that we can see which routes are coming from transit and IXP peers. However, there is no outbound policy applied yet.

In this lab activity, you'll configure an inbound and outbound policy for eBGP sessions with your transit provider and public peers, based on the mentioned recommendations.

## Check your eBGP session with the Transit provider and IXP Route Servers

u0X-R1# show bgp sum	u0X-R1# show bgp summary										
IPv6 Unicast Summary (VRF default): BGP router identifier X.1.1.1, local AS number X00 vrf-id 0 BGP table version 26 RIB entries 41, using 7872 bytes of memory Peers 6, using 4303 KiB of memory											
Neighbor	V	AS	MsgRcvd	MsgSent	TblVer	InQ (	OutQ	Up/Down	State/PfxRcd	PfxSnt	Desc
2001:db8:30:30::8	4	30	18232	15968	0	0	0	01w4d02h	14	(Policy)	N/A
2001:db8:30:30::9	4	30	18255	15968	0	0	0	01w4d02h	14	(Policy)	N/A
2001:db8:X00::2	4	<mark>X</mark> 00	15969	15975	0	0	0	01w4d02h	3	15	N/A
2001:db8:X00::3	4	<b>X</b> 00	15969	15975	0	0	0	01w4d02h	0	15	N/A
2001:db8: <mark>X</mark> 00:17::7	4	20	15975	15978	0	0	0	01w4d02h	6	(Policy)	N/A
2001:db8:X00:112::12	4	<mark>X</mark> 12	15971	15971	0	0	0	1d02h50m	(Policy)	(Policy)	N/A
Total number of neighbors 6											

You can see prefixes received (State/PfxRcd) and nothing sent (PfxSnt) from both route server peers (AS 30) and the Transit Provider (AS 20). Remember that (Policy) means that no policy has been configured on the eBGP session allowing the exchange of routing information.

### **Check BGP routes received from the Transit Provider**

```
u0X-R1# show bgp neighbors 2001:db8:X00:17::7 received-routes
BGP table version is 26, local router ID is X.1.1.1, vrf id 0
Default local pref 100, local AS X00
• • •
  Network
                    Next Hop
                                        Metric LocPrf Weight Path
*> ::/0
                    2001:db8:X00:17::7
                                              0
                                                            0 20 i
*> 2001:db8:65:1::/64
                    2001:db8:X00:17::7
                                                            0 20 65 i
*> 2001:db8:66::/48 2001:db8:X00:17::7
                                                            0 20 66 i
*> 2001:ff65::/32
                    2001:db8:X00:17::7
                                                            0 20 65 i
*> 2001:ff75::/32
                    2001:db8:X00:17::7
                                                            0 20 65 i
*> 2001:ff85::/32
                    2001:db8:X00:17::7
                                                            0 20 65 i
Total number of prefixes 6
```

All participants are connected to the same Transit Provider and IXP. They do not filter routes so in the previous and following command outputs you may see more prefixes coming from other participants.

# Check BGP routes received from IXP peers

	eighbors 2001:db8:30: is 41, local router I 100, local AS X00		
Network *> ::/0	Next Hop 2001:db8:30:30::10	Metric LocPrf Wei	ight Path
*> 2001:db8:65:1::/		0	0 10 i
,	2001:db8:30:30::65		
*> 2001:db8:66::/48	3 2001:db8:30:30::66	0	0 65 i
		0	0 66 i
*> 2001:db8:bbbb::/	/48 2001:db8:30:30::10		
<pre>*&gt; 2001:db8:bbbb:1:</pre>		0	0 10 i
, 2002102010200121	2001:db8:30:30::10	0	0 10 i
*> 2001:db8:bbbb:2:	::/64 2001:db8:30:30::10	Ū	0 10 1
*. 2001.460		0	0 10 i
*> 2001:db8:cccc::/	2001:db8:30:30::11	<u>^</u>	
*> 2001:db8:cccc:1:		0	0 11 i
	2001:db8:30:30::11	0	0 11 i
*> 2001:db8:cccc:2:	::/64 2001:db8:30:30::11		
		0	0 11 i
*> 2001:ff65::/32	2001:db8:30:30::65	0	0 65 i
*> 2001:ff75::/32	2001:db8:30:30::65	0	0 65 i
*> 2001:ff85::/32	2001:db8:30:30::65		
*> 2001:ffc1::/32	2001:db8:30:30::11	0	0 65 i
*> 2001:ffc2::/32	2001:db8:30:30::11	0	0 11 23456 5000 5000 4000 i
Total number of pre	efixes 14	0	0 11 23456 5000 5000 4000 i

You should see the same routes received from the other route server (R9) in the IXP (show bgp neighbors 2001:db8:30:30::9 received-routes).

## Step 1: Create an inbound policy on R1

In this lab activity you'll create a loose inbound policy on R1 which filters the default route, too specific prefixes (the ones longer than /48), prefixes that belong to your own AS and IXP LAN. In addition, other routes should be filtered from the transit provider or IXP peers as well, such as private blocks, reserved blocks and the prefixes not allocated by IANA. Since we're using documentation prefixes in the lab, BOGON filters will not be included in this filter configuration.

#### Step 1.1: Create a prefix-list for a default route (::/0)

u0X-R1# conf t
u0X-R1(config)# ipv6 prefix-list DEFAULT-v6 seq 5 permit ::/0

Step 1.2: Create a prefix-list for more specific prefixes

u0X-R1(config)# ipv6 prefix-list TOO-SPECIFIC-v6 seq 5 permit ::/0 ge 49

Step 1.3: Create a prefix-list matching your own prefixes

u0X-R1(config)# ipv6 prefix-list ASX00-PREFIXES seq 5 permit 2001:db8:X00::/48

Step 1.4: Create a prefix-list for IXP LAN

uOX-R1(config)# ipv6 prefix-list IXP-LAN seq 5 permit 2001:db8:30:30::/64

#### Step 1.5: Create a route-map

Create a route-map, **INBOUND**, to discard the routes in the prefix-lists created and allow any other route.

```
u0X-R1(config)# route-map INBOUND deny 10
u0X-R1(config-route-map)# match ipv6 address prefix-list DEFAULT-v6
u0X-R1(config-route-map)# route-map INBOUND deny 20
u0X-R1(config-route-map)# match ipv6 address prefix-list TOO-SPECIFIC-v6
u0X-R1(config-route-map)# route-map INBOUND deny 30
u0X-R1(config-route-map)# match ipv6 address prefix-list ASX00-PREFIXES
u0X-R1(config-route-map)# route-map INBOUND deny 40
u0X-R1(config-route-map)# match ipv6 address prefix-list IXP-LAN
u0X-R1(config-route-map)# match ipv6 address prefix-list IXP-LAN
u0X-R1(config-route-map)# route-map INBOUND permit 60
u0X-R1(config-route-map)# match ipv6 address prefix-list ANY
u0X-R1(config-route-map)# match ipv6 address prefix-list ANY
```

Step 2: Apply the inbound policy to Transit and IXP peers

u0X-R1# conf t
u0 <mark>X</mark> -R1(config)# router bgp X00
u0 <mark>X</mark> -R1(config-router)# address-family ipv6 unicast
u0X-R1(config-router-af)# neighbor 2001:db8:X00:17::7 route-map INBOUND in
u0X-R1(config-router-af)# neighbor 2001:db8:30:30::8 route-map INBOUND in
u0X-R1(config-router-af)# neighbor 2001:db8:30:30::9 route-map INBOUND in
u0 <mark>X</mark> -R1(config-router-af)# end

Meanwhile in the existing configuration, 'prefix-list ANY' is already applied on eBGP sessions with transit providers and IXP peers. But this configuration will be ignored once route-map is applied. This is because the order of preference will favour the route-map.

### Step 3: Check BGP routes from transit provider and IXP peers again

If you look at the BGP sessions, you can see a lower number of prefixes received from the route servers in the IXP (AS30) and the Transit Provider (AS20).

u0X-R1# show bgp sur	nmary									
IPv6 Unicast Summary BGP router identific BGP table version 39 RIB entries 41, usin Peers 6, using 4303	er X.1 9 1g 787	1.1, loca 2 bytes of	1 AS numb	er X00 vrf-	-id 0					
Neighbor Desc	V	AS	MsgRcvd	MsgSent	TblVer	InQ	OutQ	Up/Down	State/PfxRcd	PfxSnt
2001:db8:30:30::8	4	30	18255	15988	0	0	0	01w4d02h	8	(Policy)
N/A 2001:db8:30:30::9 N/A	4	30	18278	15988	0	0	0	01w4d02h	8	(Policy)
2001:db8:X00::2	4	<b>X</b> 00	15989	15997	0	0	0	01w4d02h	3	9
N/A 2001:db8: <b>X</b> 00::3 N/A	4	<mark>X</mark> 00	15989	15997	0	0	0	01w4d02h	0	9
2001:db8: <mark>X</mark> 00:17::7	4	20	15995	15998	0	0	0	01w4d02h	4	(Policy)
N/A 2001:db8:X00:112::12 N/A	2 4	<b>X</b> 12	15991	15991	0	0	0	1d03h10m	(Policy)	(Policy)
Total number of neig	ghbors	5 6								

You can see the specific prefixes being filtered out after applying the new inbound policy:

BGP table versi	p neighbors 2001:db8 on is 39, local rout ref 100, local AS X0	ter ID is X.1.1.1,		
 Network	Next Hop	Metric LocPrf	- Weight Path	
*> ::/0	2001:db8: <mark>X</mark> 00:17		C	
		0	0 20 i	
*> 2001:db8:65:	1::/64			
	2001:db8: <mark>X</mark> 00:17	7::7		

0 20 65 i

Total number of prefixes 2

	eighbors 2001:db8:30: is 39, local router 100, local AS <mark>X</mark> 00		
Network	Next Hop	Metric LocPrf	Weight Dath
	2001:db8:30:30::10	MECTIC LOCFT	weight Fach
*> ::/0	2001:008:30:30:10	2	0.40
		0	0 10 i
*> 2001:db8:65:1::	/64		
	2001:db8:30:30::65		
		0	0 65 i
<pre>*&gt; 2001:db8:bbbb:1</pre>	::/64		
	2001:db8:30:30::10		
	200110201301301110	0	0 10 i
* 2001.460.6666.2		0	0101
*> 2001:db8:bbbb:2			
	2001:db8:30:30::10		
		0	0 10 i
<pre>*&gt; 2001:db8:cccc:1</pre>	::/64		
	2001:db8:30:30::11		
		0	0 11 i
*> 2001:db8:cccc:2	••/64		
/ 2001.000.0000.2	2001:db8:30:30::11		
	2001.008.30.30.11	0	0 11 :
		0	0 11 i
Total number of pr	efixes 6		

You should see the same routes being filtered from the other route server (R9) in the IXP (show bgp neighbors 2001:db8:30:30::9 filtered-routes).

## Step 4: Create an outbound policy on R1

On the outbound direction, you should only send to your eBGP peers appropriate prefixes. Those are the prefixes that belong to your network and to your customer's networks. In this step you'll create an outbound policy on R1 towards the Transit Provider and the IXP peers.

#### Step 4.1: Create a prefix-list for your prefixes and your customers' prefixes

u0X-R1# conf t
u0X-R1(config)# ipv6 prefix-list ASX00-PREFIXES seq 5 permit 2001:db8:X00::/48
u0X-R1(config)# ipv6 prefix-list CUSTOMER-A-PREFIXES seq 5 permit 2001:db8:X40:1::/64
u0X-R1(config)# ipv6 prefix-list CUSTOMER-A-PREFIXES seq 10 permit 2001:db8:X40:2::/64
u0X-R1(config)# ipv6 prefix-list CUSTOMER-A-PREFIXES seq 15 permit 2001:db8:X40::/48
u0X-R1(config)# ipv6 prefix-list CUSTOMER-B-PREFIXES seq 5 permit 2001:db8:X50:1::/64
u0X-R1(config)# ipv6 prefix-list CUSTOMER-B-PREFIXES seq 10 permit 2001:db8:X50:2::/64
<pre>u0X-R1(config)# ipv6 prefix-list CUSTOMER-B-PREFIXES seq 15 permit 2001:db8:X50::/48</pre>

#### Step 4.2: Create a route-map

Create a route-map, OUTBOUND that only advertises your prefixes and your customers' prefixes.

u0X-R1(config)# route-map OUTBOUND permit 10 u0X-R1(config-route-map)# match ipv6 address prefix-list ASX00-PREFIXES u0X-R1(config-route-map)# route-map OUTBOUND permit 20 u0X-R1(config-route-map)# match ipv6 address prefix-list CUSTOMER-A-PREFIXES u0X-R1(config-route-map)# route-map OUTBOUND permit 30 u0X-R1(config-route-map)# match ipv6 address prefix-list CUSTOMER-B-PREFIXES u0X-R1(config-route-map)# match ipv6 address prefix-list CUSTOMER-B-PREFIXES u0X-R1(config-route-map)# match ipv6 address prefix-list CUSTOMER-B-PREFIXES

# Step 5: Apply the outbound policy to Transit and IXP peers

u0X-R1# conf t u0X-R1(config)# router bgp X00 u0X-R1(config-router)# address-family ipv6 unicast u0X-R1(config-router-af)# neighbor 2001:db8:X00:17::7 route-map OUTBOUND out u0X-R1(config-router-af)# neighbor 2001:db8:30:30::8 route-map OUTBOUND out u0X-R1(config-router-af)# neighbor 2001:db8:30:30::9 route-map OUTBOUND out u0X-R1(config-router-af)# neighbor 2001:db8:30:30::9 route-map OUTBOUND out u0X-R1(config-router-af)# neighbor 2001:db8:30:30::9 route-map OUTBOUND out

### Step 6: Check BGP routes advertised to Transit Provider and IXP peers

u0X-R1# show bgp neighbors 2001:db8:X00:17::7 advertised-routes BGP table version is 39, local router ID is X.1.1.1, vrf id 0 Default local pref 100, local AS X00							
•••		Maturia LasDaf Na					
Network	Next Hop	Metric LocPrf We	light Path				
*> 2001:db8: <mark>X</mark> 00:	:/48						
	•••	0 3	2768 i				
*> 2001:db8:X40:	:/48						
	::	100	0 X40 i				
*> 2001:db8:X40:	1::/64						
	::	100	0 X40 i				
*> 2001:db8:X40:							
/ 2001:000:740.		100	0 <b>X</b> 40 i				
	•••	100	0 1 0 1				
Total number of	prefixes 4						

u0X-R1# show bgp neighbors 2001:db8:30:30::8 advertised-routes
BGP table version is 39, local router ID is X.1.1.1, vrf id 0
Default local pref 100, local AS X00
...
Network Next Hop Metric LocPrf Weight Path
\*> 2001:db8:X00::/48

::	0 32768 i
*> 2001:db8:X40::/48	
::	100 0 X40 i
*> 2001:db8:X40:1::/64	
::	100 0 X40 i
*> 2001:db8:X40:2::/64	
::	100 0 X40 i
Total number of prefixes 4	

You should see the same routes being advertised to the other route server (R9) in the IXP (show bgp neighbors 2001:db8:30:30::9 advertised-routes).

At the moment only the routes from Customer A are advertised to the Transit and the IXP, because those are the only ones received by R1. In the next activity you will configure the policies for Customer B that will also allow those routes to be advertised.

# Activity 2.2: Filtering with customers

The **inbound filtering policy** with end customers is straightforward: "**Accept only customer prefixes and discard the rest**".

So, if you know the prefixes of your customers and their customers (this might be based on information you get directly from your customer, IRR and/or RPKI data), then you can apply an inbound policy accordingly.

But, in case the customer advertises too many prefixes and/or there is not a reliable knowledge of all prefixes originated from the customer and their customers, then generic filters can be used to filter the following prefixes:

- Prefixes that are not globally routable.
- Prefixes not allocated by IANA (IPv6 only).
- Routes that are too specific.
- Prefixes belonging to the local AS, IXP LAN prefixes, and the default route.

However, the **outbound filtering policy** with customers may vary according to the routes the customer wants to receive. If the customer is expecting only the default route, this can be done easily by applying a filter allowing the default route only. In case the customer wants to receive the full routing (if it is multihomed or if they want to have a view of the Internet table), a policy can be applied on the BGP peering to filter prefixes that are not globally routable, routes that are too specific, and the default route.

In this lab activity, you'll configure both inbound and outbound filters with Customer B. **Customer B** wants to receive the **full Internet routing** table. Also, it is assumed that customer prefixes are known. So, you'll create an inbound filter to accept only customer prefixes from your Customer B, and will discard the rest.

**Customer A** has a stub network and **asks for a default route only**. Everything is already configured for this customer.

#### **Customer A Prefixes:**

- 2001:db8:X40::/48
- 2001:db8:X40:1::/64
- 2001:db8:X40:2::/64

#### **Customer B Prefixes:**

- 2001:db8:X50::/48
- 2001:db8:X50:1::/64
- 2001:db8:X50:2::/64

### Step 1: Check your eBGP session with customer routers

Make sure that the eBGP sessions in R3 with Customer B (router R5) is up and running. Do you receive any routes from your customer?

u0X-R3# show bgp s	u0X-R3# show bgp summary										
IPv6 Unicast Summa BGP router identif BGP table version RIB entries 36, us Peers 4, using 286	ier X.3. 15 ing 6912	3.3, lo bytes	ocal AS nur of memory	nber <mark>X</mark> 00 vr	rf-id 0						
Neighbor	V	AS	MsgRcvd	MsgSent	TblVer	InQ	OutQ	Up/Down	State/PfxRcd	PfxSnt	Desc
2001:db8:X00::1	4	X00	186	179	0	0	0	02:56:59	15	0	N/A
2001:db8:X00::2	4	<u>X</u> 00	181	181	0	0	0	02:56:58	0	0	N/A
2001:db8:X00:35::5	4	<mark>X</mark> 50	182	182	0	0	0	02:57:12	(Policy)	(Policy)	N/A
2001:db8:X00:36::6	4	<mark>X</mark> 60	181	180	0	0	0	02:57:13	(Policy)	(Policy)	N/A
Total number of neighbors 4											

The BGP session is up, but no prefixes received or advertised from/to the customer router yet, and you see (Policy) in PfxRcd and PfxSnt counters. The reason for this is that no inbound or outbound policy has been configured on the eBGP session with the customer yet.

FRR open-source routing software supports RFC 8212 - Default External BGP (eBGP) Route Propagation Behavior without Policies. So according to this policy, BGP speakers do not accept or send routes on eBGP sessions, unless specifically configured to do so.

# Step 2: Create an outbound policy with customers

# Step 2.1: On R3, configure an outbound policy for Customer B

R3 will be configured with an outbound policy which advertises any route to Customer B's router, R5. In case the full routing table is sent to a customer, some prefixes such as default route (if it's not desired by the customer), too-specific prefixes and the ones that are not globally routable (BOGONs) can be filtered.

Create a route-map on R3 to filter the default route (::/0) and specific prefixes (smaller than /48 for IPv6) from being advertised to Customer B. However, do not filter BOGONs. *Because in our lab setup, IPv6 documentation prefix is used which is from the reserved space and one of the BOGON prefixes.* 

```
u0X-R3# conf t
u0X-R3(config)# ipv6 prefix-list ANY seq 10 permit any
u0X-R3(config)# ipv6 prefix-list DEFAULT-v6 seq 5 permit ::/0
u0X-R3(config)# ipv6 prefix-list TOO-SPECIFIC-v6 seq 5 permit ::/0 ge 49
```


```
u0X-R3(config)# route-map CUSTOMER-B-OUT deny 10
u0X-R3(config-route-map)# match ipv6 address prefix-list DEFAULT-v6
u0X-R3(config-route-map)# route-map CUSTOMER-B-OUT deny 20
u0X-R3(config-route-map)# match ipv6 address prefix-list T00-SPECIFIC-v6
u0X-R3(config-route-map)# route-map CUSTOMER-B-OUT permit 40
u0X-R3(config-route-map)# match ipv6 address prefix-list ANY
u0X-R3(config-route-map)# end
```

The last step is to apply the route-map as an outbound policy for the neighbour R5.

```
u0X-R3# conf t
u0X-R3(config)# router bgp X00
u0X-R3(config-router)# address-family ipv6 unicast
u0X-R3(config-router-af)# neighbor 2001:db8:X00:35::5 route-map CUSTOMER-B-OUT out
u0X-R3(config-router-af)# end
```

#### Step 2.2: On R3, check advertised routes to Customer B

u0X-R3# show bgp neighbors 2001:db8:X00:35::5 advertised-routes BGP table version is 15, local router ID is X.3.3.3, vrf id 0 Default local pref 100, local AS X00					
 Network	Next Hop	Metric LocPrf	Weight	Pat	th
*> 2001:db8:66::/4		100	•	66	
*> 2001:db8:00::/		100	0	00	<b>±</b>
/ 2001.000.700/	::	100	0	i	
*> 2001:db8: <b>14</b> 40::		100	0		
/ 2001.000.1440	::	100 0	1440 i		
*> 2001:db8:bbbb::		100 0	T++0 T		
/ 2001.000.0000.		100	Ø	10	i
*> 2001:db8:cccc::	·· //18	100	0	10	<b>±</b>
/ 2001.000.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.00000.0000	::	100	Ø	11	÷
*> 2001:ff65::/32	•••	100		65	
*> 2001:ff75::/32		100		65 65	
*> 2001:ff85::/32	::	100	0	65	1



You should see that too-specific prefixes, smaller than a /48, and the default route (::/0) are filtered out and not advertised to Customer B.

Note that you may also see other participant's prefixes being sent to the customer, because they are received by R1 and distributed to R3 internally (iBGP).

#### Step 3: Create an inbound policy with customers

In router R3, create an IPv6 prefix-list to only accept customers' prefixes from Customer B (R5) router.

#### Step 3.1: In R3, Create an inbound policy for Customer B prefixes

u0X-R3# conf t u0X-R3(config)# ipv6 prefix-list CUSTOMER-B-PREFIXES seq 5 permit 2001:db8:X50:1::/64 u0X-R3(config)# ipv6 prefix-list CUSTOMER-B-PREFIXES seq 10 permit 2001:db8:X50:2::/64 u0X-R3(config)# ipv6 prefix-list CUSTOMER-B-PREFIXES seq 15 permit 2001:db8:X50::/48

#### Step 3.3: Apply the filters to eBGP sessions with your customers


In R3 apply the prefix list created for the BGP session with R5 as an inbound filter.

```
U0X-R3(config)# router bgp X00
u0X-R3(config-router)# address-family ipv6 unicast
u0X-R3(config-router-af)# neighbor 2001:db8:X00:35::5 prefix-list CUSTOMER-B-PREFIXES in
u0X-R3(config-router-af)# end
```

#### Step 3.4: Check received routes from customers

Run "show bgp neighbors XXX received-routes" command on R3 to see the prefixes received from customers' router R5.

We can see many prefixes announced by R5, in addition to Customer B's prefixes:



			0 <mark>X</mark> 5	00 <mark>X</mark> 00	i				
*> 2001:db8:X40::/4									
	2001:db8: <mark>X</mark> 00:35::5		0 <u>¥</u> 5(	9 <mark>X</mark> 00	YAC	a i			
*> 2001:db8:X50::/4	-8			<b>X</b> 00	<u></u>	) <u> </u>			
	2001:db8: <mark>X</mark> 00:35::5								
* 2001.460.750.1.		0	0 <mark>X</mark> 50	ð i					
*> 2001:db8:X50:1::	2001:db8:X00:35::5								
	2002.000.000.000.00	0	0 <mark>X</mark> 50	ð i					
<pre>*&gt; 2001:db8:X50:2::</pre>									
	2001:db8:X00:35::5	0	0 <u>×</u> 50	a i					
<pre>*&gt; 2001:db8:bbbb::/</pre>	48	0		) <u> </u>					
	2001:db8: <mark>X</mark> 00:35::5								
*. 2001.4-0	40		0 <mark>X</mark> 5(	00 <mark>X</mark> 00	10	i			
<pre>*&gt; 2001:db8:cccc::/</pre>	48 2001:db8:X00:35::5								
	2001.000.000.000.000		0 <mark>X</mark> 50	0 <mark>×</mark> 00	11	i			
*> 2001:ff65::/32	2001:db8: <mark>X</mark> 00:35::5								
*> 2001:ff75::/32	2001:db8:X00:35::5		0 <mark>X</mark> 50	9 <mark>X</mark> 00	65	i			
2001.1175752	2001.008.000.555		0 <mark>X</mark> 50	0 <mark>X</mark> 00	65	i			
*> 2001:ff85::/32	2001:db8: <mark>X</mark> 00:35::5								
*. 2001.55-1(22			0 <mark>X</mark> 5(	8 <mark>X</mark> 00	65	i			
*> 2001:TTC1::/32	2001:db8: <mark>X</mark> 00:35::5		0 X50	a xaa	11	23456	5000	5000	4000
i				, NOO		23130	5000	3000	1000
*> 2001:ffc2::/32	2001:db8: <mark>X</mark> 00:35::5								
i			0 <mark>X</mark> 50	00X 0	11	23456	5000	5000	4000
Total number of pre	fixes 13 (10 filtered)								

If we look at what is being filtered out by the configured filters, we can see that it's filtering everything apart from Customer B's prefixes.

	s 21, local router 1	0:35::5 filtered-routes ID is X.3.3.3, vrf id 0
 Network	Next Hop	Metric LocPrf Weight Path
	2001:db8:X00:35::5	
		0 <mark>X</mark> 50 X00 66 i
*> 2001:db8:X00::/4		
	2001:db8:X00:35::5	
*> 2001:db8:X40::/4	18	0 <b>X</b> 50 <b>X</b> 00 i
/ 2001.000.740/4	2001:db8:X00:35::5	
		0 <u>X</u> 50 <u>X</u> 00 <u>X</u> 40 i
*> 2001:db8:bbbb::/		
	2001:db8:X00:35::5	
*> 2001.db8.cccc.	40	0 <b>X</b> 50 <b>X</b> 00 10 i
*> 2001:db8:cccc::/	48 2001:db8:X00:35::5	
	2001.000.700.555	0 X50 X00 11 i
*> 2001:ff65::/32	2001:db8:X00:35::5	
		0 <mark>X</mark> 50 X00 65 i
*> 2001:ff75::/32	2001:db8:X00:35::5	
*> 2001.ff85/32	2001:db8:X00:35::5	0 <b>X</b> 50 <b>X</b> 00 65 i
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	2001.008.00.35.5	

*> 2001:ffc1::/32	2001.462.400.255	0 >	<mark>X</mark> 50	<mark>X</mark> 00	65	i				
*> 2001:ffc2::/32		0)	<mark>X</mark> 50	<mark>X</mark> 00	11	23456	5000	5000	4000	i
*> 2001:1102::/32	2001.008.000.555	0)	<mark>X</mark> 50	<mark>X</mark> 00	11	23456	5000	5000	4000	i
Total number of pre-	fixes 10									

In summary, you have implemented the recommendation to accept customers' prefixes for customer B in ASX00.

# (OPTIONAL) Activity 2.3: Filtering based on BGP communities

BGP communities are very powerful attributes when implementing routing policies. When there are no BGP communities attached to the BGP routes, service providers need to update their BGP filters each time they have a new customer. This allows their prefixes into their network and advertises them to their upstream providers. In this lab activity, you'll implement filtering based on BGP communities.

You're providing partial transit to one of your customers (Customer C, ASX60) and only give access to your private peer (ASX12) through your network. To achieve that, configure BGP filters based on BGP communities. Tag Customer C's routes with a specific community at the border of your network and only advertise these routes to your private peer's router, R12.

#### **Customer C Prefixes:**

- 2001:db8:X60::/48
- 2001:db8:X60:1::/64
- 2001:db8:X60:2::/64

# Step 1: On R3, set BGP community to received routes from Customer C (ASX60)


u0X-R3# conf t
u0X-R3(config)# route-map CUSTOMER-C-IN permit 10
u0X-R3(config-route-map)# set community X00:X60
u0X-R3(config-route-map)# router bgp X00
u0X-R3(config-router)# address-family ipv6 unicast
u0X-R3(config-router-af)# neighbor 2001:db8:X00:36::6 route-map CUSTOMER-C-IN in
u0X-R3(config-router-af)# end

## Step 2: Check on R3 that community is attached to Customer C routes

First look at the received routes from the Customer C router:

u0X-R3# show bgp neighbors 2001:db8:X00:36::6 received-routes BGP table version is 31, local router ID is X.3.3.3, vrf id 0 Default local pref 100, local AS X00					
•••					
Network	Next Hop	Metric LocPrf	Weight Path		
*> 2001:db8:X60::;	/48				
	2001:db8: <mark>X</mark> 00:36::6				
		0	0 160 i		
*> 2001:db8:X60:1	::/64				
	2001:db8: <mark>X</mark> 00:36::6				
		0	0 160 i		
*> 2001:db8:X60:2	::/64				
	2001:db8: <mark>X</mark> 00:36::6				
		0	0 160 i		
Total number of p	refixes 3				

Now check one of the routes in detail to see if the BGP community X00:X60 is attached to it:



You should see the same community attached to the two prefixes received from Customer C (R6): 2001:db8:X60:1::/64 and 2001:db8:X60:2::/64

## Step 3: Check this route on R1

u01-R1# show bgp 2001:db8:X60::/48						
BGP routing table entry for 2001:db8:X60::/48, version 40						
Paths: (1 available, best #1, table default)						
Not advertised to any peer						
<mark>X</mark> 60						
2001:db8:X00::3 (metric 20) from 2001:db8:X00::3 (X.3.3.3)						
Origin IGP, metric 0, localpref 100, valid, internal, best (First path received)						
Community: X00:X60						
Last update: Sat Sep 2 16:55:00 2023						

You can see that R1 gets this tagged route with the specific BGP community  $\times 00: \times 60$ . This is why we wanted to be able to create filtering policies for routes based on the community attribute.

## Step 4: Create an outbound policy on R1 for Customer C prefixes

u0X-R1# conf t
u0X-R1(config)# bgp community-list 10 permit X00:X60
u0X-R1(config)# route-map CUSTOMER-C-PREFIXES permit 10
u0X-R1(config-route-map)# match community 10
u0X-R1(config-route-map)# router bgp X00
u0X-R1(config-router)# address-family ipv6 unicast
<pre>u0X-R1(config-router-af)# neighbor 2001:db8:X00:112::12 route-map CUSTOMER-C-PREFIXES out</pre>
u0X-R1(config-router-af)# end

You use a community list to specify the community tag you want to use, and then create a route map using it. That route map is applied as an outbound filter for the BGP session with R12 (ASX12). The intended result is that only the routes with that community tag are announced to ASX12, and all the others are filtered out.

#### Step 5: Check BGP routes on the private peer's router, R12

u0X-R12# show bgp neighbors 2001:db8:X00:112::1 received-routes					
BGP table version	is 6, local router	r ID is <mark>X</mark> .12.12.12, vrf id 0			
Default local pre	f 100, local AS <mark>X</mark> 12	2			
•••					
Network	Next Hop	Metric LocPrf Weight Path			
*> 2001:db8:X60::	/48				
	2001:db8: <mark>X</mark> 00:112	2::1			
		0 X00 X60 i			
*> 2001:db8:X60:1	::/64				
	2001:db8: <mark>X</mark> 00:112	2::1			
		0 X00 X60 i			
*> 2001:db8:X60:2	::/64				
	2001:db8: <mark>X</mark> 00:112	2::1			
		0 X00 X60 i			
Total number of p	refixes 3				

You should see the three prefixes that were tagged in R6 (ASX60).

# Lab Activity 3: Filtering AS-Path and Number of Prefixes

# Activity 3.1: Filtering routes with AS-path filters

BGP routes can also be filtered based on AS path information. This method is widely used and highly scalable.

It is recommended that you filter BOGON Autonomous Systems Numbers (ASNs. Bogon ASNs are private and reserved ASNs that should never appear in the global routing table. You should reject routes that have BOGON ASNs anywhere in the AS Path. AS23456 (AS\_TRANS) is one of these BOGON ASNs and therefore should be filtered.

In this lab activity, create an AS path filter to discard routes that have AS23456 (AS\_TRANS) in the AS path and apply it to your eBGP session with your public peer, AS11.

## Step 1: On R1, check your BGP table

u0X-R1# show bgp BGP table version is 76, local router ID is X.1.1.1, vrf id 0 Default local pref 100, local AS X00								
 Network	Next Hop Metr	ic LocPrf Weight	: Pat	th				
* 2001:ffc1::/32	fe80::a8c1:abff:fe8d:3ba	f						
			) 11	23456	5000	5000	4000	i
*>	fe80::a8c1:abff:fe8d:3ba							
			) 11	23456	5000	5000	4000	i
* 2001:ffc2::/32	fe80::a8c1:abff:fe8d:3ba	f						
		0 6	) 11	23456	5000	5000	4000	i
*>	fe80::a8c1:abff:fe8d:3ba	f						
		0 6	) 11	23456	5000	5000	4000	i
•••								

If you look at the AS PATHs, there are up to two routes, with two paths each one, that include the Bogon ASN 23456 (AS\_TRANS).

#### Step 2: Create an AS PATH filter to discard routes with AS23456

u0X-R1# conf t u0X-R1(config)# bgp as-path access-list AS-TRANS seq 5 deny \_23456\_ u0X-R1(config)# bgp as-path access-list AS-TRANS seq 10 permit .\*

The above configuration filters out (denies) any AS PATH with AS23456 anywhere in the AS-PATH attribute and allows others.

# Step 3: Apply the AS Path filter to eBGP sessions with IXP Route servers (R8 and R9)

u0X-R1(config)# router bgp X00 u0X-R1(config-router)# address-family ipv6 unicast u0X-R1(config-router-af)# neighbor 2001:db8:30:30::8 filter-list AS-TRANS in u0X-R1(config-router-af)# neighbor 2001:db8:30:30::9 filter-list AS-TRANS in u0X-R1(config-router-af)# end

In the current configuration, route-map INBOUND is already applied to eBGP sessions with IXP route servers (R8 and R9). When the filter-list is applied together with the route-map configuration, both are active. For inbound updates, route-map configuration will be preferred over filter-list configuration and the output of the route-map will be used as an input for the filter-list. So, according to the configuration above, in addition to the filtered prefixes from Route Servers, the routes with AS23456 (AS TRANS) in the AS Path will be discarded as well.

## Step 4: On R1, check your BGP table again

#### u0X-R1# show bgp

You should see that prefixes with AS23456 in the AS PATH do not exist anymore. The same principle can be applied to filter out the BOGON ASNs we showed in the course.

# Activity 3.2: Limiting the number of accepted prefixes

Limiting the number of prefixes accepted on an eBGP session provides protection in case too many routes are sent by your upstream or by your peers. It is important to review the limits regularly and increase it if needed, since the number of the routes on the Internet grows very fast. Some vendors provide two thresholds to monitor this limit, while the first threshold will only trigger a log, the higher threshold will shut down BGP peering.

In this lab activity, configure the maximum number of prefixes that will be accepted from your IXP peers on the R1 router

#### Step 1: On R1, check the number of prefixes learned from IXP peers

uOX-R1# show bgp neighbors 2001:db8:30:30::8 routes

When you run the command above, you'll see several prefixes received from the IXP peer R8. You can do the same with R9 (2001:db8:30:30::9).

#### Step 2: Configure maximum prefix limit for Route Server R8

Configure a maximum prefix limit for the routes learned from the IXP Route Server R8. Here in the example, it is set to 3 because we have a small number of routes. To see the prefixes limit in action you need to use a number lower than the number of prefixes you saw in the previous step for R8.


u0X-R1# conf t u0X-R1(config)# router bgp X00 u0X-R1(config-router)# address-family ipv6 u0X-R1(config-router-af)# neighbor 2001:db8:30:30::8 maximum-prefix 3 u0X-R1(config-router-af)# end

#### Step 3: Check your BGP session with IXP Route Server R8

```
u0X-R1# show bgp summary neighbor 2001:db8:30:30::8
IPv6 Unicast Summary (VRF default):
BGP router identifier X.1.1.1, local AS number X00 vrf-id 0
. . .
Neighbor
                 V
                           AS
                                MsgRcvd
                                          MsgSent
                                                    TblVer InQ OutQ Up/Down State/PfxRcd PfxSnt Desc
2001:db8:30:30::8 4
                           30
                                   3587
                                              3138
                                                          0
                                                              0
                                                                    0 00:02:06 Idle (PfxCt)
                                                                                                    0 N/A
Displayed neighbors 1
Total number of neighbors 6
```

You can see that the BGP session between R1 and R8 is in **Idle (PfxCt)** state, related to the prefix count. Let's see more details:

```
U0X-R1# show bgp neighbors 2001:db8:30:30::8
BGP neighbor is 2001:db8:30:30::8, remote AS 30, local AS X00, external link
Local Role: undefined
Remote Role: undefined
BGP version 4, remote router ID 192.0.2.8, local router ID X.1.1.1
BGP state = Idle
Last read 00:01:36, Last write 00:01:27
.
.
.
For address family: IPv6 Unicast
.
Incoming update prefix filter list is *ANY
Incoming update AS path filter list is *AS-TRANS
Route map for incoming advertisements is *INBOUND
Route map for outgoing advertisements is *OUTBOUND
0 accepted prefixes
Maximum prefixes allowed 3
```



It indicates that the reason for the Idle state is that the peer has exceeded the maximum number of configured prefixes (3).

#### Step 4: Remove the maximum-prefix limit configuration on R1

```
u0X-R1# conf t
u0X-R1(config)# router bgp X00
u0X-R1(config-router)# address-family ipv6
u0X-R1(config-router-af)# no neighbor 2001:db8:30:30::8 maximum-prefix 3
u0X-R1(config-router-af)# end
```

Let's see if things went back to the previous state after removing the prefixes limit.

#### Step 5: Check again the BGP session with IXP Route Server R8

```
u0X-R1# show bgp neighbors 2001:db8:30:30::8
BGP neighbor is 2001:db8:30:30::8, remote AS 30, local AS X00, external link
Local Role: undefined
Remote Role: undefined
BGP version 4, remote router ID 192.0.2.8, local router ID X.1.1.1
BGP state = Established, up for 00:01:28
Last read 00:00:31, Last write 00:00:28
.
.
Connections established 1; dropped 1
Last reset 00:07:31, Notification sent (Cease/Maximum Number of Prefixes Reached)
```

The BGP session with R8 is established again. If you check the received routes, you will see the previously received routes again. The effect of limiting the prefixes accepted from a peer was not to accept up to that number, but to disconnect the BGP session, so no routes are exchanged.

In a real environment, the limit number would be much larger, allowing the expected number of routes and allowing for some growth over time, but checking it regularly. The goal is to protect the BGP speaker resources from running out because of one BGP session with a sudden increase in the number of announced routes.

# Lab Activity 4: Create a route6 object

IRR is the routing registry database where network operators register their routing information to declare who is supposed to originate their prefixes in BGP. They do that by creating **route(6)** objects and by publishing their policies by adding **(mp-)import/(mp-)export** attributes in **aut-num** objects. Upstream providers can create BGP filters automatically based on IRR data.

In this lab activity, create a route6 object in the **RIPE Test Database** for the IPv6 address block allocated to your user, userX. You will use your assigned AS number for this activity, ASX00. The following objects are already created for your user in the RIPE Test Database:

person	TP <mark>X</mark> -TEST
inet6num	2001:db8: <mark>X</mark> 00::/48
aut-num	ASX00
maintainer	CM <mark>X</mark> -MNT
org	ORG-TCP <mark>X</mark> -TEST

## Step 1: Create a RIPE NCC Access account

Create a RIPE NCC Access account if you don't have one. You can create one easily by visiting <u>https://access.ripe.net/registration</u>

# Step 2: Go to RIPE Test Database

Access to RIPE Test Database by using the following link: <u>https://apps-test.db.ripe.net</u> In the upper right corner, you can find the option to "Go to Login" using your RIPE NCC Access account. **You will need to be logged in to complete this activity**.

# Step 3: Search for your IPv6 allocation and your AS number

Search for your own allocated IPv6 address block, 2001:db8:X00::/48. Type your prefix in the search box ("Enter a search term").

You can see as an example the prefix for User1, 2001:db8:100::/48 below.

×	🛞 RIPE D	atab	ase rest
۵	<b>Resources</b> My Resources, Sponsored Resources	>	Welcome to the TEST Environment of the RIPE Database.
	TEST Database	~	You can use this environment to learn and experiment with RIPE Database. It uses a TEST source and all changes are reverted each night.
	Query Database		Enter a search term 2001:db8:100::/48
	Full Text Search		Types V Hierarchy flags V Inverse lookup V Advanced filter (I) V APPLY FILTERS RESET FILTERS
	Syncupdates		By submitting this form you explicitly express your agreement with the RIPE Database Terms and Conditions $\mathbb{Z}^3$
	Create an Object		
/			
~		atab	<b>ase</b> Test
	RESOURCES My Resources, Sponsored Resources	atab >	ase Test Welcome to the TEST Environment of the RIPE Database.
	Resources My Resources,		
	Resources My Resources, Sponsored Resources	>	Welcome to the TEST Environment of the RIPE Database.
	Resources My Resources, Sponsored Resources TEST Database	>	Welcome to the TEST Environment of the RIPE Database. You can use this environment to learn and experiment with RIPE Database. It uses a TEST source and all changes are reverted each night.
	Resources My Resources, Sponsored Resources TEST Database Query Database	>	Welcome to the TEST Environment of the RIPE Database. You can use this environment to learn and experiment with RIPE Database. It uses a TEST source and all changes are reverted each night. Search results
	Resources My Resources, Sponsored Resources TEST Database Query Database Full Text Search	>	Welcome to the TEST Environment of the RIPE Database.         You can use this environment to learn and experiment with RIPE Database. It uses a TEST source and all changes are reverted each night.         Search results         This is the RIPE Database search service. The objects are in RPSL format. The RIPE Database is subject to Terms and Conditions C.         Responsible organisation: RIPE NCC training courses-Participant 1 Organisation No abuse contact found         Image: Provide the RIPE NCC managed values
	Resources My Resources. Sponsored Resources TEST Database Query Database Full Text Search Syncupdates	>	Welcome to the TEST Environment of the RIPE Database.         You can use this environment to learn and experiment with RIPE Database. It uses a TEST source and all changes are reverted each night.         Search results         This is the RIPE Database search service. The objects are in RPSL format. The RIPE Database is subject to Terms and Conditions C.         Responsible organisation: RIPE NCC training courses-Participant 1 Organisation         No abuse contact found         Image: Highlight RIPE NCC managed values         intefinum:       2001:db81000::/48
	Resources My Resources. Sponsored Resources TEST Database Query Database Full Text Search Syncupdates	>	Welcome to the TEST Environment of the RIPE Database.         You can use this environment to learn and experiment with RIPE Database. It uses a TEST source and all changes are reverted each night.         Search results         This is the RIPE Database search service. The objects are in RPSL format. The RIPE Database is subject to Terms and Conditions C.         Responsible organisation: RIPE NCC training courses-Participant 1 Organisation         No abuse contact found         Intelfnum:         Intelfnum:         2001:db81001:748         Intelfnum:         BCP-TRAINING-NET
	Resources My Resources. Sponsored Resources TEST Database Query Database Full Text Search Syncupdates	>	Welcome to the TEST Environment of the RIPE Database.         You can use this environment to learn and experiment with RIPE Database. It uses a TEST source and all changes are reverted each night.         Search results         This is the RIPE Database search service. The objects are in RPSL format. The RIPE Database is subject to Terms and Conditions C.         Responsible organisation: RIPE NCC training courses-Participant 1 Organisation         No abuse contact found         Image: Highlight RIPE NCC managed values         intefinum:       2001:db81000::/48
	Resources My Resources. Sponsored Resources TEST Database Query Database Full Text Search Syncupdates	>	Welcome to the TEST Environment of the RIPE Database.         You can use this environment to learn and experiment with RIPE Database. It uses a TEST source and all changes are reverted each night.         Search results         This is the RIPE Database search service. The objects are in RPSL format. The RIPE Database is subject to Terms and Conditions C.         Responsible organisation: RIPE NCC training courses-Participant 1 Organisation No abuse contact found         Highlight RIPE NCC managed values inetforum:         1         1         1         1         2         1         1         2         1         2         1         2         1         2         1         2         1         2         1         2         1         2         1         2         2         2         2         2         2         2         2         2         2         2         2         2         2         <
	Resources My Resources. Sponsored Resources TEST Database Query Database Full Text Search Syncupdates	>	Welcome to the TEST Environment of the RIPE Database.         You can use this environment to learn and experiment with RIPE Database. It uses a TEST source and all changes are reverted each night.         Search results         This is the RIPE Database search service. The objects are in RPSL format. The RIPE Database is subject to Terms and Conditions C.         Responsible organisation: RIPE NCC training courses-Participant 1 Organisation         No abuse contact found         Highlight RIPE NCC managed values         inetionum:       2001:db8:100::/48         netname:       B67-TRAINING-NET         org:       ORG-TEPI-TEST         sponsoring-org:       ORG-EIPB1-TEST
	Resources My Resources. Sponsored Resources TEST Database Query Database Full Text Search Syncupdates	>	Welcome to the TEST Environment of the RIPE Database.         You can use this environment to learn and experiment with RIPE Database. It uses a TEST source and all changes are reverted each night.         Search results         This is the RIPE Database search service. The objects are in RPSL format. The RIPE Database is subject to Terms and Conditions 2.         Responsible organisation: RIPE NCC training courses-Participant 1 Organisation         No abuse contact found         ImetToRum:       2001:db81:000:1/48         netrame:       B6P-TRAINING-WET         org:       ORG-TEP1-TEST         sponsoring-org:       ORG-TEP1-TEST         gensoring-org:       ORG-TEP1-TEST         gensoring-org:       RIPE NCC training courses - Participant 1 Assignment
	Resources My Resources. Sponsored Resources TEST Database Query Database Full Text Search Syncupdates	>	Welcome to the TEST Environment of the RIPE Database.         You can use this environment to learn and experiment with RIPE Database. It uses a TEST source and all changes are reverted each night.         Search results         This is the RIPE Database search service. The objects are in RPSL format. The RIPE Database is subject to Terms and Conditions [2].         Responsible organisation: RIPE NCC training courses-Participant 1 Organisation         No abuse contact found         Image: Highlight RIPE NCC managed values         InetTome:       2001:db8:1000:1/48         InetTome:       000-TRAINING-MET         org:       000-Grep1-TEST         gensoring-org:       000-Training courses - Participant 1 Assignment         country:       EU         admin-c:       TP1-TEST         tech-c:       TP1-TEST
	Resources My Resources. Sponsored Resources TEST Database Query Database Full Text Search Syncupdates	>	Welcome to the TEST Environment of the RIPE Database.         You can use this environment to learn and experiment with RIPE Database. It uses a TEST source and all changes are reverted each night.         Search results         This is the RIPE Database search service. The objects are in RPSL format. The RIPE Database is subject to Terms and Conditions C.         Responsible organisation: RIPE NCC training courses - Participant 1 Organisation         No abuse contact found         Highlight RIPE NCC managed values         Inetfonum:       2001:dBs1000::/48         netname:       B0F-TRAINING-NET         org:       0.004-TCP1-TEST         sponsoring-org:       0.004-TCP1-TEST         dmin-c:       TP1-TEST         dmin-c:       TP1-TEST         tech-c:       TP1-TEST         tech-c:       ASSIGNED PI
	Resources My Resources. Sponsored Resources TEST Database Query Database Full Text Search Syncupdates Create an Object	>	Welcome to the TEST Environment of the RIPE Database.         We can use this environment to learn and experiment with RIPE Database. It uses a TEST source and all changes are reverted each night.         Search results         This is the RIPE Database search service. The objects are in RPSL format. The RIPE Database is subject to Terms and Conditions C.         Responsible organisation: RIPE NCC training courses - Participant 1 Organisation         No abuse contact found         Image: Participant 1 Organisation         Mode Second
	Resources My Resources. Sponsored Resources TEST Database Query Database Full Text Search Syncupdates	>	Welcome to the TEST Environment of the RIPE Database.         Welcome to learn and experiment with RIPE Database. It uses a TEST source and all changes are reverted each night.         Search results         This is the RIPE Database search service. The objects are in RPSL format. The RIPE Database is subject to Terms and Conditions [2].         Responsible organisation: RIPE NCC training courses-Participant 1 Organisation         No abuse contact found         Image:       BGP-TRAINING-MET         org:       ORG-TCP1-TEST         sponsoring-org:       ORG-TCP1-TEST         gensoring-org:       RIPE NCC training courses - Participant 1 Assignment         country:       EU         admin-c:       TP1-TEST         tech-c:       TP1-TEST         status:       ASSIGNED PI         mt-by:       TEST-MECC-ME-MIT         mt-by:       TEST-MEC HM-MIT
	Resources My Resources. Sponsored Resources TEST Database Query Database Full Text Search Syncupdates Create an Object	>	Welcome to the TEST Environment of the RIPE Database.         We can use this environment to learn and experiment with RIPE Database. It uses a TEST source and all changes are reverted each night.         Search results         This is the RIPE Database search service. The objects are in RPSL format. The RIPE Database is subject to Terms and Conditions C.         Responsible organisation: RIPE NCC training courses - Participant 1 Organisation         No abuse contact found         Image: Participant 1 Organisation         Mode Second

# Step 4: Create a route6 object for your allocated IPv6 prefix

On the left hand side, click on "Create an Object", then choose "route6" and click on [Create]

×	& RIPE Database Test						
۵	Resources My Resources, Sponsored Resources		Welcome to the TEST Environment of the RIPE Database.				
	TEST Database		You can use this environment to learn and experiment with RIPE Database. It uses a TEST source and all changes are reverted each night.				
	Query Database						
	Full Text Search		Select object type you would like to create				
	Syncupdates		Object type v role and maintainer pair				
	Create an Object		a-set				
			domain filter-set inet-tr inet6num inetnum irt key-cert mother organisation				
E	Documentation		peering-set person				
þ	Feedback/Support		role route				
Ĵè	Legal Copyright, Privacy, Terms an Cookies	nd	route-set route6 rrt-set				

It will ask for a maintainer, use CMX-MNT, the password is: secretX. Complete the rest of the form with your prefix (route6 attribute) and your AS number (origin attribute).

### BGP Routing Security Training Course

RIPE Database		ssword authentication	×
atabase > You can Mod	n use this enviro	ect a maintainer to authenticate the update operation. MI-MNT vide the password for the selected maintainer Forgotten MNTNER password Also authorise my RIPE NCC Access account for this maintainer. Learn more.	) oo ? it
mntr	ner /1-MNT		
Resources		e TEST Environment of the RIPE Database.	
TEST Database Query Database Full Text Search Syncupdates Create an Object	Create "route6" Please enter the maint CML-MNT\$2 > route6 2001:db8:100:/48 origin AS100 source TEST	t to sam and experiment with RIPE Database. It uses a TEST source and all changes are reverted each right. You are editing ainers you would like to use as mnt-by explicitly express your agreement with the RIPE Database Terms and Conditions [2]	Reseaux IP Europeens Net * CREATE IN TEXT AREA + 2 + 2 + 2 CANCEL SUBMT [22]
Your object has been succe route6 "2001:co			
route6: origin: mnt-by: created: last-modified: source:		AS1 CM1 202	-MNT 4-02-02T16:21:49Z 4-02-02T16:21:49Z

So, now you have created a route6 object which authorises your ASN to originate the prefix in BGP. If it is hijacked and originated from any other network intentionally or accidentally, upstream providers who are implementing filtering based on IRR data will filter them out.

# Lab Activity 5: RPKI

In the following lab activities we will see both sides of RPKI: The authorisation by signing Route Origin Authorisations (ROAs) and the validation by configuring Route Origin Validation (ROV).

# Activity 5.1: Creating ROAs

In this lab activity, you are going to create ROAs for **your LIR's prefixes** in a **test environment.** Log in to **the test RPKI Dashboard** with your LIR account, if you don't remember your LIR account login, the trainer will also provide a demo by logging in to the LIR Portal and creating ROAs for the nl.ripencc-ts LIR account.

On the left hand side, click on "Resource Certification" and then "Dashboard".

Test RPKI Dashboard: https://localcert.ripe.net/

### Step 1: Check your BGP announcements

×	🛞 RPKI						
പ്പ	Resource Certification 🗸 🗸	You are using the pilot environmen	t.				
	Dashboard						Reseaux IP Europeens Networ 💡
		RPKI Dashboard				3 CERTIFIED RESOURCE	ES ALERTS ARE SENT TO 1 ADDR
		🔀 2 BGP An	nouncements		🗄 0 ROAs		
		🗹 0 Valid	🔋 0 Invalid 🛛 👔 2 Unknov	'n	🖸 о ок	0 Causing prob	blems
		BGP Announcements	Route Origin Authorisations (RC	As) History			Search
		↓	ected BGP Announcements			⊠ Va	lid 🛆 Invalid 💿 Unknown
		Origin AS	Prefix	Current Status			
		C AS2121	193.0.24.0/21	UNKNOWN			\$ %
		C AS2121	2001:67c:64::/48	UNKNOWN			\$ %
	Documentation	The data displayed under I Please note that:	GP announcements is based on the <mark>riswho</mark> i	a dumps available at www.ris.ripe.n	et/dumps.		
	Feedback/Support		s for an announcement to be visible.				
~~	Tell us what you think		w visibility (i.e. visible to five or fewer RIS pe				
୶ୖୢୄ	Copyright, Privacy, Terms and cookies	Announcements that do	not propagate on the Internet may be listed	ir they are visible to enough RIS p	eers.		🧐 Tour

The RPKI dashboard shows the prefixes collected by RIPE NCC's Routing Information Service (RIS). In the example image, you can see the announcements for the RIPE NCC's AS2121. You will see your LIR's prefixes in your output.

## Step 2: Creating ROAs

In the RPKI dashboard, you can select the BGP announcements you want to create ROAs for, and then click on "Create ROAs for selected BGP Announcements".

#### BGP Routing Security Training Course

RPKI Dashboard	Announceme				
_	0 Invalid 🔋 2 Unk		_	0 Causing pro	blems
BGP Announcem	ents Route Origin /	Authorisations (ROAs)	History	Search	
🕽 🎇 Create ROAs t	or selected BGP Announcem	nents		Valid 🛆 Invalid	⑦ Unknown
Origin AS	Prefix	Current Status			
AS2121	193.0.24.0/21	UNKNOWN			*774
AS2121	2001:67c:64::/48	UNKNOWN			*//*
Show 25 ~ Looking for ROA	Certification for Phase	urces?		Revok	e hosted CA
	ouncements	🗄 <b>0</b> ROAs	Causing problems	Revok	e hosted CA
Looking for ROA	OUNCEMENTS Lid 2 Unknown Route Origin Authorisation ed BGP Announcements	С о ок ок соружение и соруже	ges 🗇 Discard the changes	Cancel Affected a AS2121 VALID	nnouncements 193.0.24.0/21 UNKNOWN 2001:67c:64::/48 UNKNOWN
Looking for ROA 2 BGP Ann 3 0 Valid  3 0 Inva 3 0 Valid  3 0 Inva 3 Create ROAs for select 0 origin AS AS2121	OUNCEMENTS lid  2 Unknown Route Origin Authorisation ed BGP Announcements Prefix Curree 193.0.24.0/21 UNKKN	I construction of the characteristic of the	ges ℃ Discard the changes 5 193.0.24.0/21 ↔ 21	Cancel Affected a AS2121 AS2121	nnouncements ⊟ 193.0.24.0/21 Utranowy
Looking for ROA 2 BGP Ann 0 Valid 0 Inva 3 O Valid 0 Inva 3 O Valid 0 Inva 3 Create ROAs for select Origin AS	OUNCEMENTS lid 2 Unknown Route Origin Authorisation ed BGP Announcements Prefix Curre	I construction of the characteristic of the	ges ℃ Discard the changes 5 193.0.24.0/21 ↔ 21	Cancel Affected a AS2121 AS2121	nnouncements ⊟ 193.0.24.0/21 Utranowy

You can review the changes before finally publishing the ROAs by clicking on "Apply the changes". In the example, the two prefixes will change from Unknown to Valid.

# Step 3: Verify that ROAs have been created

😇 2 BGP Ann	ouncements	🔁 2 ROAs
🗹 2 Valid	0 Invalid 🛛 👔 0 Unknown	2 OK 🕜 0 Causing problems
BGP Announcements	Route Origin Authorisations (ROAs)	) History Search
🖒 Discard Changes 🗍 🛙	Delete ROAs	△ Causing Problems ✓ Not Causing Problems + New ROA
AS number	Prefix	Most specific length allowed Affected announcements
AS2121	2001:67c:64::/48	48 0 🗹 🗍
AS2121	193.0.24.0/21	21 0 🗹 🗍
Show 25 V		

By default, it creates ROAs for the exact prefix, so the more specific length allowed is the same as the prefix length.

## Step 4: Create a more specific ROA for one of your IPv4/IPv6 prefixes

Pick one of **your LIR's prefixes** and decide on a more specific one (i.e /24 or even /25 for IPv4, and /36 or /40 for IPv6). Then, create a ROA with your assigned AS number, ASX00, as the origin AS.

You can do this using the "+ New ROA" button, then saving (floppy disc icon), and finally reviewing and publishing changes.

(]) R	PKI Dashboard			3 CERTIFIED RESOURCES NO A	LERT EMAIL CONFIGURE
°€	2 BGP Anr 2 Valid 🛛 0 Inv	ralid <b>8</b> 0 Unknown	)	2 ROAs 2 0K 0 Causing	problems
B	GP Announcements	Route Origin Author	isations (ROAs)	) History Search	
	つ Discard Changes ①	Delete ROAs	<u>∧</u> Causir	ng Problems 🛛 🖂 Not Causing Proble	ms + New ROA
	AS number	Prefix	Most specific length allowe		
	AS700	193.0.24.0/24	24	0	
	AS2121	2001:67c:64::/48	48	0	
	AS2121	193.0.24.0/21	21	0	6 1

You have now published ROAs for all or some of your prefixes in the RIPE NCC repository. You are protecting your address space from origin hijacks, but that protection will only happen in networks using BGP and RPKI to validate their routes. This is called BGP Route Origin Validation. You will configure ROV in the next lab activity.

# Activity 5.2: BGP Origin Validation with RPKI

BGP Origin Validation (BGP OV) is BGP filtering using the information in ROAs. It is used to validate the origin of BGP announcements by using RPKI infrastructure. This verifies if the network originating a prefix is really authorised to originate it in BGP or not.

In this lab activity, implement BGP Origin Validation and discard BGP announcements with "Invalid" RPKI status.

The **Routinator** validator is preinstalled and pre-configured, and already running in your network. It connects to the RPKI test repository via RRDP and downloads the ROAs which are pre-created and signed for in all users' networks. Once the RPKI data is downloaded, the validator verifies the signatures on all objects and outputs the valid route origins as a list. Each object in this list contains an IP prefix, a maximum length, and an origin AS number. This object is referred to as **Validated ROA Payload (VRP)**. The collection of VRPs is known as the **validated cache**.

## Step 1: Check valid ROAs on Routinator's GUI

Click "**Validator UI**" in the lab dashboard to see if a valid ROA exists for your resources, which authorises your ASN to originate your prefix in BGP. Use your IPv6 address block (2001:db8:X00::/48) and your assigned ASN (X00). Disable "Validate Prefixes for ASN found in BGP" when you run the search. Click "Validate".


REUTINATOR	Prefix Check Me	trics Repositories	Connections
	Prefix or IP Address 2001:db8:100::/48	Origin ASN (optional AS100	ai)
	Validate hide optio	ons	
	ASN Lookup 🚱		7
	Origin ASN Validation	Source 2	
	Longest Matching Pre	fix Exact Match of	nly
	BGP 2023-09	-08 9:31:17 UTC (44 sec -08 2:06:10 UTC (7 hour -07 13:45:06 UTC - 202	s ago)

#### VALIDATION

Results for 2001:db8:100 :: /48 - AS100	VALID	
At least one VRP Matches the Route Prefix		
Matched VRPs		
Prefix	Max Length	ASN
2001:db8:100::/48	48	AS100

The output shows that the valid ROA for AS100 prefix exists for your allocated IPv6 address block and the assigned ASN.

## Step 2: Connect your validator (Routinator) to router R1



In our lab setup, only one validator is running, but in a real network it is recommended to run at least two validators, because the validation state changes to NOT FOUND for all routes when RPKI-enabled routers lose connection with the validators. This can mean some routes are accepted when they're supposed to be discarded.

Here the polling\_period timer tells the router how long to wait before the next attempt to poll the validator (RPKI cache). In this lab, set the timer to 3,600 seconds, which is the default value recommended by RFC 8210.

## Step 3: Display the connection status to the validator

u0X-R1# show rpki cache-connection Connected to group 1 rpki tcp cache 2001:db8:30:30::ff 3323 pref 1 (connected)

This command displays which validators are connected to the router using the RTR protocol.

#### Step 4: Check the RPKI prefix table on R1

uQV D1# chou noki profix toblo		
u0X-R1# show rpki prefix-table		
RPKI/RTR prefix table		
Prefix	Prefix Length	Origin-AS
10.3.1.0	24 - 24	203
10.4.1.0	24 - 24	204
10.1.1.0	24 - 24	201

• • •				
2001:ff03::		32 -	32	103
2001:ff16::		32 -	32	116
2001:db8:412::		48 -	48	412
2001:db8:440::		48 -	48	440
2001:db8:460::		48 -	48	460
2001:db8:500::		48 -	48	500
2001:db8:540::		48 -	48	540
2001:db8:550::		48 -	48	550
2001:db8:560::				
Number of IPv4 Prefixes:	90			
Number of IPv6 Prefixes:	259			

This command displays the RPKI prefix table which contains the VRPs, the validated prefixes received from the validator.

#### Step 5: Create a BGP hijack

To help you understand how BGP origin validation works, you will now simulate a hijack. Announce IPv6 address block of User(X + 1). Remember that the prefix 2001:db8:X00::/48 is allocated to user X. As more participants do this step, you'll see more and more hijacked prefixes in your BGP table.

```
u0X-R1# conf t
u0X-R1#(config)# ipv6 route 2001:db8:(X+1)00::/48 null0
u0X-R1#(config)# router bgp X00
u0X-R1#(config-router)# address-family ipv6
u0X-R1#(config-router-af)# network 2001:db8:(X+1)00::/48
u0X-R1#(config-router-af)# end
```

#### Step 6: Check the validation result

Check your BGP table and see that all the hijacked prefixes are tagged with "RPKI Invalid" status. A BGP route will be tagged with **RPKI Invalid status** unless it's originated by an ASN which is authorised to do so and is registered in the RPKI system with a a ROA.

In addition to RPKI Invalids, you'll see BGP routes with "Valid" and "Not Found" RPKI status:

```
u0X-R1# show bgp
BGP table version is 21, local router ID is X.1.1.1, vrf id 0
Default local pref 100, local AS X00
...
RPKI validation codes: V valid, I invalid, N Not found
Network Next Hop Metric LocPrf Weight Path
N* 2001:db8:66::/48 fe80::a8c1:abff:fe05:df70
```

		0		0 66 i
N14.				0 00 1
N*>	fe80::a8c1:abff:fe05:d1	-70		
		0		0 66 i
N*	fe80::a8c1:abff:fe63:41	f7		
		/		0.00.00.
				0 20 66 i
V*> 2001:db8:X00::/	48			
	::	0		32768 i
V*>; 2001. db8. V40/				
V*>i2001:db8:X40::/				
	2001:db8: <mark>X</mark> 00::2	0	100	0 X40 i
I*>i2001:db8:X40:1:	:/64			
	2001:db8:X00::2	0	100	0 <b>X</b> 40 i
	2001.008.0002	0	100	0 1 0 1
•••				
V* 2001:db8:(X+1)0	0::/48			
	fe80::a8c1:abff:fee3:c0			
		0		0 (X+1)00 i
<b>V</b> *	fe80::a8c1:abff:fee3:c0	)b3		
		0		0 (X+1)00 i
<b>V</b> *	fe80::a8c1:abff:fe63:42	lf7		
				0 20 (X+1)00 i
<b>I</b> *>	::	0		32768 i
	••			<u>52700 1</u>
••••				

However, as you have not configured a filter to drop RPKI Invalids yet, this route is still taken into consideration for BGP path selection. It may be chosen as the best route and actively used for traffic forwarding. Let's see how to discard Invalid BGP routes.

# Step 7: Discard BGP RPKI Invalids

Update the existing route-map "INBOUND" that has been created in the previous activities. Add a new "deny" line which discards "RPKI Invalid BGP routes" and accept all prefixes that have RPKI "Valid" and "Not Found" states and have passed previous controls.

You should not discard RPKI Not Found BGP routes. RPKI "Not Found" state indicates that there is no ROA for a certain prefix in the RPKI repositories. ROAs do not exist for more than two thirds of all prefixes on the Internet. If you therefore drop BGP announcements with RPKI "Not Found" state, you will lose access to a huge part of the Internet, so you need to accept them.

```
u0X-R1# conf t
u0X-R1(config)# route-map INBOUND deny 50
u0X-R1(config-route-map)# match rpki invalid
u0X-R1(config-route-map)# end
```

Make sure the changes apply to the BGP sessions:

```
u0X-R1# clear bgp 2001:db8:X00:17::7 in
u0X-R1# clear bgp 2001:db8:30:30::8 in
u0X-R1# clear bgp 2001:db8:30:30::9 in
```

## Step 8: Check R1 BGP table again

The BGP routes with RPKI Invalid status (which have been learned from the transit provider and the IXP route servers) do not appear in the BGP table anymore. You only see Valid, Not Found, and Invalid for the prefixes that you're the origin of the hijack or coming from other peers.

```
u0X-R1# show bgp
. . .
RPKI validation codes: V valid, I invalid, N Not found
   Network
                     Next Hop
                                          Metric LocPrf Weight Path
   2001:db8:66::/48 fe80::a8c1:abff:fe05:df70
Ν*
                                                               0 66 i
                                                0
N*>
                      fe80::a8c1:abff:fe05:df70
                                                0
                                                               0 66 i
N*
                      fe80::a8c1:abff:fe63:41f7
                                                               0 20 66 i
V*> 2001:db8:X00::/48
                                                0
                                                          32768 i
                     ::
V*>i2001:db8:X40::/48
                                                     100
                                                               0 X40 i
                     2001:db8:X00::2
                                                0
• • •
V*
    2001:db8:(X+1)00::/48
                     fe80::a8c1:abff:fee3:c0b3
                                                               0 (X+1)00 i
                                                0
V*
                      fe80::a8c1:abff:fee3:c0b3
                                                               0 (X+1)00 i
                                                0
<mark>\/</mark>*
                      fe80::a8c1:abff:fe63:41f7
                                                               0 20 (X+1)00 i
```

Note that, while it is recommended in many places to set higher local-preference to RPKI Valids, and lower local-preference to RPKI Unknowns, there are some concerns with this approach. It is considered harmful to manipulate BGP Path Attributes (for example LOCAL\_PREF or COMMUNITY) based on the RPKI Origin Validation state. Making BGP Path Attributes dependent on RPKI Validation states can introduce needless brittleness in the global routing system.